Exclusive: Defending Taiwan: Now and 50 Years Ago
by WILLIAM R. HAWKINS
October 17, 2008
On October 13th, Defense Minister Liang Guanglie of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) demanded that the United States cancel a $6.5 billion arms sale to Taiwan, saying it created “obstacles” in relations between Beijing and Washington. The United States must “strictly adhere to its commitments on the Taiwan issue, immediately cancel all items regarding arms sales to Taiwan and cease U.S.-Taiwan military relations,” he said in Beijing. According to the official Xinhua News Agency, Liang told this to a sympathetic listener, visiting U.S. Senator Chuck Hagel (R-NE), known for his dovish criticism of Bush Administration policy in Asia as well as the Middle East.
Under the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act, “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.” Contrary to Liang’s claim, there are no U.S. commitments to the PRC that abrogate the 1979 pledge to Taiwan.
The U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency released notifications of the arms sale on October 3rd. The package includes the upgrade of four E-2T “Hawkeye” early warning radar aircraft; 30 AH-64D Block III Apache Longbow attack helicopters; 330 Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missile defense missiles; 32 UGM-84L submarine launched Harpoon Block II anti-ship missiles; a blanket order for follow-on spare parts in support of F-5E/F, F-16A/B, and Indigenous Defense Fighter combat aircraft; and 182 Javelin guided anti-tank missiles. Missing from the notification was a design study for a new class of conventional submarines and 60 Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters. The PAC-3 buy, however, was reduced to four batteries from the original six requested. The U.S. has also stalled on Taiwan’s request for advanced F-16C/D fighters made by newly elected President Ma Ying-jeou.
John Tkacik of the Heritage Foundation says that the reduction in PAC-3 batteries will give Taiwan fewer options against the roughly 1,300 Dong Feng short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan by China. Tkacik lays out a host of concerns about the U.S.-Taiwan defense strategy in a new paper available on the Heritage website [http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm2098.cfm]. His conclusion that “Taiwan is slowly being decoupled from America's network of security alignments in the western Pacific” should be troubling to all who want to see American influence remain strong in Asia. China poses the greatest danger to the United States as a rising peer competitor, with values and interests at odds with those of America in every trouble-spot around the world.
Deterrence is the key to peace, and if peace fails, to the limitation of conflict. An enemy must know that if matters get out of hand, the consequences will be dire, even cataclysmic. This is the lesson from a major U.S.-Chinese confrontation over Taiwan that took place 50 years ago, from August 23rdthrough October 25, 1958. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted a massive artillery bombardment of Quemoy and Matsu, two islands under Taiwan’s control just off the Chinese coast. Beijing also sent patrol boats to blockade the islands, which were garrisoned by 88,000 Republic of China (ROC) troops on Quemoy and 160,000 on Matsu.
The United States immediately declared it would support the ROC. The islands were supplied by ships escorted by the U.S. Navy through the “international waters” of the Taiwan Strait to within three miles of the besieged islands. Some eight aircraft carriers were deployed. Warships from the 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean were sent to reinforce the 7th Fleet in the Pacific.
American combat aircraft helped the ROC establish control of the sky. In addition to the Navy’s carrier air wings, the Air Force and Marines sent fighters to fly from bases on Taiwan. A battalion of Nike Hercules air defense missiles was sent to Taiwan in October. In 1957, the United States had placed Matador missiles on Taiwan capable of attacking land targets up to 600 miles away with either conventional or nuclear warheads. Their deployment was consistent with the 1955 mutual defense treaty between the U.S. and ROC, and with the statements of Secretary of State John Foster Dulles who had threatened “massive retaliation” against Communist aggression anywhere in the world.
ROC pilots flying F-86 Sabre jets armed with the new Sidewinder infra-red homing air-to-air missile (both sold to Taiwan by the U.S.) defeated their more numerous Mig-15 and Mig-17 opponents in a series of air battles. According to U.S. data, between August 23rd and October 6th, there were 25 air battles during which the ROC shot down 32 PLAAF aircraft with the loss of only four of their own fighters. In addition to having better technology, the Taiwanese were better trained, with more flying hours.
As tension mounted between the United States and China, the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff planned nuclear strikes on major Chinese cities, including Shanghai. On September 7th, Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent a public letter to President Dwight Eisenhower supporting the Chinese, charging the U.S. with aggression, and warning that an attack on China would be considered an attack on the Soviet Union. Eisenhower replied that if the Soviets wanted peace, they should council moderation in Beijing. U.S. intelligence analysts noted that the Soviets did not seem to be making war preparations and predicted that they would not become involved as long as the conflict was confined to the Taiwan Strait. A diplomatic track was opened, with the U.S. and China meeting in Warsaw, Poland on September 15th.
Beijing and Washington both took steps to limit the military confrontation and avoid escalation. Chinese and American rules of engagement prohibited their forces from initiating attacks on each other. U.S. policymakers rejected ROC calls for attacks on mainland bases. Beijing refrained from attacking Taiwan itself, though this may have reflected a lack of Chinese capabilities.
Facing superior forces, PRC Defense Minister Peng Dehuai broadcast a message on October 6th declaring a “suspension” of the bombardment for seven days during which the ROC could ship supplies on condition that there was no U.S. escort. During his October 21st-23rd visit to Taipei, Secretary of State Dulles persuaded ROC leader Chiang Kai-shek to make a “no force” declaration against using the islands for raids or an invasion of the mainland. On October 24th, Beijing announced it would only shell the islands on odd-numbered days, after which the bombardment tapered off and the crisis subsided. Quemoy and Matsu have remained part of Taiwan.
The “no force” rule is the third part of President Ma’s current “three no’s” doctrine; the other two being “no unification with the mainland” and “no declaration of independence.” The status quo of de facto Taiwanese freedom favors peace, but must be supported by a credible risk of escalation should the Beijing dictatorship perpetrate military action against the island democracy.
The 2008 Pentagon report on The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China concludes, “China does not yet possess the military capability to accomplish with confidence its political objectives on the island, particularly when confronted with the prospect of U.S. intervention.” Keeping Beijing’s confidence low is the basis for deterrence and continued peace across the Taiwan Strait. One way to accomplish this goal is to supply Taiwan with what it needs to defend itself.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor William R. Hawkins is a consultant specializing in defense and trade issues. E-mail him at HawkinsUSA@aol.com.
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