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February 11, 2009
Exclusive: The World at Risk Report – Will It Make a Difference? (Part Two of Three)
Click here for Part One.
SECTION 2
“WORLD AT RISK: VIEW FROM NEW YORK” Conference hosted by the Center for Security Policy, sponsored by the Sloan Foundation.
Participants
World at Risk Commissioner Stephen Rademaker
Fran Townsend, Former Homeland Security Advisor to President George W. Bush
Discussion leader; Frank Gaffney, President of the Center for Security Policy
Charles Duelfer, Iraq Survey Group
Stephen Flynn, Council on Foreign Relations
Michael Sheehan, Former NYPD Deputy Commission for Counter Terrorism
Major General Donna Barbisch (USA Ret), Former Dept. of Defense, Director – Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Program Integration
Moderator: Judith Miller, Manhattan Institute
**********************
What follows is a compilation of insights and commentary from the conference participants. Each expert was given the opportunity to share their insights, underscore issues they agree with or offer constructive criticism about the World at Risk report. Topics of broad agreement or critical importance will be presented.
COMMON THEMES
· The risk is growing as our enemies learn to adapt.
· It will take us working as communities to defeat terrorism.
· Al Qaeda will try again.
o Al Qaeda wants to obtain WMD, especially nuclear weapons
· Biological and nuclear technology are increasing accessible
· The people willing to carry this out are looking to make the biggest statement they can; WMD is the biggest statement of all!
· We need to address not only the weapons and technology but what is animating the movement towards terrorism with WMD
· We must focus more on Pakistan, especially the FATA region
· We must engage the public more
· The greatest threat is Pakistan Islamic Terrorism, and how to talk about it.
· While most Muslims don’t support terrorism, a small percent do; numerically that still is a significant problem
· It is important to engage the Muslim community
o Likely 35 Jihad training camps in the U.S.
· Biological weapons will eventually be obtained by terrorists with increasingly diffuse technology available worldwide.
o It is more difficult to restrict. Hard to stop it.
· The need for strengthening arms control bioweapon convention – it is not universally supported and greater effort and pressure must be brought to get nations involved with biologicals to sign on and adhere to it
· There is no international biological inspection teams like nuclear or chemical. That needs to be changed.
· An important approach to limiting access to biologicals is to stabilize and control the most dangerous pathogens.
o Greater concern and efforts must be expended on securing biological experts.
· The U.S., more than other countries internationally, has a layered approach to securing pathogens.
o One way to increase awareness about and greater security for biologicals might be to convene a summit among biological nations and those interested in the hope of effecting bioweapon security.
· We need to be more aggressive in educating and engaging the public.
o Remember the days of civil defense and resiliency – the drop and roll approach to putting out fires or go under the desk?
o Greater education with the public – not fear but awareness and solutions.
o The problem – after the mistakes of duct tape and plastic sheet we pulled back and didn’t reengage the public. We need to inform the public, especially about bio.
· The issue was raised – are scientists becoming terrorists or terrorists becoming scientists? The culture of scientists supports technology and information flow which is a good thing and a vulnerability.
o Need to instill a culture of security mindset among the life sciences; it appears nuclear workers more than biological workers seem to appreciate the threat their industry poses as potential weapons for terrorists.
· Government has made a significant investment with the countermeasures stockpile here and internationally.
o But on the prevention side we need greater intelligence capability, and collaboration between CIA, scientific communities, law enforcement, public health world wide.
· The Russian biological weapons program is shrouded within their military and is a black box; they have not been forthcoming in sharing information.
o During the Soviet era there were estimates of 50,000 working on their biological weapons.
o Our current intelligence on their capabilities is not what it ought to be. Putin and his team are tending toward less cooperation.
o There is little transparency into their black box and scientific ministry.
o While we don’t think Putin would give these to terrorists, the threat that such a large program could be infiltrated = the nexus of WMD and terrorism.
· Threat assessment and vulnerability assessment are important. “Gaming” scenarios and continuing such assessments will allow greater use of resources and decrease cost/gaps.
o Unfortunately in times of economic crisis, gaming and vulnerability assessments are the first to be cutout of the budget; this is a major mistake.
· Global nature of science – a lot of knowledge spread internationally.
o Knowledge is out there for everyone, especially with the Internet.
· Human intelligence is one of the most important focus areas over the last several years, has been responsible for thwarting threats and needs to receive continued support
· Need to increase our ability to protect materials
· Intelligence allows us to go after people of interest and thwart them
· Patriotic and professional responsibility regimens for bio and chemical.
o If you can’t protect them, then give them up.
o It is your industry and company.
o If it is your business to handle these chemicals then protect them.
o It is not and should not be a $$ thing. It is your duty.
o If you are waiting for the funding, you aren’t taking your responsibility to heart.
· The recent USAir on the Hudson demonstrated the value of preparedness and practice
· It has taken 7 or 8 years and radioactive materials still not well handled.
· If we are going to ask the public for their consent to take a leadership role in preparedness and enhanced security, we need to do a better job communicating with the public
Concerns raised among participants
Some panelists suggested the report would have been better had chemical weapons been given more attention in the report.
Excluding Chemicals:
“The question was raised why we didn’t include chemical and radiological weapons; we only had six months and we made the decision not to emphasize radiological weapons because of the number of casualties anticipated. More would die with nuclear or biological. We agree there is a need to do more to control radiation sources. The threat is real and remains important.
Radiological threats are not unimportant but these materials are increasingly being regulated and thefts are reported, with law enforcement Federal and local following up. Whether cesium or ANFO – these are pretty well monitored. Not that it is a fool proof system. These pose a serious threat but state and local regulatory are involved.”
Some felt that China, Russia and North Korea were not emphasized enough.
“Why not highlight them more? Especially China and Russia – they pose an “awkward problem” because they are permanent members of the UN Security Council; without their cooperation, not much can happen. We need to work with them. Problems are really with North Korea and Iran; and so far China and Russia have not been helping move them back from their nuclear weapons.”
Why we have not been good about civil defense
Virtually every panelist agreed we need to engage, educate and empower the public. While they agree the report underscores that, more specifics are needed. They also offer insights about the disconnect between wanting to engage the public and actually doing it:
“Once the misstep of duct tape and plastic sheets occurred, the government pulled back instead of having an adult conversation and engaging the public. And we need to do it in a non threatening way. We should start with children. Remember the stop, drop and roll that we were taught if someone’s clothes were burning? We taught kids that. Do the same with children what to do in a non-threatening, educational way. We need to include civic society. We need to develop greater resilience, “
At the end of the conference, each member had an opportunity to share a key concern.
Although numerous concepts were shared (see above in bullets), the seven themes common to all were:
1. Continue with growing our human intelligence capability
2. Work on engaging and empowering the public with greater communication and a stronger message
3. Increase efforts to open the “black box” of Russian biological weapons programs
4. Improve efforts to work with and in the FATA region of Pakistan
5. Foster international collaboration to limit WMD threats
6. Inculcate a culture of security in the life sciences
Most of the opinions shared paralleled or reinforced many of the concepts presented in the World at Risk Report, even though some of the participants were not authors of the document.
Part Three will focus on an interview with Frances Townsend, Homeland Security Advisor during the recent Bush administration.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Dr. Robin McFee is a physician and medical toxicologist. An expert in WMD preparedness, she is a consultant to government agencies, corporations and the media. Dr. McFee is a member of the Global Terrorism, Political Instability and International Crime Council of ASIS International. She has authored numerous articles on terrorism, health care and preparedness, and coauthored two books: Toxico-Terrorism by McGraw Hill and The Handbook of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Agents, published by Informa/CRC Press.
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