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March 26, 2009
Exclusive: Cooking the Books: Easter Baskets for the Mullahs
If the Iranian government was worried about U.S. and NATO plans to deploy a ballistic missile defense in Europe to deal with Iranian rockets armed with nuclear weapons, they may soon be able to rest easy. A new strategy is emerging to derail the missile defense deployment plans for Poland and the CzechRepublic. The result may very well be that the Easter Bunny comes early to Tehran.
The first element of the campaign involves proposals to trade away the third missile defense site in Europe in return for promises from the Russians to “lean on Iran” to stop its nuclear weapons program. Without nuclear weapons, it is believed the missiles being deployed by the mullahs are less threatening.
Part of this effort involves what former Defense Secretary Les Aspin described as “cooking the books.” This is linked to a strategy of deploying missile defense systems that “work” and only discarding those that “have not been proven.” Part of that is to jigger estimates of the cost and viability of current plans for a European missile defense system.
The incoming Administration reportedly sent a letter to the Russian President hinting at a quid pro quo – the U.S. would delay or abandon its deployment of a missile defense system in Poland and the CzechRepublic in return for Russian “help with Iran.” This would initiate a “reset” of relations with Moscow. Russia has loudly opposed the central European missile defense system, (but not because it in any way diminishes Russia’s ability to defend itself).
Moscow’s anger at the NATO endorsed deployment stems from its wounded pride. Nations once part of the Warsaw Pact would host the missile defense system. They would be defending NATO – which they have recently joined – against an Iranian ballistic missile threat. The irony was that one could reasonably conclude this growing threat was at least in part the result of Russia’s trade in ballistic missile and nuclear energy technology with Iran itself. As the President of then Czechoslovakia Vaclav Havel said at the time of his country becoming a partner, NATO is the final nail in the coffin of Russian-sought hegemony over the affairs of Eastern Europe. The proposed missile defense strengthens the bond between the “new” and “old” Europe within NATO.
Unfortunately, the Russians have long sought to dismiss the potential missile threats from Iran. They have argued that the United States and NATO were being irresponsible in bringing to Europe’s attention the “supposed” threat posed by Iranian missiles. They said we were undermining the relationship of Iran and Russia as major trading partners, without of course mentioning the two countries seeking to form a cartel of natural gas producers not unlike OPEC, or Russian efforts to intimidate Ukraine and Georgia and engage in a new type of energy Cold War against Europe. (Perhaps a “reset button” could be pushed on these things as well?)
During the previous administration the United States, under the leadership of Secretary Gates, proposed to the Russians an agreement. If concrete, definable elements of an Iranian rocket threat could be demonstrated, then the U.S. and Russia could cooperatively move forward in deploying missile defenses. One of these factors could be “missile tests.” What could be more reasonable? The Russians said “No, that is not useful” according to one senior U.S. negotiator.
But after successive Iranian missile launches, and unable to keep a straight face and claim Iran’s missiles are no threat, the Russians took to claiming we were undermining their “deterrent” with a missile defense based in Europe. Some long time critics of U.S. missile defense echoed these claims. But when the science of missile defense trajectories clearly showed such concerns were pure horse feathers, the Russians then offered vague plans to allow the U.S. to use radars based in Azerbaijan as a substitute.
But this hardly made any sense as the radar in question is not particularly suited for tracking ballistic missiles and does not have any capability to shoot such missiles down. The Russians responded by saying the radars could be used to identify “missile tests” and thus determine whether there was a potential threat, (even though the U.S. can monitor such tests already). Of course, this was precisely opposite of what they had claimed in earlier discussions with the United States.
In short, why agree to monitor missile tests as a basis for determining whether there is an emerging Iranian threat when the Russians specifically rejected such measures as the basis for moving forward on cooperative missile defenses? In fact, according to former senior administration officials, the Russians explicitly said any missile defense cooperation must eliminate any European-based missile defense as well as any use of space-based systems.
Despite this Russian stubbornness, throughout 2003-08, the U.S. proposed to cooperate on technologies such as seekers, sensors and targets. In one case, the Russians said they wanted this to be solely a commercial relationship where the U.S. would purchase old Russian rockets. The U.S. said fine. The Russians then complained the U.S. was restricting the cooperative effort to only a “commercial one” which is exactly what Moscow had insisted on in the first place! And even when the U.S. provided the Russians detailed proposals to build a joint US and Russian defense against Iranian missile threats, even integrated with NATO plans, the Russians would say only that in return the U.S. had to foreswear all European based defenses against Iranian missiles.
In large part, Russia’s condemnation of our missile defense plans is pure theater. It has no basis in fact. Privately, the Russians have told senior U.S. military and civilian leaders that they know the Polish based interceptors pose no threat to Russia’s deterrent. They have even gone so far as to propose that the U.S. base interceptors in England instead, even as they have simultaneously acknowledged to American officials that such deployed rockets would then be able to intercept Russian missiles flying over the North Pole toward America!
As a member of the UN Security Council, it could be argued that Russia has a serious obligation to see to it that Iran abides by the terms of the NPT or Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The current sanctions against Iran implemented by the United Nations lack sufficient effectiveness, but this is due in no small part to the unwillingness of Russia and China to approve such measures. Ensuring Iranian compliance with the NPT is not exactly what Moscow has been doing over the past few years. Its construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant and its transfer and sale of defense technologies to Iran has only served to embolden the Mullahs and give them further top-cover for their terrorist ways.
Thus any campaign to make U.S.-Russian cooperation on missile defense a central plank in relations between Moscow and Washington has a great deal of baggage to overcome, not the least of which is the idea that sufficient alternatives exist to the planed deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic that could be utilized that would not irritate the Russians. Some recent reports have said such a defense is available at a cheaper price, would be more effective, and would not have to be based in its currently planned locations in Poland and the CzechRepublic but elsewhere such as in Germany and Turkey.
At first, such a claim would appear on its face to be reasonable. Why not find an alternative if it is easier to complete in terms of construction and deployment, costs less money and does not cause problems for the Russians? Unfortunately, some of the current alternatives being considered are not what they appear to be – they are not now available and there is no guarantee they would be in the future.
For example, one alternative involves a proposed Navy Aegis standard missile technology. It would fly out at a robust 4.5k/sec. It would be deployed aboard sufficient Navy ships in 2018-2019 if the currently planned development takes place. A land-based deployment using the standard missile could also be made available, probably well within a year of the new missiles initial development or 2016. I absolutely favor the continued development of such alternatives and would deploy it as soon as possible as an adjunct and complement to the planned sites in Poland and the CzechRepublic.
But there are two problems. First, alternatives assume an interceptor with a velocity of 4.5 kilometers per second, when the current standard missile system speed is just slightly greater than 3/k/sec. This makes an enormous difference. A system with the 4.5k/sec capability* could deploy 3 ships on permanent station around Europe and defend against Iranian missile launches for nearly the entire continent, (although not providing any additional coverage of the United States). Let us hope such a deployment can be swiftly undertaken but I doubt the Iranian ballistic missile and nuclear threats are being calibrated to graciously wait for our defense to be deployed prior to their own emergence.
Thus to give up the currently planned system for Poland, when the technology has been tested in a similarly deployed system in California and Alaska, for the hope of a future system not yet developed is fraught with danger. And to use such a future system – untested and not yet available – as a façade behind which a deal to give away the currently planned European site could take place is not good for America’s security.
Second, critics of the European site in Poland and the CzechRepublic claim the mid-course intercept system planned couldn’t work by virtue of the law of physics. They say it cannot distinguish between real warheads and decoys and countermeasures and thus any attacker can use far more decoys, balloons and other countermeasures plus actual warheads than interceptors can be available to defend. One former DOD official in recent Congressional testimony called the planned system already obsolete.
But such claims are apparently driven by something other than concern whether the defensive system would work. The very same type of system – a mid-course defense with Standard Missiles – is being pushed as an alternative! The Standard Missile, now being deployed aboard some 18 Aegis Cruisers, is an excellent missile defense system. But if we are to believe its critics, as a mid-course system it suffers from the same defects that the planned European defense in Poland suffers from – a supposed inability to distinguish decoys from the real warheads. A way around this is to deploy systems in space so to shoot down rockets in “boost phase” or the very early stages of flight, when countermeasures are not deployed, but the current guidance on missile defense is to forgo all such systems!
And so we are left with some stubborn facts. The currently available missile defenses cannot defend against Iranian missiles aimed at the heart of Europe. And it is this threat the Iranians wish to use to frighten NATO capitols from supporting furthering sanctions or other measures against Tehran. And this is the case whether the alternatives are deployed on ships or on U.S. military bases in Germany or Turkey. In addition, as we have noted, a mid-course system, whether a version of the ground-based interceptors now deployed in the US or a sea-based or land-based derivative of the standard missile now deployed aboard our Aegis Navy ships is still a mid-course system – it supposedly cannot deal with decoys and countermeasures. If so, why deploy it?
On the other hand, let us assume it works as did the Congressional Budget Office, (CBO). It looked at the costs and coverage of such missile defenses. It claimed the mid-course system once destined to be deployed in Poland and the CzechRepublic could not affectively cover all of Europe, particularly the southern portions of the Iberian Peninsula, and including Turkey or Greece, two important members of NATO. All true.
But an additional deployment of currently available Aegis ships with standard missile interceptors or the THAAD or Patriot batteries would provide the needed protection for these portions of NATO now threatened by Iranian shorter range ballistic missiles. This would deal with one supposed flaw in the currently planned system for Poland and the CzechRepublic. The cost would be a relatively modest.
But CBO did not look at such a proposal. If they had, they would have concurred that the third site planned for Poland and the CzechRepublic radar was adequate even compared to their hypothetical alternatives with just the relatively simple addition of a new theater defense systems deployed in Turkey located at an existing U.S. military base or additional Aegis cruisers deployed in the Black Sea.
However, even if the ship-based interceptors were fast enough, and were capable of 4.5k/sec, the cost of building and deploying sufficient ships to have a 24/7 presence in the European and NATO Theater might be prohibitive. But CBO decided not to include the costs of an Aegis cruiser, but arbitrarily decided to use Navy Littoral ships which cost some $600 million rather than the $1.2-3 billion each for an Aegis Cruiser. Thus with some sleight of hand, $9 billion in costs evaporated, although to be fair to CBO they noted the total costs of this alternative still exceeded $20 billion, at least double the cost of the baseline deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic.
In short, the currently available Aegis Standard Missile interceptors cannot defend central Europe or the United States from the 2400-3500+ kilometer range of emerging Iranian ballistic missile threats. But critics have kicked around the planned European site, even though it relies primarily on a two-stage version which is 95% compatible with the already deployed ground based interceptors now in California and Alaska. They are 3 for 3 in the last three flight tests. Instead, they have relied on technology which has not been built, not been deployed and not been tested. And it will not be deployed until probably around 2015-18, nearly a decade hence, while the deployments planned for Poland and the Czech Republic could be up and ready to defend NATO by 2013.
It is not as if such assessments have not been done previously. MDA, the Missile Defense Agency, assessed various possible alternatives within the past year. And they assumed the future Standard Missile capability would in fact reach the 4.5k/sec speed. They correctly noted the currently planned Poland and CzechRepublic system including interceptors and the radar would cost $3.5 billion.
The MDA study then assessed the cost of upgrading and modifying 13 ships with interceptor missiles and necessary modifications to cost $14 billion, not including the cost of the ships or the cost of operating and maintaining the fleet. As an alternative they looked at a ship-based system using additional radars which would cost $7.8 billion using 6 Aegis ships.
And finally, they examined the cost of deploying THAAD, the Theater High Air Defense, as a terminal defense of Europe which would consist of nearly 80 batteries costing some $39 billion. Note then how these numbers look: $3.5 billion for the alternative in Poland and the CzechRepublic, followed by alternatives that cost $7.8 billion, $14 billion and $39 billion. Looks like the sites in Poland and the CzechRepublic were the proper choice for an initial deployment.
What about the complaint that MDA is spending too much money and not being sufficiently careful in managing these programs? In one of numerous assessments of the programs under the auspices of the Missile Defense Agency, or MDA, the “watch dog” Congressional advisory group, the Government Accountability Office, once again criticized MDA for what it considered excessive cost-overruns. The facts of the matter were considerably different than the rhetoric used to describe the GAO findings but that is nothing new. GAO is designed to find fault and would do so if examining the Ten Commandments.
What are the facts? MDA’s $30 billion in current contracts over 8-10 years were estimated to be running some $2-3 billion over initial cost estimates, which comes to slightly more than 6% or about one-half of one-percent per year on 16 separate and complex technology contracts for weapons systems, interceptors, sensors, radars and battle-management programs. If only the cost-growth in such programs as Medicaid or welfare were so small!
A much better alternative than what apparently is emerging as potential Administration policy would be to proceed with the planned European missile defense site in Poland and the Czech Republic. We could within NATO fully illustrate its role in dealing with threats from Iran and its inability to interfere with Russia’s deterrence capability. We could definitely complement the deployment with the further addition of Aegis or land based interceptors discussed above. We could publish detailed assessments of how such deployments cannot interfere with Russian rockets even as we also work to inform Russia of the careful boundaries placed on the size of such deployments, apparently a concern of Moscow. After all, Russia itself is currently on its fourth generation missile defense systems now deployed around Moscow, to say nothing of their other missile and air defense systems such as the A-300 and A-400.
As part of a package agreement, we could extend the START verification rules with a Moscow Treaty extension as well, reducing nuclear warheads levels to around the 1700 level contained in SORT or the Moscow Treaty but with flexible counting rules. This could both accommodate Russia’s concerns over strategic stability and the relative US nuclear capability. We should emphasize the need for both countries to maintain a robust nuclear force of launchers in order to further degrade any capability to preempt one another’s nuclear forces.
We should also seek a positive answer from the Russian leadership about joining with the United States and NATO in other joint missile defense endeavors, but certainly within the context of either stopping the emerging Iranian missile and nuclear weapons threats or defending against them. And we should not reduce U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe without serious constraints on, and accounting of, Russian stockpiles of such weapons which apparently number in the tens of thousands.
Previous strategic agreements with Russia have always contained room for a hedge against future dangers. One of those we currently face is Iran – both its nuclear weapons program and its ballistic missiles. The deployments in Poland and the CzechRepublic are very reasonable anticipatory responses to such threats. The cost over the next five years would be $1 out of every $500,000 we spend even if the Federal budget remained flat over that period of time.
While future defense technologies may very well materialize, we should not wait to base the security of all of NATO on one such timely development. We have a system in place which we know has succeeded in the past three tests and upon which new European-based system would be largely based. While both of these options are not perfect, we do have a responsibility to “provide for the common defense” as best we can as soon as we can.
Unlike the Cold War, we are not facing in Iran an adversary that is completely rational. Their leaders have called for the use of nuclear weapons against both Israel and the United States. They have also evidenced no concern about the prospects of numerous nuclear weapons being detonated on Iranian soil. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani has said in the eventuality of a nuclear exchange with Israel, “all the Jews die and our revolution continues!”
Deterrence is tough enough under such circumstances. Even should we put together a comprehensive package of divestment, sanctions, covert operations, and support for Iranian democratic elements, missile defense among other military capabilities, would remain critical to the defense of America, NATO and our friends and allies. It is necessary to reduce the prospects for Iranian blackmail and coercion. It is also important to prevent the incineration of millions should what the former DCI R. James Woolsey calls the genocidal maniacs in Tehran decide to hit the button. In this context, it is decidedly the wrong thing to send Easter Baskets to the Mullahs.
*A 4.5k/sec velocity for the SM would make the job of defending NATO and America considerably easier than current technologies. Although the original baseline for the Standard Missile was to achieve such a capability, the program had to be divided into Block 1 and 1a and the Block 2, between those technologies deemed easier to do and those pushed off into the future. Using solid rocket fuel, which the Navy requires, is difficult at very high velocities and relatively small rockets even though Block 2 would use a stage 1 and stage 2 each 21 inches in diameter. The acceleration and velocity of a rocket depends upon the ability to burn large amounts of fuel in a short period of time in a relatively small environment. Also critical is the weight of the kill vehicle which must be boosted into space as well. A light weight vehicle would certainly help in developing such a technology.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Peter Huessy is a Senior Defense Associate of the National Defense University Association and President of GeoStratic Analysis.
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