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June 6, 2008

Exclusive: Preparing for Larger Threats

William R. Hawkins

Defense Secretary Robert Gates and Navy Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, testified before the Senate Appropriations Committee's defense subcommittee on May 20th. The topic was the Bush Administration's defense spending request for fiscal 2009, which calls for a base budget of $515.4 billion. This is only 3.4% of the U.S. gross domestic product, one of the lowest levels of national commitment to military preparedness since World War II. The sad truth is that despite being "a country at war" since 9/11, the armed forces have not been rebuilt from the drastic cuts made in the 1990s.

Gates told the Senators that the threats to America are real and changing. Old hatreds have combined with new capabilities to pose dangers such as terrorism, "violent Jihadism," and ethnic, tribal and sectarian conflicts. Dangerous weapons, materials and delivery systems proliferate in some states, he noted, while other, failing states provide havens for terrorists to plan and launch attacks against U.S. and allied interests. The United States also must be prepared for dealing with nations "discontented with their role in the international order and rising and resurgent powers whose future paths are uncertain," Gates said. These were diplomatic code words for a rising China and a resurgent Russia. Adm. Mullen added "a growing global competition for scarce natural resources, the constant threat of natural disasters and pandemics, as well as increasing cyber and Space threats" to the list.

Their testimony built on that of Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey before the House Armed Services Committee last September. Gen. Casey said, "National security experts are virtually unanimous in predicting that the next several decades will be ones of persistent conflict- protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors that use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends." This kind of analysis is welcome news. It indicates the continued evolution back to reality from nearly twenty years of optimism about the "post-Cold War" world.

As recently as 2004, the Pentagon's National Military Strategy noted, "Both the NSS [National Security Strategy] and NDS [National Defense Strategy] envision a future environment that is safer and better than today." But the long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have finally transformed thinking. The deepened capacity for violence of secondary powers, and even non-state groups, combined with a heightened spirit of nationalism (drawing on ethnic or religious fervor) has been a reminder that the world is always a dangerous place. And the spread of industry and technology is encouraging a number of major, non-European states to aspire to great power status.

There has been considerable controversy about the supposed dichotomy between "conventional" and "irregular" warfare, usually advanced by those who want to reconfigure U.S. forces from expensive "cold war" heavy weapons to lighter, special operations forces. The prolonged insurgencies in the Middle East have brought "irregular" warfare to the fore. Combating insurgents and terrorists does not, however, require a complete reorientation of U.S. forces, as major combat operations by foreign troops are not the optimal response to internal threats. Intelligence, political, and economic efforts are just as important. The first line of defense is formed by local forces whose capabilities can be improved by American aid short of large-scale intervention.

Three years ago, the Defense Department asked Congress for authority to create a global train-and-equip system for foreign militaries. Gates was right to ask for this program to be increased to $750 million. As he told the Senators, "It allows the State and Defense Departments...to help other countries build and sustain capable security forces. The program focuses on places where we are not at war, but where there are emerging threats and opportunities. It creates the opportunity to reduce stress on U.S. forces by decreasing the likelihood that troops will be used in the future. Combatant Commanders consider this a vital tool in the war on terror beyond Afghanistan and Iraq. It has become a model of interagency cooperation between State and Defense." Marines and special operations units have also been working with local forces around the world under other programs. Plan Columbia, for example, supports that country's fight against narco-terrorists with links to the "rogue" Venezuela regime.

Secretary Gates was wrong, however, when he said in a speech May 13th that "any major weapons program, in order to remain viable, will have to show some utility and relevance to...irregular campaigns." Such one-dimensional thinking, and at the low end of the conflict spectrum, would endanger America's global strategic superiority against the most dangerous threats-rival powers with the resources to expand their international influence.

British troops were the best in the world at fighting "irregular" wars at the close of the 19th century, policing an empire that encompassed a quarter of humanity. But when war broke out in Europe in 1914, London could muster only a handful of divisions to help defend France from the German invasion. The larger British forces mobilized in 1915 suffered terrible casualties due to a lack of training and a shortage of weapons and ammunition. Despite its wealth, Great Britain was unprepared for a decisive struggle against major rivals. America cannot afford to make the same mistake.

The U.S. already has over 45,000 special operations troops, plus several airborne and light infantry divisions. If anything, it is the heavy combat units that need to be reconstituted due to previous downsizing. Iraq has demonstrated that even in counterinsurgency operations, armor and firepower are still critical to victory. New, high-performance aircraft, like the F-22 fighter, are essential to maintain the aerial supremacy that U.S. forces have enjoyed since the end of World War II.

It is America's dominance in conventional and high-end warfighting that keeps enemies at the low end of operations. Terrorism and insurgencies are the tactics of the weak. Sustained irregular warfare on a level that could expand into a successful bid for conquest generally requires outside support for arms, training and diplomatic backing. To deter such outside intervention, strong U.S. conventional and strategic capabilities are needed. Only states have the power to upset regional balances. Failed states and terrorist groups can create a variety of violent problems, but it is successful states, with the resources and confidence to reach for more power, that pose the greater dangers. The U.S. military must be prepared to fight major wars against other nation-states, or their well-armed proxies. Gates was back on track when he testified before the Senate appropriations subcommittee in behalf of a budget that addresses, albeit frugally, the full spectrum of possible conflicts.

Iran is the prime example of a threat that runs across the entire conflict spectrum. Tehran is an oil-rich extremist state that supports terrorist groups and foreign militias that destabilize the Middle East. It is pursuing a nuclear program. Iran is backed by China and Russia, who provide both material and diplomatic support as part of their strategies to become peer competitors of the United States.

Aerial supremacy, command of the sea, a strategic nuclear deterrent, and the ability to deploy heavy ground forces are paramount to maintaining U.S. global leadership. The requirement is for larger, deeper force levels for all services, because such high-caliber units cannot be conjured up out of thin air on short notice. They are the product of years of training and procurement. And behind the fighting units must be a strong, innovative and diverse industrial base to provide the warfighter with the tools needed to win on the battlefield. If the United States fails at the high-end of conflict, it cannot succeed anywhere else.

William Hawkins is Senior Fellow for National Security Studies at the U.S. Business and Industry Council in Washington, DC. Feedback: editorialdirector@familysecuritymatters.org

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