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November 26, 2008
Colombia: Moving In The Right Direction
Thousands of Colombian demonstrators took to the streets of Caracas, Venezuela, in a huge demonstration against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) guerrillas and their kidnapping of scores of hostages held captive for years in hidden jungle camps.
In a near made-for-TV rescue, in early July, Colombian armed forces freed 15 hostages, including a former presidential candidate and three Americans, being held by a narco-terrorist group known as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia - or "FARC." The raid was near made-for-TV only because the rescue unbelievably took place without firing a single shot.
Indeed, the Colombian military’s operation was so slick - enhanced by acting classes for the participating commandos—that the hostages didn’t even know they were being rescued, instead believing they were being transferred from one FARC jungle camp to another. The rescue marks just one of the positive developments in Colombia in recent years, which rebounded from a near failed-state in the late 1990s to its status as a pro-American bulwark in an increasingly complex—and left leaning—Latin America.
But nothing has been as central to Colombia’s newfound success as the demise of the FARC, which held large swaths of Colombian territory and operated in and around the capital just a decade ago, threatening to topple the federal government.
FARC FADES
Unfortunately, no word is as synonymous with Colombia as FARC. But that word-association is changing, thanks to the FARC’s faltering at the hands of the Colombian armed forces and national police, combined with assistance from the United States. Indeed, the infamous Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) is “Latin America’s oldest, largest, most capable, and best equipped insurgency,” according to the State Department’s most recent annual report on terrorism.
It was established in the early 1960s as a peasant-rights group by the mythical rebel, Pedro Marin—best known by the nom de guerre “Manuel Marulanda.” (For security purposes, most FARC commanders go by aliases.) Inspired by the Cuban Revolution, the FARC later embraced Marxism- Leninism, which remains central to its ideology today. Its main goal is overthrowing the central government in Bogota and ruling the nation of more than 40 million people under a socialist banner.
Operating in the jungles of southern and eastern Colombia, the FARC is currently thought to number about 8,000 fighters, down from an estimated high of 17,000 rebels just a few years ago. It can also rely on an untold number of supporters, including militias.
The terrorist group uses the 1,300- mile long Venezuelan and 400-mile long Ecuadorian border areas as safe havens for staging operations into Colombia, a country twice the size of Texas. Those operations include “bombings, murder, mortar attacks, kidnapping, extortion, and hijacking, as well as guerrilla and conventional military action against Colombian political, military, and economic targets,” reports the State Department.
The recent hostage raid, codenamed Operation “Check” (as in the game of chess), was much more than a crushing blow to the collective ego of the FARC’s Secretariat, the secretive, seven-person leadership circle. Not only was the group duped by faux FARC and humanitarian workers, some wearing Che Guevara t-shirts, but among the hostages were their most valuable bargaining chips: A former Colombian presidential candidate (with ties to France) and three U.S. civilian counter-narcotics contractors. Foreigners, including Americans, are often targeted for abduction for the purposes of gaining ransom for FARC operations and subsistence as well as exercising political leverage over Bogota and other foreign capitals.
The raid also led to the nabbing of two senior FARC guerillas, who boarded the two Russian-built Mi-17 helicopters (painted white to look like a humanitarian operation) with the hostages to ensure their transfer to the other FARC camp. But the humiliating July raid is not the only issue that has made 2008 one of the worst years in the FARC’s 44-year history. Just this spring, the FARC lost three of its top seven commanders, most to Colombian military operations.
In March, the Colombian army crossed the Ecuadorian border to kill Raul Reyes, the FARC’s No.2—the first-ever Secretariat member bagged by Bogota. The raid against the Reyes camp led not only to a big brouhaha with Venezuela and Ecuador (i.e., both states sent troops to the border and broke off diplomatic relations), but also to a treasure trove of explosive intelligence found on rebel laptops and computer drives. The Associated Press recently reported that the names and some photos of nearly 9,400 FARC rebels were found on a memory stick recovered during the raid.
Later, the FARC’s money man, Ivan Rios, was done in by his own bodyguard, who served up the rebel’s severed hand as proof (for identification purposes and a handsome bounty)—and another laptop—to the Colombian military. But perhaps the biggest body blow to the FARC’s leadership did not come through martial means: The FARC’s founder and ideological firebrand, the nearly 80-year-old Marulanda, died of a heart attack in his jungle camp in late March.
In addition to the large leadership losses, the FARC also suffered a rash of defections this year to the government of Colombian president Alvaro Uribe, undermining not only the group’s military might, but its morale. (Uribe has no love for the FARC: They killed his father, and they mortared central Bogota during Uribe’s 2002 inauguration, killing more than a dozen people.) The Colombian government claims that nearly 1,700 FARC have defected this year alone, choosing reintegration into society over revolution. In addition to these internal problems, the FARC has good reason to worry about external support, too.
It has long been suspected the FARC receives financial and security assistance from outside Colombia, but the evidence has been limited and circumstantial; there was no smoking gun—at least until this year. One of the laptops seized this spring contained damning e-mails amongst senior FARC commanders that discussed dealings with the Venezuelan government, including parties close to President Hugo Chavez.
The revelation caused a firestorm of embarrassment for Chavez, who has long been suspected of providing aid and comfort to the FARC. The e-mails indicated Venezuela provided the FARC with a range of support, including safe haven, training and weapons. Discussions even took place over $300 million in Venezuelan aid and the provision of portable surface-to-air missiles for use against Colombian helicopters. Not surprisingly, Chavez denied any association with the FARC, calling for an end to all Latin American rebel movements. While it may be too early to fill-out the FARC’s death certificate, the patient is fortunately on life support. There are reasons for cautious optimism.
Its hopes for a Marxist-Leninist state in this democratic Andean country have clearly been dashed. As a result, the security situation has improved, allowing the Colombian government some breathing room to address other pressing issues, including human rights, paramilitaries, extra-judicial killings, judicial reform and internally displaced persons, who likely number more than 1 million. While hard to fathom, Colombia has recently suffered years that tallied as many as 35,000 murders and 3,500 kidnappings. Last year, murders were dramatically down to nearly 17,000 and kidnappings plummeted to about 300, according to Bogota.
Though more work needs to be done, the lives of Colombians have improved significantly as a result of increased stability. Better security has helped business, cutting unemployment by at least 5 percent in the past five years, now hovering around 11 percent. The Colombian economy grew nearly 7 percent in 2007, and is expected to grow 3 percent to 5 percent in 2008, depending on the course of the global financial crisis. Poverty, still around 50 percent of the population, continues to drop.
The 2008 Index of Economic Freedom, a Heritage Foundation- Wall Street Journal product reports: “Uribe’s next challenge is to reduce the burden of government so that the economy can grow faster. … A pending trade agreement with the U.S., if approved, should encourage economic diversification and stimulate growth.” Indeed, in the view of the State Department, a free trade agreement with Bogota would lead to the creation of nearly 300,000 additional jobs in Colombia and boost U.S. exports by more than $1 billion if passed by the U.S. Congress, which has balked at approving the pact.
While this is promising, Colombia isn’t without other big problems—some of which directly affect the United States.
DEADLY DRUGS
The FARC and assorted drug trafficking organizations make Colombia responsible for 80 percent of the world’s cocaine supply—90 percent of it reaching the U.S. market. The FARC alone earns $200 million to $300 million a year from drug trafficking, says the United Nations. Colombia’s geography and well-developed infrastructure, including “ports on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, multiple international airports, a growing highway system, and extensive rivers for their operations,” makes fighting the traffickers difficult, according to the U.S. government.
Unfortunately, coca production provides a steady stream of income for indigent farmers in Colombia—just one of several possible coca harvests a year keeps a grower in business—even though alternative growing and development programs reportedly benefit nearly 150,000 families. Traffickers ensure that those who oppose their work pay a price. Drug syndicates plant mines and other improvised explosive devices to prevent the manual eradication of crops or raids on jungle processing labs, costing security forces and other innocent people their lives.
Notably, in addition to its own important “Democratic Security Policy,” Bogota has received more than $5 billion in aid from Washington under “Plan Colombia,” a counter-narcotic and counter-insurgency program begun in 2000. In fact, Washington’s effort in Colombia is so large that it comprises the biggest U.S. aid program outside Iraq and Afghanistan, experts say. Plan
Colombia has been widely credited with helping rescue the country from the abyss.
Working cooperatively, Colombia has extradited more than 700 drug traffickers to the United States and, according to the U.S. government: “Cocaine production has fallen by a third, seizures of cocaine bound for the United States have more than doubled, and while estimates differ, coca cultivation has declined since 2002.” But while Plan Colombia is making it tougher for traffickers, problems remain. Now instead of running a gauntlet of Colombian police, military, U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, Navy or Coast Guard, they’re taking off from neighboring Venezuela en route to the United States—as well as Africa and Europe, where cocaine is becoming a growing problem.
Strikingly, data from the White House’s Office of National Drug Control Policy has shown a near 10-fold increase in drug flights leaving Venezuela in 2007 over 2002. Most of the flights head for the Dominican Republic, where the drugs are transshipped. But that’s only part of the predicament posed by Venezuela.
NASTY NEIGHBOR
In addition to its support for the FARC, Venezuela continues to grow as a threat to Colombia and the region. Chavez has already bought $4 billion in Russian arms, including advanced fighter aircraft and 100,000 assault rifles. Colombian paramilitaries train in the Colombian jungle. The paramilitaries are now one of the biggest military problems for Colombia’s guerrilla groups and have been bolstered by U.S. aid for the government’s anti-drug “Plan Colombia.”
Not only are these developments disquieting to the United States but any of these arms—or relationships—could be used to destabilize neighboring Colombia, a goal many see as part of Chavez’s plans to re-establish “Gran Colombia,” a short-lived 19th century Latin American republic.
Chavez also supports leftist political candidates with cold-hard cash and other bennies in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, Bolivia and Nicaragua. He’s throwing money at kindred-spirit candidates in El Salvador, too. This sort of political meddling in Colombia is also very possible.
Fortunately, many Venezuelans are pushing back: They’re fed up with high inflation, crime and corruption, especially considering the country’s oil and gas wealth—which is often sent abroad to prop up the likes of Cuba. So while there has been progress in Colombia, there are still challenges ahead. For the moment, the Bush administration can chalk up Colombia as a distinct, but unsung, foreign policy success as it exits the world stage. As Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice said: “With courage and sacrifice, Colombians have taken their nation from the verge of failure to the brink of peace and prosperity in little more than a decade. The U.S. has been with them every step of the way.”
But the most critical element will be a continued U.S. commitment to Colombia. American economic, trade, political and security support and assistance are vital to Colombia’s future success—and our interests. A victory by America’s ally, Colombia, over the FARC and drug producers would be both a blow against international terrorism and narcotics-trafficking as well as a boost for democracy and regional stability— especially in light of Venezuela’s ambitions.
Colombia survived a near-death experience earlier this decade, and it is now one of America’s closest friends in this hemisphere, providing an important opportunity for developing a long-term regional and global partnership that should not be squandered.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Peter Brookes is a Senior Fellow for National Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation and is a member of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. Feedback: editorialdirector@familysecuritymatters.org.
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