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October 20, 2008
Jihad and the ‘Reconciliation’ with Islamic Supremacism (Part One of Two)
American military leaders are calling for talks with the Islamic supremacist Taliban in Afghanistan, as part of some type of political "reconciliation" with Islamic supremacists in Afghanistan to promote "peace." Such military calls for "reconciliation" with Islamic supremacists in global theaters of war complement the increasing calls for "engagement" with Islamic supremacists by individuals in the counterterrorism and foreign policy communities. Both groups use terms that sound appealing to an innately peace-loving America. However, such efforts at "reconciliation" and "engagement" are ultimately calls for surrender in the war of ideas against Islamic supremacists – by legitimizing the infiltration and influence of Islamic supremacists in dealing with Jihad.
More dangerously, such calls for "reconciliation" and "engagement" fail to grasp that as Islamic supremacists gain more legitimacy, they will gain more influence and members. By failing to confront the ideology of Islamic supremacism and therefore empowering it, efforts by advocates of "reconciliation" and "engagement" will help Islamic supremacist organizations grow. Jihad is based on Islamic supremacism and views America as a natural obstacle to their goals for a global Islamic caliphate. Therefore, such efforts at "reconciliation" and "engagement" will ultimately help to grow more Jihadists for future attacks on America. Instead of bringing "peace" and defending America, the sponsors of "reconciliation" and "engagement" are going to help the Islamic supremacist enemy grow stronger by proving the Jihadist argument of America's "weakness" in defending its values.
America's military leaders' recent support for "reconciliation" negotiations with the Islamic supremacist Taliban is a wake-up call to all of us as to just how dire our situation is in the war of ideas. The American public must confront its military and political leaders on this issue. We cannot afford a continuing "war on extremism," without a clearly defined enemy in Jihad and an acknowledgement that Jihad is based on the ideology of Islamic supremacism. America's armed forces' sacrifices demand that the American public make this important strategic definition of the enemy a priority to each of us.
To do so, the American public will need to hold those leaders accountable who have focused on a tactical "war on extremism," and demand that they develop a true war strategy that is more than battlefield tactical planning. Such demands for accountability and criticism of these leaders may be unpleasant and unpopular; that does not make it any less necessary. In the words of Robert Spencer, "[t]he counterjihad, the resistance to Islamic supremacism, is much larger than any personality," and so it must also be larger than any of our individual leaders.
1. American Military Leaders Support Surrender in War of Ideas to the Taliban's Ideology
Any time anyone calls for "peace" with Islamic supremacists, they are effectively legitimizing the ideology of Islamic supremacism and surrendering in the war of ideas, where the long term war will be won or lost. We are seeing this happen in Afghanistan in calls for negotiations with the Islamic supremacist Taliban.
Last year, between August and October 2007, America saw the push for foreign and diplomatic organizations in calling for "peace" talks to the Taliban in Afghanistan. In August 2007, we saw then-Pakistan President Musharraf calling for a mainstreaming of the Taliban in Afghanistan as a political organization, arguing that the "Taliban are a part of Afghan society." In September 2007, we saw Afghanistan President offer the Taliban a role in the Afghanistan government, as part of peace talks with the Taliban. Such offers peace talks with the Taliban in September and October 2007 were supported by the U.S. State Department, UK Defense Secretary, and UN Secretary General's Special Envoy in Kabul Tom Koenigs.
But last year, in October 2007, the U.S. military leadership still viewed the Taliban as "the enemy." Now, in October 2008, we have U.S. Defense Secretary Gates, Gen. Petraeus, and U.S. Gen. for NATO McKiernan calling for "reconciliation" and a political solution with the Islamic supremacist Taliban organization in Afghanistan.
On October 6, 2008, AP reported that U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates "endorsed efforts to reach out to members of the Taliban or other militants in Afghanistan who may be considered reconcilable, much like what has happened in Iraq." AP stated that Secretary Gates told reporters that "efforts must be made to determine who is willing to be part of the future of Afghanistan and who is not." He was further quoted as stating, "Part of the solution is reconciliation with people who are willing to work with the Afghan government going forward... That is one of the key long-term solutions in Afghanistan, just as it has been in Iraq." Secretary Gates also told reporters that he welcomed reported efforts by Saudi Arabia to host negotiations between the Afghanistan government and the Islamic supremacist Taliban group. On October 8, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported this discussion as "US Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Monday endorsed efforts to reach out to Taliban or other militants in Afghanistan who may be considered reconcilable." On October 10, 2008, Reuters/AFP reported that "Gates said reconciliation would be the political end to the insurgency and war in Afghanistan but, he said, reconciliation must be on the Afghan government's terms and the Taliban must commit to subject itself to the sovereignty of the government." On October 7, 2008, Dawn reported on Gates' comments as believing "that this target can be achieved if the Taliban renounce violence and sever their ties to Al Qaeda." Defense Secretary Gates was quoted on October 10, 2008 by Reuters/AFP that the U.S. "would not consider any negotiations with Al Qaeda."
Defense Secretary Gates' views demonstrate the flaws in the "regionalization" argument that the ideology behind global Jihad must be examined through a regional filter, treating each instance of Jihadist activity in the world as isolated incidents. Although Secretary Gates is against negotiations with al Qaeda, he supports the idea of "reconciliation" negotiations with the Taliban, based on the conscious denial of their shared ideology of Islamic supremacism and their shared goals in seeking a global Islamic caliphate. This conscious denial creates an artificial world of distinctions between the al Qaeda and the Taliban, where such "regional" Taliban Islamic supremacists could be considered for peace talks. This is the same conscious denial that has Secretary Gates identifying our enemies as "extremists," and defining the enemy as "extremists" in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. Islamic supremacism is an inconvenient truth for some American military leaders that would get in the way of a tactical-centered war. It is so inconvenient that such truths are ignored completely. The concept that Islamic supremacism itself is an inherent violence against the values of equality and liberty is not acknowledged, because acknowledging this would mean America would have to rethink its entire approach to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.
U.S. Gen. David Petraeus will assume command over the U.S. Central Command at the end of October 2008, and will be in charge of all U.S. military operations in the area including Afghanistan and Iraq. On October 8, 2008, AFP reported that "General David Petraeus said Wednesday that attempts are being made to open talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan and that the United States should be prepared to engage with its enemies." AFP reported that Gen. Petraeus "noted that Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai has asked Saudi Arabia to arrange peace talks with the Taliban, and added 'there also have been some local activities.'" Gen. Petraeus stated "If there are people that are willing to reconcile, then I think certainly that that would be a positive step in some of these areas that have actually been spiraling downward throughout the course of this year."
On October 8, 2008, Reuters also quoted U.S. Gen. Petraeus on UK comments in calling for negotiations with the Taliban. The Reuters report states that "[t]he British commander in Afghanistan, Brig. Mark Carleton-Smith, also told the Sunday Times that negotiations with the Taliban could bring needed progress. Asked about those remarks, Petraeus noted that Britain's long experience negotiating with adversaries helped reduce violence in Iraq. 'They've sat down with thugs throughout their history, including us in our early days, I suspect,' he said." Here again is where U.S. military leaders' failure to identify the enemy threat of Islamic supremacism leads to absurd comments as well as absurd tactics. How could a U.S. general describe American Revolutionary War fighters as "thugs," let alone allow for a comparison with Islamic supremacists in either Iraq or Afghanistan? The idea that an American general could even tangentially suggest a comparison between Gen. George Washington and the Taliban's Mullah Omar is a disturbing relativism. This will be our new commander of the U.S. Central Command.
AFP also quoted Gen. Petraeus as stating that "I do think you have to talk to enemies." Notably, the October 8, 2008 AFP report does not mention anyone asking Gen. Petraeus to actually define who exactly America's "enemies" are in Afghanistan or defining the enemy's ideology. We have reached such a consensus of denial on Islamic supremacism that we just won't talk about such issues. America's military leadership will only address "extremism" and al Qaeda as the sole definition of the enemy threat. As previously discussed, Osama Bin Laden is also against "extremism," demonstrating the weak value of this meaningless, but inoffensive, term.
The NATO commander in Afghanistan, U.S. Gen. David McKiernan, stated in August 2008 that in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan the "answer must be found politically." In June 2008, Gen. McKiernan repeated the short-sighted and inaccurate "regionalization" argument about Islamic supremacists that "[t]he Taliban, I look at as a regional threat... Why people fight, here, for the Taliban or for the insurgency I also believe is for a variety of reasons. Poverty, fear, intimidation, some for ideological reasons, some because it's the fighting season and there's a history of violence in this country, some for inter-tribal reasons." Gen. McKiernan views Afghanistan as a "very, very complex security environment," which are code words for "don't hold me accountable for not having a strategy or a defined enemy." Gen. McKiernan goes on to state that "[t]he insurgency here comes from a variety of influences. It's much more than just a religious or ethnic division." So don't expect Gen. McKiernan to have a position on Islamic supremacism any time soon. That would way too simple for such a "very, very complex" issue.
But Gen. McKiernan does not view Afghanistan as too complex to prevent "reconciliation" negotiations with the Islamic supremacist Taliban. On October 2, 2008, AFP reported that Gen. McKiernan "did not rule out reconciliation with ousted Taliban leader Mullah Mohamed Omar." AFP reported that, at a Pentagon press conference, "[a]sked whether dealing with the man who harbored Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was beyond the pale, McKiernan said, 'I think that's a political decision that will ultimately be made by political leadership.'" McKiernan continued to state that "Ultimately, the solution in Afghanistan is going to be a political solution not a military solution.... So the idea that the government of Afghanistan will take on the idea of reconciliation, I think, is (an) approach and we'll be there to provide support within our mandate." Without the ability to actually define an enemy that America is fighting in Afghanistan, Gen. McKiernan told the Pentagon press conference that "We're not going to run out of bad guys there that want to do bad things in Afghanistan." There was no report of anyone challenging Gen. McKiernan for seeking a political "reconciliation" that could include the same Taliban that sheltered the 9/11 attackers who attacked the same Pentagon where the press conference was being held. Moreover, the failure to identify an Islamic supremacist enemy results in military leaders like Gen. McKiernan who are left with repeatedly define the enemy as nothing more than "bad guys." After all, according to Gen. McKiernan, the "security environment" is so "very, very complex."
On October 16, 2008, Reuters published a follow-up interview with Gen. McKiernan stating that "Western pessimism over the conflict in Afghanistan is unwarranted, [per] the U.S. general leading the fight." In the interview, Gen. McKiernan again reiterates that "ultimately the outcome in Afghanistan will not be a military outcome, it will be a political outcome." Gen. McKiernan told Reuters that "to say we are losing or the Taliban are winning is simply not true," and that "I want to stay committed to this battle of perceptions." This is the same Gen. McKiernan who describes the enemy as "bad guys," and seeks political "reconciliation" between the Afghanistan government that could include the Taliban. Regrettably, Gen. McKiernan is more concerned about winning his so-called "battle of perceptions" than winning the war of ideas against Islamic supremacism. Despite his zig-zagging interviews (that we are for negotiations with the Taliban, but we are not losing), in the war of ideas where such U.S. military leaders refuse to acknowledge the Islamic supremacist threat, any suggestion of negotiations with the Islamic supremacist Taliban serves to legitimize and empower Islamic supremacism as an activist ideology. As a result, U.S. military leaders such as Gen. McKiernan are losing the "battle of perceptions" as well as the war of ideas against Islamic supremacism.
On October 9, 2008, the New York Times reported on a "draft report by American intelligence agencies [that] concludes that Afghanistan is in a 'downward spiral' and casts serious doubt on the ability of the Afghan government to stem the rise in the Taliban's influence there, according to American officials familiar with the document." Not surprisingly, the inability to define the enemy is not mentioned as an issue in the New York Times report. The next day, October 10, 2008, Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen told reporters how "it's been very, very tough fighting this year," and how America will make no progress until "the political piece, the diplomatic piece, the economic piece" of our efforts in Afghanistan are improved. This focus on "reconciliation," "political," and "diplomatic" efforts is nothing less than successive U.S. military leaders laying the groundwork for accepting negotiations with the Islamic supremacist Taliban in Afghanistan.
While such American military leaders play appeasement politics with Islamic supremacists, America's on-the-ground armed forces in Afghanistan bravely continue to fight an enemy that is poorly defined by their leadership. As the U.S. 101st Airborne Division's Major Patrick Seiber states: "We are going to go at them, let there be no doubt about that."
2. Afghanistan's Karzai Seeking "Peace" Deal with Taliban – Again
In October 2008, a few months before another Afghanistan winter, Afghanistan President Karzai reportedly started making "peace" offers to the Taliban, inviting Taliban's Mullah Omar to return to Afghanistan from Pakistan for Afghan political discussions with the Taliban. This is the same Taliban leader Mullah Omar that the U.S. Rewards for Justice program still has posted a $10 million reward offer for information on his whereabouts. Mullah Omar's wanted poster where U.S. is "Seeking Information Against International Terrorism" states that: "Mullah Omar's Taliban regime in Afghanistan sheltered Osama bin-Laden and his al-Qai'da network in the years prior to the September 11 attacks. Although Operation Enduring Freedom removed the Taliban regime from power, Mullah Omar remains at large and represents a continuing threat to America and her allies."
A year ago, in September 2007, Afghanistan President Karzai, our so-called "ally," offered to meet with the Taliban's Mullah Omar for peace talks, and offered the Taliban a role in the Afghanistan government. This was supported by the U.S. State Department, UK, and the United Nations. The Taliban rejected his offer then and apparently have rejected his offer now. The Taliban likely view Karzai's calls for accepting the Taliban as a sign that they are winning the war in Afghanistan, and thus far, their strategy has been that they have no need to compromise with Karzai if they are winning. The October 8, 2008 Christian Science Monitor quotes former Taliban official Waheed Muzhda: "The meetings signal that the Afghan government is weak and is desperate for a solution."
Regardless of this, in October 2008, Afghanistan President Karzai has reportedly continued to seek negotiations with the Taliban. In addition to offering "safe passage" for the Taliban's Mullah Omar to Afghanistan for negotiations, Afghanistan President Karzai has also been reportedly working with another so-called "ally" Saudi Arabia to hold talks between representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban. While U.S. Defense Secretary Gates and Gen. Petraeus have confirmed such Saudi actions, some Taliban spokesman have denied such Saudi-hosted talks. AFP has reported that sources stated that while the Afghanistan government desired such talks, they had not taken place yet. On October 6, 2008, CNN reported that a Saudi source told them that planned Saudi-Afghanistan-Taliban talks were to take place in two months.
The CNN report also stated that Taliban Mullah Omar's "representatives were keen to stress the reclusive cleric is no longer allied to al Qaeda." This was echoed by an October 6, 2008 AP report that stated "Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi said Monday that the militant group is independent from al-Qaida." This is, of course, exactly what the "regionalization" tacticians want to believe. On October 7, 2008, Bill Roggio's Long War Journal reported: "[t]he Taliban have not broken ranks with al Qaeda, senior US military and intelligence sources told The Long War Journal. The idea that the Taliban has severed relations is promoted by European countries who wish to back out of Afghanistan after years of bloody fighting, the sources, who wish to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the subject, said." Bill Roggio's report continues to indicate that his sources indicate that the "Taliban" individuals allegedly in negotiations with the Afghanistan government are individuals "who have fallen out of favor with the Taliban high command."
On October 15, 2008, Reuters had a follow-up report interviewing former Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil who claims that the Afghanistan Taliban is seeking to split with al Qaeda, stating that "Al Qaeda will not be allowed to create an obstacle... it is the right of Afghans to negotiate for peace." Reuters indicated that Muttawakil "does not speak directly for the Taliban," and referenced his role with the Taliban in 1996 to 2001. Bill Roggio's October 7, 2008 report, however, specifically points out how Muttawakil is viewed as an "outsider" to the current Taliban leadership. According to Bill Roggio's sources, "Mutawakil, who served as the Taliban's foreign minister in 2001, has long fallen out of favor with the Taliban, according to sources as well as reports in the press. 'He has no authority among the Taliban leaders who matter,' said one senior source."
The Afghanistan government has continued to promote negotiations between Afghanistan and the Taliban. The October 11, 2008 Daily Telegraph reported that Afghanistan President Karzai has again offered the Taliban a role in the Afghan government. The Daily Telegraph report stated that "President Hamid Karzai has offered Taliban leaders the possibility of positions in his government if they agree to a peace deal which could bring fighting to an end"... and that "the Sunday Telegraph has learned that the allies would insist that the Taliban would have to split with al Qaeda and provide information on international terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan as the price of a deal." If true, such an offer fits with the inaccurate view of "regionalization" tacticians who believe that we can readily divide Islamic supremacist groups into factions that will allow negotiation with some groups. Because the "very, very complex" enemy is merely defined as "extremism," acknowledging such Jihadist groups' overall ideology of Islamic supremacism is not being taken into consideration, and idea that some Jihadist are merely "regional" versus "international" simply demonstrates a total refusal to understand Islamic supremacism and Jihad.
Not that Afghanistan President Karzai minds such confusion among Western leaders. In the long-standing tradition of so-called "allies," President Karzai of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan continues to play both sides – just as the other Islamic governments and "allies" of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have done. Afghanistan President Karzai has spent the past summer blaming the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the problem of the Taliban and its "insurgents," calling for the international community to act against the Taliban in Pakistan. Reuters reported in August 2008 that Karzai stated that "the danger against his country and the foreign troops was in Pakistan." There is no doubt as to the culpability of Pakistan here, with former Pakistan Prime Minster Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) readily offering to be a negotiator with the Taliban, who his government supported; Nawaz Sharif also sought to expand Sharia law in Pakistan - a chief goal of the Taliban.
But this dire problem of the Taliban is certainly not one that Afghanistan President Karzai is not only willing to negotiate with, but also willing to offer a role in the Afghanistan government – while America's armed forces are sacrificing their lives in Afghanistan. On October 12, 2008, Roznama Mashriq reported that the Taliban responded to Karzai's offerings of negotiations with a vow to continue suicide bombings against American and NATO troops.
Once again, this highlights the problem in American leadership's failure to define the enemy and its ideological basis in Islamic supremacism. Such failure prevents the creation of any coherent strategy in dealing with Islamic supremacism when working with "allies" that lead Islamic governments themselves.
More dangerously, such calls for "reconciliation" and "engagement" fail to grasp that as Islamic supremacists gain more legitimacy, they will gain more influence and members. By failing to confront the ideology of Islamic supremacism and therefore empowering it, efforts by advocates of "reconciliation" and "engagement" will help Islamic supremacist organizations grow. Jihad is based on Islamic supremacism and views America as a natural obstacle to their goals for a global Islamic caliphate. Therefore, such efforts at "reconciliation" and "engagement" will ultimately help to grow more Jihadists for future attacks on America. Instead of bringing "peace" and defending America, the sponsors of "reconciliation" and "engagement" are going to help the Islamic supremacist enemy grow stronger by proving the Jihadist argument of America's "weakness" in defending its values.
America's military leaders' recent support for "reconciliation" negotiations with the Islamic supremacist Taliban is a wake-up call to all of us as to just how dire our situation is in the war of ideas. The American public must confront its military and political leaders on this issue. We cannot afford a continuing "war on extremism," without a clearly defined enemy in Jihad and an acknowledgement that Jihad is based on the ideology of Islamic supremacism. America's armed forces' sacrifices demand that the American public make this important strategic definition of the enemy a priority to each of us.
To do so, the American public will need to hold those leaders accountable who have focused on a tactical "war on extremism," and demand that they develop a true war strategy that is more than battlefield tactical planning. Such demands for accountability and criticism of these leaders may be unpleasant and unpopular; that does not make it any less necessary. In the words of Robert Spencer, "[t]he counterjihad, the resistance to Islamic supremacism, is much larger than any personality," and so it must also be larger than any of our individual leaders.
1. American Military Leaders Support Surrender in War of Ideas to the Taliban's Ideology
Any time anyone calls for "peace" with Islamic supremacists, they are effectively legitimizing the ideology of Islamic supremacism and surrendering in the war of ideas, where the long term war will be won or lost. We are seeing this happen in Afghanistan in calls for negotiations with the Islamic supremacist Taliban.
Last year, between August and October 2007, America saw the push for foreign and diplomatic organizations in calling for "peace" talks to the Taliban in Afghanistan. In August 2007, we saw then-Pakistan President Musharraf calling for a mainstreaming of the Taliban in Afghanistan as a political organization, arguing that the "Taliban are a part of Afghan society." In September 2007, we saw Afghanistan President offer the Taliban a role in the Afghanistan government, as part of peace talks with the Taliban. Such offers peace talks with the Taliban in September and October 2007 were supported by the U.S. State Department, UK Defense Secretary, and UN Secretary General's Special Envoy in Kabul Tom Koenigs.
But last year, in October 2007, the U.S. military leadership still viewed the Taliban as "the enemy." Now, in October 2008, we have U.S. Defense Secretary Gates, Gen. Petraeus, and U.S. Gen. for NATO McKiernan calling for "reconciliation" and a political solution with the Islamic supremacist Taliban organization in Afghanistan.
On October 6, 2008, AP reported that U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates "endorsed efforts to reach out to members of the Taliban or other militants in Afghanistan who may be considered reconcilable, much like what has happened in Iraq." AP stated that Secretary Gates told reporters that "efforts must be made to determine who is willing to be part of the future of Afghanistan and who is not." He was further quoted as stating, "Part of the solution is reconciliation with people who are willing to work with the Afghan government going forward... That is one of the key long-term solutions in Afghanistan, just as it has been in Iraq." Secretary Gates also told reporters that he welcomed reported efforts by Saudi Arabia to host negotiations between the Afghanistan government and the Islamic supremacist Taliban group. On October 8, 2008, the Pakistan Daily Times reported this discussion as "US Defense Secretary Robert Gates on Monday endorsed efforts to reach out to Taliban or other militants in Afghanistan who may be considered reconcilable." On October 10, 2008, Reuters/AFP reported that "Gates said reconciliation would be the political end to the insurgency and war in Afghanistan but, he said, reconciliation must be on the Afghan government's terms and the Taliban must commit to subject itself to the sovereignty of the government." On October 7, 2008, Dawn reported on Gates' comments as believing "that this target can be achieved if the Taliban renounce violence and sever their ties to Al Qaeda." Defense Secretary Gates was quoted on October 10, 2008 by Reuters/AFP that the U.S. "would not consider any negotiations with Al Qaeda."
Defense Secretary Gates' views demonstrate the flaws in the "regionalization" argument that the ideology behind global Jihad must be examined through a regional filter, treating each instance of Jihadist activity in the world as isolated incidents. Although Secretary Gates is against negotiations with al Qaeda, he supports the idea of "reconciliation" negotiations with the Taliban, based on the conscious denial of their shared ideology of Islamic supremacism and their shared goals in seeking a global Islamic caliphate. This conscious denial creates an artificial world of distinctions between the al Qaeda and the Taliban, where such "regional" Taliban Islamic supremacists could be considered for peace talks. This is the same conscious denial that has Secretary Gates identifying our enemies as "extremists," and defining the enemy as "extremists" in the 2008 National Defense Strategy. Islamic supremacism is an inconvenient truth for some American military leaders that would get in the way of a tactical-centered war. It is so inconvenient that such truths are ignored completely. The concept that Islamic supremacism itself is an inherent violence against the values of equality and liberty is not acknowledged, because acknowledging this would mean America would have to rethink its entire approach to the Afghanistan and Iraq wars.
U.S. Gen. David Petraeus will assume command over the U.S. Central Command at the end of October 2008, and will be in charge of all U.S. military operations in the area including Afghanistan and Iraq. On October 8, 2008, AFP reported that "General David Petraeus said Wednesday that attempts are being made to open talks with the Taliban in Afghanistan and that the United States should be prepared to engage with its enemies." AFP reported that Gen. Petraeus "noted that Afghanistan's President Hamid Karzai has asked Saudi Arabia to arrange peace talks with the Taliban, and added 'there also have been some local activities.'" Gen. Petraeus stated "If there are people that are willing to reconcile, then I think certainly that that would be a positive step in some of these areas that have actually been spiraling downward throughout the course of this year."
On October 8, 2008, Reuters also quoted U.S. Gen. Petraeus on UK comments in calling for negotiations with the Taliban. The Reuters report states that "[t]he British commander in Afghanistan, Brig. Mark Carleton-Smith, also told the Sunday Times that negotiations with the Taliban could bring needed progress. Asked about those remarks, Petraeus noted that Britain's long experience negotiating with adversaries helped reduce violence in Iraq. 'They've sat down with thugs throughout their history, including us in our early days, I suspect,' he said." Here again is where U.S. military leaders' failure to identify the enemy threat of Islamic supremacism leads to absurd comments as well as absurd tactics. How could a U.S. general describe American Revolutionary War fighters as "thugs," let alone allow for a comparison with Islamic supremacists in either Iraq or Afghanistan? The idea that an American general could even tangentially suggest a comparison between Gen. George Washington and the Taliban's Mullah Omar is a disturbing relativism. This will be our new commander of the U.S. Central Command.
AFP also quoted Gen. Petraeus as stating that "I do think you have to talk to enemies." Notably, the October 8, 2008 AFP report does not mention anyone asking Gen. Petraeus to actually define who exactly America's "enemies" are in Afghanistan or defining the enemy's ideology. We have reached such a consensus of denial on Islamic supremacism that we just won't talk about such issues. America's military leadership will only address "extremism" and al Qaeda as the sole definition of the enemy threat. As previously discussed, Osama Bin Laden is also against "extremism," demonstrating the weak value of this meaningless, but inoffensive, term.
The NATO commander in Afghanistan, U.S. Gen. David McKiernan, stated in August 2008 that in fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan the "answer must be found politically." In June 2008, Gen. McKiernan repeated the short-sighted and inaccurate "regionalization" argument about Islamic supremacists that "[t]he Taliban, I look at as a regional threat... Why people fight, here, for the Taliban or for the insurgency I also believe is for a variety of reasons. Poverty, fear, intimidation, some for ideological reasons, some because it's the fighting season and there's a history of violence in this country, some for inter-tribal reasons." Gen. McKiernan views Afghanistan as a "very, very complex security environment," which are code words for "don't hold me accountable for not having a strategy or a defined enemy." Gen. McKiernan goes on to state that "[t]he insurgency here comes from a variety of influences. It's much more than just a religious or ethnic division." So don't expect Gen. McKiernan to have a position on Islamic supremacism any time soon. That would way too simple for such a "very, very complex" issue.
But Gen. McKiernan does not view Afghanistan as too complex to prevent "reconciliation" negotiations with the Islamic supremacist Taliban. On October 2, 2008, AFP reported that Gen. McKiernan "did not rule out reconciliation with ousted Taliban leader Mullah Mohamed Omar." AFP reported that, at a Pentagon press conference, "[a]sked whether dealing with the man who harbored Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden was beyond the pale, McKiernan said, 'I think that's a political decision that will ultimately be made by political leadership.'" McKiernan continued to state that "Ultimately, the solution in Afghanistan is going to be a political solution not a military solution.... So the idea that the government of Afghanistan will take on the idea of reconciliation, I think, is (an) approach and we'll be there to provide support within our mandate." Without the ability to actually define an enemy that America is fighting in Afghanistan, Gen. McKiernan told the Pentagon press conference that "We're not going to run out of bad guys there that want to do bad things in Afghanistan." There was no report of anyone challenging Gen. McKiernan for seeking a political "reconciliation" that could include the same Taliban that sheltered the 9/11 attackers who attacked the same Pentagon where the press conference was being held. Moreover, the failure to identify an Islamic supremacist enemy results in military leaders like Gen. McKiernan who are left with repeatedly define the enemy as nothing more than "bad guys." After all, according to Gen. McKiernan, the "security environment" is so "very, very complex."
On October 16, 2008, Reuters published a follow-up interview with Gen. McKiernan stating that "Western pessimism over the conflict in Afghanistan is unwarranted, [per] the U.S. general leading the fight." In the interview, Gen. McKiernan again reiterates that "ultimately the outcome in Afghanistan will not be a military outcome, it will be a political outcome." Gen. McKiernan told Reuters that "to say we are losing or the Taliban are winning is simply not true," and that "I want to stay committed to this battle of perceptions." This is the same Gen. McKiernan who describes the enemy as "bad guys," and seeks political "reconciliation" between the Afghanistan government that could include the Taliban. Regrettably, Gen. McKiernan is more concerned about winning his so-called "battle of perceptions" than winning the war of ideas against Islamic supremacism. Despite his zig-zagging interviews (that we are for negotiations with the Taliban, but we are not losing), in the war of ideas where such U.S. military leaders refuse to acknowledge the Islamic supremacist threat, any suggestion of negotiations with the Islamic supremacist Taliban serves to legitimize and empower Islamic supremacism as an activist ideology. As a result, U.S. military leaders such as Gen. McKiernan are losing the "battle of perceptions" as well as the war of ideas against Islamic supremacism.
On October 9, 2008, the New York Times reported on a "draft report by American intelligence agencies [that] concludes that Afghanistan is in a 'downward spiral' and casts serious doubt on the ability of the Afghan government to stem the rise in the Taliban's influence there, according to American officials familiar with the document." Not surprisingly, the inability to define the enemy is not mentioned as an issue in the New York Times report. The next day, October 10, 2008, Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael Mullen told reporters how "it's been very, very tough fighting this year," and how America will make no progress until "the political piece, the diplomatic piece, the economic piece" of our efforts in Afghanistan are improved. This focus on "reconciliation," "political," and "diplomatic" efforts is nothing less than successive U.S. military leaders laying the groundwork for accepting negotiations with the Islamic supremacist Taliban in Afghanistan.
While such American military leaders play appeasement politics with Islamic supremacists, America's on-the-ground armed forces in Afghanistan bravely continue to fight an enemy that is poorly defined by their leadership. As the U.S. 101st Airborne Division's Major Patrick Seiber states: "We are going to go at them, let there be no doubt about that."
2. Afghanistan's Karzai Seeking "Peace" Deal with Taliban – Again
In October 2008, a few months before another Afghanistan winter, Afghanistan President Karzai reportedly started making "peace" offers to the Taliban, inviting Taliban's Mullah Omar to return to Afghanistan from Pakistan for Afghan political discussions with the Taliban. This is the same Taliban leader Mullah Omar that the U.S. Rewards for Justice program still has posted a $10 million reward offer for information on his whereabouts. Mullah Omar's wanted poster where U.S. is "Seeking Information Against International Terrorism" states that: "Mullah Omar's Taliban regime in Afghanistan sheltered Osama bin-Laden and his al-Qai'da network in the years prior to the September 11 attacks. Although Operation Enduring Freedom removed the Taliban regime from power, Mullah Omar remains at large and represents a continuing threat to America and her allies."
A year ago, in September 2007, Afghanistan President Karzai, our so-called "ally," offered to meet with the Taliban's Mullah Omar for peace talks, and offered the Taliban a role in the Afghanistan government. This was supported by the U.S. State Department, UK, and the United Nations. The Taliban rejected his offer then and apparently have rejected his offer now. The Taliban likely view Karzai's calls for accepting the Taliban as a sign that they are winning the war in Afghanistan, and thus far, their strategy has been that they have no need to compromise with Karzai if they are winning. The October 8, 2008 Christian Science Monitor quotes former Taliban official Waheed Muzhda: "The meetings signal that the Afghan government is weak and is desperate for a solution."
Regardless of this, in October 2008, Afghanistan President Karzai has reportedly continued to seek negotiations with the Taliban. In addition to offering "safe passage" for the Taliban's Mullah Omar to Afghanistan for negotiations, Afghanistan President Karzai has also been reportedly working with another so-called "ally" Saudi Arabia to hold talks between representatives of the Afghan government and the Taliban. While U.S. Defense Secretary Gates and Gen. Petraeus have confirmed such Saudi actions, some Taliban spokesman have denied such Saudi-hosted talks. AFP has reported that sources stated that while the Afghanistan government desired such talks, they had not taken place yet. On October 6, 2008, CNN reported that a Saudi source told them that planned Saudi-Afghanistan-Taliban talks were to take place in two months.
The CNN report also stated that Taliban Mullah Omar's "representatives were keen to stress the reclusive cleric is no longer allied to al Qaeda." This was echoed by an October 6, 2008 AP report that stated "Taliban spokesman Qari Yousef Ahmadi said Monday that the militant group is independent from al-Qaida." This is, of course, exactly what the "regionalization" tacticians want to believe. On October 7, 2008, Bill Roggio's Long War Journal reported: "[t]he Taliban have not broken ranks with al Qaeda, senior US military and intelligence sources told The Long War Journal. The idea that the Taliban has severed relations is promoted by European countries who wish to back out of Afghanistan after years of bloody fighting, the sources, who wish to remain anonymous due to the sensitivity of the subject, said." Bill Roggio's report continues to indicate that his sources indicate that the "Taliban" individuals allegedly in negotiations with the Afghanistan government are individuals "who have fallen out of favor with the Taliban high command."
On October 15, 2008, Reuters had a follow-up report interviewing former Taliban foreign minister Wakil Ahmed Muttawakil who claims that the Afghanistan Taliban is seeking to split with al Qaeda, stating that "Al Qaeda will not be allowed to create an obstacle... it is the right of Afghans to negotiate for peace." Reuters indicated that Muttawakil "does not speak directly for the Taliban," and referenced his role with the Taliban in 1996 to 2001. Bill Roggio's October 7, 2008 report, however, specifically points out how Muttawakil is viewed as an "outsider" to the current Taliban leadership. According to Bill Roggio's sources, "Mutawakil, who served as the Taliban's foreign minister in 2001, has long fallen out of favor with the Taliban, according to sources as well as reports in the press. 'He has no authority among the Taliban leaders who matter,' said one senior source."
The Afghanistan government has continued to promote negotiations between Afghanistan and the Taliban. The October 11, 2008 Daily Telegraph reported that Afghanistan President Karzai has again offered the Taliban a role in the Afghan government. The Daily Telegraph report stated that "President Hamid Karzai has offered Taliban leaders the possibility of positions in his government if they agree to a peace deal which could bring fighting to an end"... and that "the Sunday Telegraph has learned that the allies would insist that the Taliban would have to split with al Qaeda and provide information on international terrorists in Pakistan and Afghanistan as the price of a deal." If true, such an offer fits with the inaccurate view of "regionalization" tacticians who believe that we can readily divide Islamic supremacist groups into factions that will allow negotiation with some groups. Because the "very, very complex" enemy is merely defined as "extremism," acknowledging such Jihadist groups' overall ideology of Islamic supremacism is not being taken into consideration, and idea that some Jihadist are merely "regional" versus "international" simply demonstrates a total refusal to understand Islamic supremacism and Jihad.
Not that Afghanistan President Karzai minds such confusion among Western leaders. In the long-standing tradition of so-called "allies," President Karzai of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan continues to play both sides – just as the other Islamic governments and "allies" of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have done. Afghanistan President Karzai has spent the past summer blaming the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for the problem of the Taliban and its "insurgents," calling for the international community to act against the Taliban in Pakistan. Reuters reported in August 2008 that Karzai stated that "the danger against his country and the foreign troops was in Pakistan." There is no doubt as to the culpability of Pakistan here, with former Pakistan Prime Minster Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) readily offering to be a negotiator with the Taliban, who his government supported; Nawaz Sharif also sought to expand Sharia law in Pakistan - a chief goal of the Taliban.
But this dire problem of the Taliban is certainly not one that Afghanistan President Karzai is not only willing to negotiate with, but also willing to offer a role in the Afghanistan government – while America's armed forces are sacrificing their lives in Afghanistan. On October 12, 2008, Roznama Mashriq reported that the Taliban responded to Karzai's offerings of negotiations with a vow to continue suicide bombings against American and NATO troops.
Once again, this highlights the problem in American leadership's failure to define the enemy and its ideological basis in Islamic supremacism. Such failure prevents the creation of any coherent strategy in dealing with Islamic supremacism when working with "allies" that lead Islamic governments themselves.
Part Two will cover The European-Left Bandwagon of Surrender to Taliban; "Reconciliation" and the Tribal Argument; and more.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Jeffrey Imm, formerly of the FBI, has his own counterterrorism research web site at UnitedStatesAction.com and is a part of the Anti-Jihad League of America.
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