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February 16, 2009
Exclusive: Force Rules with Iran
As the new Barack Obama administration takes over, we prepare to witness what is self-described as a change in America’s foreign policy. In particular, recognizing the extreme importance of dealing with the nuclear ambitions of Iran, the hope is for a diplomatic strategy that will protect the world from an Islamic Republic bomb.
Yet, no matter what the strategy and regardless of whether that strategy constitutes a change, one principle stubbornly remains paramount: No matter how civilized we wish to claim our world to be, force, nonetheless, ultimately rules. While democracies tend to turn away from using military force between one another, they are able to do so only because of the shared agreement that other means are mutually more preferable. Once that agreement is broken, or should a state not so agree in the first place, force again rules.
The George W. Bush administration is alleged to have not engaged Iran; to have even shied away from the most basic of diplomatic efforts with Iran. Consequently, the notion has been subliminally sold to the public that the current danger we face with Iran could have been averted. The Obama administration now seems to take the posture that it will try to save the day by doing what should have been done years ago. If it works, great. If not, Obama will always deem it Bush’s fault anyway.
Bush, however, did engage. He did so through the EU who, along with the UN, spent an inordinate amount of time struggling to get Iran to comply. Iran’s resistance, however, was never because of a lack of U.S. engagement. Rather, it reflects Iran’s singular realization that whatever leverage it enjoys today will only be exponentially increased once it achieves nuclear status. Consequently, Iran has the sole goal of getting there and avoiding anything that gets in its way.
With Iraq, Bush had years of prior U.N failed efforts and disobeyed resolutions behind him. He had the will of the country, as divided as it was, to mount an offensive. He also had previously stated that he would retaliate against the Taliban and did so very swiftly. Bush frequently stated that he says what he means and means what he says. The Iraq and
Afghanistan operations, rightly or wrongly, were poised to convince other regimes that Bush is wild enough to carry through on a threat of force if he ever was pushed to issue one. Following the U.S. attack upon Iraq, Iran was fearful that Bush would make a right turn and go after Iran’s nuclear sites. That was the time that Iran demonstrated it was willing to cooperate with the U.S. and assisted, to some degree, our military efforts against the Taliban.
The simple problem Bush confronted, however, was the loss within our nation of political will to use any military force whatsoever against Iran. Following the removal of Saddam from leadership, the U.S. public showed it had no stomach for another battle. Bush was quickly attacked at home as the Iraq effort was turned into a long term occupation under anti-Bush State Department and CIA watch. As mistake after mistake was made under State Department supervision, Bush absorbed all of the nation’s frustration and quickly lost all political capital for the use of force elsewhere.
Without the ability to demonstrate to our enemies our willingness to employ force against Iran if circumstances require, Bush was essentially emasculated. No diplomatic effort could possibly succeed under such conditions as Iran would always test our nerve. And nothing would be as severely damaging to our position in the Middle East (where force commands respect) as to be caught bluffing force and then not delivering. Simply put, Bush could not threaten force unless he was prepared to use it and that use was made politically impossible. Without a credible threat, Iran will simply never budge.
Bush avoided direct contact with Iran for one simple reason. He lacked the ability to appropriately respond when negotiations failed to achieve a timely result. Historically, the U.N. has served a valuable function for presidents who did not wish or were unable to utilize force. As long as the U.N. was involved, the president had political cover for inaction. Bush was also able to hide behind the EU in similar fashion. Quite rationally, he avoided that which he would not be allowed to finish.
Put simply, any credible and ultimately effective diplomatic effort with Iran requires that the U.S. carve a clear red line as to under what circumstances it is willing to use force. Without doing so, Iran will continue to duck and dodge, lie and stall, until it is able to demonstrate it already has the bomb. And once that line is drawn and then tested, it must be acted upon.
Even Obama’s guru, Saul Alinsky, stressed this concept in his Rules for Radicals. He stated that your enemy (which to Alinsky was the “establishment”) must be made to know “not only that you have the power to execute the tactic but that you definitely will. You can’t do much bluffing in this game; if you’re ever caught bluffing, forget about ever using threats in the future. On that point you’re dead.”
The dilemma for Bush was that he knew if he advanced the diplomatic effort to the ultimate showdown where Iran called his bluff, the U.S. Congress and public, along with many of our “allies,” would not allow him to follow through. Many believed the U.S. had no legal or moral authority to attack while others insisted a military strategy would never succeed. Bush understood, accordingly, that the resultant humiliation and loss of credibility from an unsupported threat would make matters substantially worse for the country than merely allowing the EU negotiations to stumble along.
The Obama administration faces the same challenge. Obama campaigned on the presupposition that somehow he knows how to execute diplomacy properly. Obama is a master of speech. Vice President Joe Biden believes he is a foreign policy expert, and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has articulated a seemingly sophisticated and expert foreign policy worldview. She has created the impression that she will now utilize the full array of tools – the three D’s of diplomacy and development which are under her auspices (as well as defense which is not) – which will uniquely equip this administration to solve this annoying Iranian problem.
When stripped to their core, however, these foreign policy techniques essentially consist of the three B’s: buying, bullying, or bombing to get what she wants. Whatever leverage a party has is ultimately utilized, whether it consists of giving aid dollars, training and other valuable economic tools, or threatening directly or indirectly the use of force or withholding economic value.
Essentially, the critical “change” that comes with Obama’s foreign policy was really crystallized and installed in the latter years of the Bush administration. The change was the almost pure agreement to eliminate the will to use force from our bag of tools for dealing with our most critical enemies. Force still shows up from time to time in the political rhetoric; but rarely other than to demonstrate how judicious and elevated we are in avoiding its use.
All of the “statecraft,” use of “smart power,” and clever diplomatic techniques, however, will ultimately fail to stop Iran from continuing the path on which it has embarked. No “nuanced” approach; no amount of increased sanctions will force change for a leadership that endured years of the Iraq-Iran War; no recognition that the Iranian public is generally pro-American will cause any change to the anti-American leadership; no hope that unassisted internal unrest will unseat the Iranian leadership prior to acquisition of the bomb; no dream of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad being replaced by a more “moderate” president will result in any substantive regime change or change in regime priorities; no strategy that isolating Syria from Iran will force Iran to its knees, no determination that force would be ineffective and would create unbearable retaliation, and no waiting for Iranian elections to bring about “change” there will prevail. And even if Obama and Clinton (or any of Obama’s other designees) are able to persuade Russia and China, along with a host of other countries, to stiffen U.N. economic sanctions against Iran, Iran is most unlikely to be deterred. This delusional wishful thinking that Iran is anything other than what it has clearly said it is demonstrates the true audacity of hope of the Obama administration.
As the diplomatic elites talk of the necessity of “nuanced diplomacy” in our foreign policy, the Iran puzzle reduces to a simple calculus: Either be willing to use force against Iran and tackle the vast array of possible consequences or accept that the Islamic Republic will have nuclear weapons. If you are unwilling to use force, do not risk U.S. integrity by starting dialogue only to have your bluff called. If you are ultimately willing to use force, then establish a diplomatic strategy around it and do as much as reasonable to avoid its use. In a world, however, where some nations still lift up their swords, other nations are stuck with lifting up theirs regardless of their own sense of morality. Anyone who thinks the consequences of using force should be avoided at all costs has not thought through the consequences of a nuclear Iran. Unfortunately, with the Obama administration, we are likely to live them.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Bill Siegel lives in New York.
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