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May 15, 2009
Exclusive: Iran: Plutonium or Uranium? Does it matter? (Part Two of Three)
Click here for Part One.
Iran’s Nuclear Facilities
Iran’s nuclear activities were probably born in the late 1950s when a research center was created at Tehran University. Ironically the U.S. and Europe, in addition to Russia, China India and Pakistan, gave their support. To date, there are numerous nuclear activities across the country in addition to the still operating facilities at TU.
Bushehr Reactor
Through a “billion dollar deal” with Moscow to finish construction of this light water reactor that was originally started by a German company. It is designed to produce 1000 MW; Russia plans on providing the fuel. Although behind schedule, this reactor will become a reality.
Arak Heavy Water
Arak is a heavy water separation plant with proposed 40 megawatt reactor.
The heavy water facility was disclosed in 2002. Initially Iran stated it would use it to produce heavy water for export; not surprisingly, the story changed and it is now intended for use as coolant and moderator for the Arak reactor being built.
In 2004 the IAEA called on Iran to freeze construction of the heavy water reactor. Do you think that has happened?
Of note, heavy water programs are an expensive proposition. It does not make senses for Iran to have this type of facility when Bushehr and light water reactors are more cost efficient and less likely to result in weapons grade isotopes.
Arak Reactor
Heavy water reactors can convert uranium to high grade plutonium through a variety of physics we won’t discuss here, unless you suffer from insomnia. When completed, it is likely to produce sufficient amounts of plutonium for plutonium nuclear weapons; estimates suggest this reactor could produce 8 – 10 kg of plutonium annually. Though originally scheduled for 2014, it is likely to be operational much sooner.
The enriched uranium can also be further processed to produce uranium nuclear weapons.
As posited before, early members of the nuclear club embarked upon their weapons program through development of heavy water reactors; India (Cirrus), Pakistan (Khushab) and Israel (Dimona). One need not obtain enriched uranium; natural uranium can fuel these types of reactors. Once the fuel rods are irradiated in such reactors, obtaining quantities of weapons grade plutonium is possible. North Korea’s 5 MW Yongbyon, purported to be a source of their weapons grade plutonium is of similar design, but using graphite as moderator. Looking for political cover (if not plausible deniability) when questioned about the true value of a heavy water reactor, Tehran pointed to early meetings to learn from Canada’s nuclear (commercial) program which is based upon this technology. Canada denies such meetings.
Given the Arak reactor will only produce 40 megawatts of power (compared to the 1,000 megawatts expected from Bushehr), and Iran needs a steady dose of 7000 megawatts to meet its power needs, tell me again why they are building this very expensive reactor that requires a fair amount of heavy water (expensive) for peaceful applications? Especially when intelligence analysis and other reports fail to identify the necessary construction features inherent in a medical or peaceful reactor. The deceit that it is for medical applications doesn’t make sense either given the architecture of the reactor facility and the much less expensive alternatives Iran could pursue.
Not surprisingly, whenever senior Iranian leaders are asked about the likelihood Arak can be a plutonium source, they categorically deny their intention to build nuclear weapons.
So, is Iran just a peaceful and misunderstood country trying to become energy independent as its leader Ahmadinejad asserts, or precisely what most preparedness experts consider – the bully you don’t want to have the biggest stick?
Parchin Military Complex
Although the publicly stated function is in research, development and production of conventional weapons such as rockets and high explosives, there is a facility on site that has attracted IAEA concern. They have asked for permission to inspect the area; Iran has refused. You decide.
If you have a willing suspension of disbelief and abandon common sense, then the fact that Iran needs nuclear power as one of the worlds more significant energy suppliers to free up extra inventory to sell, and thus raise funds to compensate for the sanctions levied against it, makes sense. Except that the sanctions are far more symbolic than effective. And Iran is doing quite nicely in its partnerships with Russia, Venezuela and its energy deals in the region with other producers, pipeline nations or customers. Were that not the case, how on earth is Iran paying for the wide array of weapons and nuclear technology from Russia? Or purchasing other essential technologies from N. Korea or China?
But a more telling reason to suspect the “peaceful” aims of the Iranian nuclear programs rests upon the question: why do these facilities need protecting? When has Israel or the United States ever considered bombing a commercial reactor? It is only when facilities are capable of producing weapons grade materials, and in countries unabashedly aggressive even outright hostile to our allies that the spectre of the Israeli Air Force (IAF) destroying the Osirak reactor in Iraq or the reactor in Syria resurfaces in our consciousness. So, if the Iranian nuclear program is purely for medical and commercial purposes, why the need for the Russian S 300 PMU 1 missile defense system – one of the most advanced and effective of its kind? In fact this system is so advanced; experts agree it could counter the threat of attack from the IAF.
Although it is probably true that Iran has to ration electricity, putting out the lights an hour or so to conserve power, the reality is – Iran is a leading energy nation. And it is further blessed by the friendship of the world’s leading energy nation – Russia.
A Primer on Nuclear/Radiological Threats
Beyond the obvious that there are too many members of the nuclear club is the reality that many of the nuclear materials around the world are out of U.S. control, often beyond the prying eyes of IAEA and possessed by folks who clearly have their own geopolitical agenda. Consider the Russian facility at Obninsk; it is sitting on a large supply of HEU. How we define threat is important – the angels are always in the details. In broad strokes, anyone possessing HEU is a threat. When a rogue nation (North Korea) owns the stuff or a country that has significant internal problems (Pakistan) is part of the club, the risk of diversion as well as outright deployment must be considered.
Our own teams – including the National Nuclear Security Administration – seem to have suffered from mission creep or outright mission modification, selecting to redraw their marching orders and in the process underemphasizing projects that, quite frankly, are troublesome to the West. Like trying to pry open Russia’s black box. Money, manpower and mission mind-set – we need to decide as a country: are we “all in” and fight the fights that need fighting, or defaulting to fighting the fights we think we can win?
Regardless of the big picture – that there is a lot of nuclear material unaccounted for or lightly protected – it is important to recognize there are several ways radioactive materials can harm. It is always nice to have a menu of poison options if you are a malefactor. Choice is always a good thing! One doesn’t have to make a thermonuclear device á la Hiroshima to create a radiological mess and kill people. “Dirty Bombs” can ruin your whole day, too. Less deaths, no nuclear winter, but problematic to be sure.
Nuclear Terrorism: Radiation Threat Vulnerabilities – A brief overview
Nuclear terrorism is defined as theuse of radioactive material in various forms to produce maximum disruption, destruction, panic, injury and fear in the general population.
There are several forms of threat that could result in a radiological event.
Five categories of terrorist threat can be considered:
1. Simple Dispersal Device (SDD)
2. Radiological dispersal device (RDD)
3. Nuclear reactor sabotage
4. Improvised nuclear device (IND)
5. Nuclear weapon.
The most plausible threat would be an SDD or RDD, because hundreds of thousands of radioactive sources are available in industry and medicine around the world. DHS has yet to implement a truly cost effective program to secure easy access radioactive materials in the U.S. Chechnyans and others have already deployed these. Fortunately most were discovered and dismantled or disarmed.
1. Simple Dispersal Device, AKA Simple Radiological Devices, Radiation Exposure Device
The use of an SDD is the deliberate act of placing a high-energy source or spreading radioactive material in a highly populated area, such as an airport, train station, port or sports venue, to expose people to various levels of radiation. SDRs/SDDs or REDs have been deployed and remain a threat that can be utilized by terrorists. Primarily a psychological weapon, this form of radiation threat is more suited to cause panic than widespread injury. The mere mention of radiation causes concern and can create public angst, overwhelming health care facilities, the 911 system and law enforcement with worried well, in addition to actual victims. Consider the 2006 murder of Alexander Litvinenko in London by polonium-210. Po210 in this case was an assassination weapon not an SDD in the classical sense. And while widespread panic did not occur, the British National Health Service was deluged with calls and visits by people who feared they were exposed. Although this was a selective target of one person, when over 1,000 others are concerned, imagine the impact had the entire community or a section of London been targeted. The toxicity of such a device should not be taken lightly, especially given the radioactive materials suitable for such a weapon are ubiquitous and widely available sources are found in radiation oncology, industrial radiography and any number of other applications in medicine.
Of note, the FBI and others consider cesium (Cs 137) as one of the most likely radioactive materials to be used in an SRD/SDD or RDD. It is widely available and utilized industrially. Other radionuclides include americium, which can be found in smoke detectors, and iridium.
Especially problematic is the stealth with which an SDD could be deployed. If not announced as a weapon, no one would know about the device until patients presented with a variety of symptoms. Unless the clinician considered radiation – and this is unlikely in the early stages of illness based upon the level of radiation knowledge and preparedness among healthcare workers – and the results of the Litvinenko case where he was initially misdiagnosed, appropriate management would be delayed.
Not to put too fine a point on this – and this was not an intentional act of terrorism – the events of 1987 in Goiania, Brazil demonstrate the impact upon a community that “innocently” spread radioactive materials and underscore our vulnerabilities. Two thieves stole a hospital therapy device and sold it for scrap metal. Unbeknownst to them, it contained Cs 137. The source was broken up and shared among various individuals. At the time, these persons were not aware they had a radioactive source, and the incident was not detected for 15 days. Children and others started handling the caesium and subsequently started to develop a variety of symptoms. The medical response and cleanup phase took several months to complete. In this situation there was both exposure and contamination. When the government became involved, it developed into a significant public-health concern. The regional authorities required outside logistical support. Consider that up to 112,800 persons were surveyed for contamination. Of note, numerous Cs 137 sources have been stolen or are missing over the last few years.
2. Radiological Dispersal Devices
In an RDD, explosives are attached to a radioactive isotope and detonated; the “Dirty Bomb.” This can result in large areas of local environmental contamination, as well as patients being contaminated. RDD, and of course injured in the explosion. Although RDDs don’t offer the risk of devastation associated with thermonuclear devices, they can nevertheless spread radioactive materials. RDDs use conventional explosives then spread radioactive materials. RDDs as terror weapons would be highly effective; the explosion causing serious physical injuries from blasts, shrapnel/flying debris and thermal injuries in addition to the threat of radiation toxicity. Moreover the psychological impact of “radiation” in addition to the terror associated with a bombing would be highly effective. Again, Cs137 has been identified as a potential radiation source for such a ‘dirty’ bomb or RDD.
3. Nuclear Reactor Sabotage
In the Western world, the probability of a terrorist attack on a nuclear reactor is low, but recent events highlight the possibility. The low probability is due to the high security surrounding a nuclear reactor and the safety systems incorporated into it. There is extensive shielding around a reactor; therefore, very significant amounts of explosive would be required to breach the reactor core. Terrorist events could include use of very large amounts of explosives, but it would be extremely difficult for terrorists to breach the security cordon. It is possible that a jumbo jet could crash into a reactor or a nuclear pond of used reactor cores; given the events of 9/11, this is not as farfetched an exigency as previously considered. Israel has taken the threat to their reactors seriously. While historically published results of computer and engineering studies suggest that the construction of most reactors would sustain a direct hit from a commercial aircraft flying into a reactor at less than 300 mph, it is important to recognize modern airliners can fly upwards of 550 mph. Recall the energy of destruction, momentum = mass x velocity. Even conceding security at 300 mph, at near twice that, with the same aircraft mass, a breach is more likely.
The most common type of incident of concern involving a nuclear reaction would be the disruption of the cooling system for the reactor core of nuclear fuel. Loss-of-coolant accident (LOCA) can result in failure to cool a reactor core, allowing it to reach temperatures at which the nuclear fuel and associated assembly melts (hence the term meltdown). The cause may be a pipe break, valve failure or pump failure that interrupts cooling. Reactors generally are now designed to avoid an LOCA by automatic insertion of control rods to shut down the reactor before criticality occurs and sets the stage for a “meltdown.” LOCAs may result in the release of radioisotopes.
The Chernobyl reactor incident resulted because several safety systems were bypassed, while a set of experiments with the reactor were performed. There were two explosions, with fires and meltdown of the reactor core, leading to serious widespread contamination of the environment.
The early phase of the accident had the following results: 237 people were hospitalized, 134 had acute radiation syndrome, 28 died within the first three months, 2 were killed in the initial explosion and last but not least, 250,000 were permanently evacuated from the area.
4. Improvised Nuclear Device
An IND, if successful, could produce a nuclear yield similar to that of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with release of radiation, blast and thermal pulses, together with significant radioactive fallout. By today’s standards, Fat Man and Little Boy were IND. In reality, a terrorist organization might be able to produce a partial yield, producing less effect. The conventional explosive would detonate and blow the device apart; resulting in environmental contamination with weapons material, such as plutonium or uranium (Does the word IRAN come to mind?).
Heretofore, construction of such a device has been considered highly difficult because of the sophisticated engineering and expertise required. More recent studies conducted by Harvard University and other projects assessing the threat of nuclear terrorism have come to the conclusion that a capable, well funded and organized group could make, deliver and detonate at least a crude nuclear bomb capable of incinerating the centre of any major city in the world, if the necessary fissile materials were obtained. For a crude 10 kilotonne weapon (kt) (two thirds that of the Hiroshima bomb) detonated at Grand Central Station – a major transportation hub located in Manhattan, New York City – it is estimated over tens of thousands would be killed immediately and many thousand more would be injured. Depending upon wind direction, Manhattan would have to be evacuated – the mass exodus creating more injuries. Much of the island would be destroyed. Environmental impact and direct costs would exceed $1 trillion. The psychological impact would be incalculable.
5. Nuclear Weapons
Think mushroom cloud. Today’s nuclear weapons are far more sophisticated than the kilotonne bombs detonated over Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with destructive power in the megatonne category now possible. Recognize that a nuclear weapon, as with all explosions, creates enormous blast forces, which are the primary destructive force, along with thermal energy and radiation energy. Medical management of such a scenario would require extensive radiological and medical triage of patients to ensure appropriate and efficient utilization of public health and emergency medical resources, which would be overwhelmed immediately. While the probability of stealing a sophisticated nuclear weapon in the Western world is considered by many to still be a remote exigency because of high security, others are less optimistic.
However, there are two situations warranting concern. First, among the nuclear nations, at least two are politically and/or militarily unstable and pose a security risk in the region, and perhaps globally if their governments fail to control their weapons – North Korea and Pakistan. Second, and widely supported as worrisome, both Vladimir Putin and members of the Russian general staff, as well as security officers who have defected to the West, have stated publicly that several (estimates range from a handful to 50) suitcase nuclear weapons with a one kilotonne rating are unaccounted for in the former Soviet Union. These weapons are potential ‘suitcase bombs’, and represent an increasing threat, especially on the black market. One can argue Putin uses that threat to extort concessions or keep the West ‘honest.’ But few dispute their existence. The consequences within the first minute of detonation of a one kilotonne nuclear weapon are as follows:
· Blast range would reach 400–500 yd
· Thermal radiation would reach approximately the same distance as the blast
· Nuclear radiation, that is, gamma particles and neutrons, would reach half a mile
· Radioactive fallout could produce high exposure rates up to half a mile.
Such is the power of the genie that has long been out of the bottle!
The Russia-Israel – US Factor
Russia wins no matter what! Now that’s playing chess.
Putin is a master. To that there can be no dispute. If he plays this right with Tehran and Washington, he, again, becomes the big winner. If Israel attacks Netanz or Arak, Russia can massage feelings in the Middle East, and emerge as the voice of reason that pushed for diplomacy and sanctions. And if they didn’t sell Iran the S300, Russia can argue the U.S. Zionist coalition only used diplomacy to prevent Tehran from protecting itself and come out on the moral high ground – the winner. Then, of course, who will Iran go to rebuild their nuclear program? You guessed it. Slick, eh? And if by some miracle Moscow can get Iran to abandon its dual value technology and downplay the apparent quest for “the bomb” either because everyone bribed them up the yin yang (not likely to work – our currency is funny money and they have sellable energy resources for “hard currency”) or starts towing the NPT/IAEA line – even if it is for show, Russia will hold more IOU’s with the U.S. Point, match Putin and Putin Lite (Medvedev).
What do the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs have in common? Russia.
Consider the possibility that Russia has put the brakes on selling Iran the advanced S300 PMU 1 missile defense system, forcing at least for the moment Tehran to make overtures to Beijing. China – the great replicator – has a missile defense system – the Hong Qi 9 that, while integrating some of the characteristics of the Russian S300 and US Patriot missile surface-to-air systems, does not have the performance capabilities the S300 would confer. So what? It is still a decent system; perhaps not as vaunted or capable of protecting against the IAF that the Russian system is, but it has value for Tehran….on three levels. First, buying a Chinese system gives political cover to Russia (at least while the world is paying attention – Moscow can ultimately redo the S300 sale to Iran), making Putin and Medvedev look like they want to play nice with others and have put their weapons sales behind the needs of the world. Second, the Chinese system enhances their various defensive positions around the nuclear facilities…and there are several in Iran. Third, and in this looking glass world of competing demands and changing alliances, Tehran earns a PR IOU from Russia. Medvedev can look POTUS 44 in the eye and assert they were the honest brokers, trying to hit the reset button with the U.S. And bonus points for Russian Israeli relations; Tel Aviv has been lobbying Moscow hard not to sell the S300 to Iran. Then, in typical Putin fashion, eventually a few S300’s will make their way to Iran. But everyone gets to save face and Obama gets to claim victory in the diplomacy wars. Someone please tell President Obama he has Russia right where they want us!
Obama is betting his diplomacy street credibility on two notions: first, that he can find common ground in the brotherhood of man and nations with Tehran and in response to this new bonhomie, Ahmadinejad will sign off on the Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and pull back on his rapidly expanding nuclear programs. A grand slam for Obama would be Iran’s assist with Afghanistan and Pakistan. Why would Iran do this when the mere threat of having a nuclear weapon is what has brought the U.S. to his table? Precisely! We’re at the table and no one has yet photographed the smoking mushroom cloud! Second, that by throwing our allies under the bus, we can make Russia and Iran feel safer, and thus less likely to be aggressive. So far, POTUS 44 has demonstrated a willingness to bargain away Europe by withholding sales of a missile defense system, and Israel by curbing support for the Arrow 3 ultra advanced missile defense system that is essential to their survival. Washington is already pulling back from Israel; the new conventional wisdom suggests Iran only started going after nukes because Israel has them. Egypt and others echoed that sentiment; for the sake of peace in the region, Israel cannot be the sole nuclear power. So Washington has decided appeasing the hostiles, and dialing down support for Tel Aviv, it will earn it points with the radicals.
In case you are baffled by this logic, consider: First, Israel has never threatened to use its nuclear weapons offensively. Second, Israel – their outstanding military notwithstanding – is so vastly outnumbered by the collective strength of its potential adversaries, that to suggest this tiny state poses a threat to Iran is laughable. Nuclear weapons have been the ultimate deterrent for Israel…so far. But once Iran produces enough nuclear materials for several weapons, or expands its supply of highly toxic radioactive materials, the balance of power that Israel currently enjoys will be altered, tenuous though it is. Iran has never made a secret its antipathy towards the State of Israel.
Third, while no one has ever suggested that such weapons would be likely stolen or diverted or their security imperiled because of an unstable regimen at the Knesset, such concerns are significant and often raised in terms of Pakistan, and Iran. If Iran cannot be trusted to hold off selling advanced weapons to rearm Hamas and Hezbollah, even the threat of nuclear diversion, once this nation gets a weapon, will be a game changer. He who has a nuke and is willing to use it to defend the homeland is a formidable ally or foe. “Rumor” has it Israel sent its own version of a Sicilian message to Saddam when he considered loading his SCUDS with chemicals and then lobbing them into Israel. They ended up with explosive payloads instead. The “plutonium shield” in action?
Wildcard - Israel
Israel is the sword the U.S. is afraid to embrace, let alone use. Israel is the wild card for the good guys and is playing the dangerous game of misdirection, too. Iran must and does take the IAF threat seriously. It is what keeps this adversary off balance. As you can see everyone is posturing, jockeying for position, playing both sides against the middle. Iran knows if they climb too fast, too far, Israel will attack. But in a cunning way, they may also be counting on it. Iran becomes enormously influential as an Israeli victim. And with the dispersal of Iran’s nuclear capabilities, complete destruction of assets by the IAF is unlikely. This is why Iran continues to pursue stealth development of its nuclear program. Iran can win whether it gets attacked or not.
Israel and many in the preparedness community know the window of opportunity is fleeting. An attack is almost meaningless once Iran builds the weapons. But in the pre-bomb making interval, where all the components have yet to be assembled, and/or time when they have yet to produce critical mass quantities of HEU or plutonium 239 is the last window to disrupt Iran. This may be moot. Iran’s increasingly hardened facilities that may resist our most advanced “bunker buster” ordinance along with their improved air defenses, coupled with a progressively cooling relationship between Tel Aviv and Washington work well in Tehran’s favor.
But the mere fact Israel Air Force has successfully attacked and blown up facilities in two burgeoning nuclear wannabes – Iraq and Syria – should give pause to the Tel Aviv wild card. That may a bargaining chip in and of itself. Playing it can be more dangerous than not. As discussed earlier, it could unleash a firestorm of hatred and violence. Worse, it could use up any good will, sub rosa or not, that Israel is developing with Jordan, Egypt and Turkey. And therein rests a potential play card – common ground among the moderates. Hezbollah poses a risk to their sovereignty as it does to Israel. Tel Aviv can aid the moderates and in the process earn some back door friendships.
Israel must provide a safe and logical rationale for nations to team up with them; this can be achieved by utilizing its significant intellectual capital. There are Muslim nations – neighbors that could benefit from the advances, technological, military and medical – that Israel is developing. In the book Emerging Markets Century, with the exception of Turkey and Israel, there are no corporations in the Middle East (or in Muslim nations) that meet the author’s criteria of emerging global leader. Even amid the rockets, Hamas-cide bombings, and being bordered by Gaza, Lebanon/Syria (Hamas, Hezbollah), Israeli companies manage to make significant technological advances. Not using the IAF strike option may provide Israel with leverage, if they know how to capitalize on it.
Unfortunately Israel has always been long on intelligence (Mosad), military prowess, security and hostage rescue, but short on public relations.
Fortunately they, too, are not beyond a bit of brinksmanship, Israel is calling up IAF reservists who operate the Arrow and Patriot systems to spend one day a week to practice, in anticipation of a conflict with Iran. The IDF has scheduled one of its largest military exercises for June 2nd. Perception is power. If you are going to bluff, sell it!
Russia and Israel are also developing closer ties, as evidenced by greater interaction between the respective governments. Defense Minister Ehud Barak asked Russian Foreign Minister Alexander Saltanov to prevent his country from selling the S300 and advanced anti-aircraft missiles to Iran; it is important for our more moderate allies to recognize their respective air forces cannot counter this system either. So while Russia and Israel are entering into early arms deals, including the purchase of Israeli unmanned drones, the fact remains Russia’s closest relationships in the Middle East are with Iran (number 1) and Syria.
Israel is smart to work with Russia; at some point the U.S. has to wake up and stop taking Israel for granted. Now no one expects Tel Aviv to drop the Stars and Stripes for the horizontal red, white and blue, but sometimes a new suitor reminds the old one to buy jewelry and send flowers.
An IAF attack of Arak, or Netanz – would that unsettle Obama Diplomacy? Can Israel leverage that threat towards getting increased U.S. aid, assistance with the Arrow 3, and a guarantee to receive most of the F35 Fighters they preordered? Is that enough to sacrifice an option that has worked in the past? Who has the most to lose with a nuclear Iran? Even if the air strikes were successful – with Russia, North Korea, Pakistan and China only too willing to supply new technology – how long does the Hydra remain without a head? Clearly the IAF attacks on Iraqi and Syrian nuclear facilities set those countries back. Recall In 1981, Prime Minister Menachem Begin sent the IAF to knock out Iraq's "Osirak" nuclear reactor. Osirak was a lone and poorly guarded nuclear facility. In 2007, IAF destroyed a Syrian site. In a report by Hans Ruehle, a former planning chief in the German Defense Ministry, it details the Israel’s September 6, 2007, raid that knocked out the nearly finished Al Kabir reactor. Ali Reza Asghari, a retired general in Iran’s Revolutionary Guards and an ex-deputy defense minister, who now provides information to the West on Iran’s own nuclear program, Ruehle said. General Asghari has asserted Iran was financing a secret nuclear project of Syria and North Korea,” he said. According to the report, U.S. intelligence was unaware of the extent.
By comparison Iran has learned from the past. Their facilities – uranium and plutonium based – are and will be spread around the country unlike Iraq in the 1980s and more recently Syria, 2007, which held most of their nuclear eggs in fewer and more readily targeted baskets.
Russia already sold Iran the Tor – M 1 air defense system and other protective measures. Moreover, Iran, unlike Iraq, has far greater global support than Iraq, including that of more radical, violent regimes in the Middle East, is not without air support, and can wage a violent fire storm of suicide attacks, rocket barrages from Gaza and send fighters to swell the ranks of Lebanon/Syrian Hezbollah. Iran can funnel advanced antitank weapons, rockets, and, most likely shoulder fired systems which to be sure, could impact the effectiveness of the IDF and IAF.
Israel has to gauge the upside and downside geopolitically and militarily. But at the end of the day, the imminent threat trumps the potential threat. For better or worse, Israel is used to being the “visiting team,” outnumbered by hostiles. When they believe their survival is at stake, they will act; a compelling motivator for enlightened self interest or need for cooler heads to prevail? Unfortunately with the exception of a handful of nations, Israel could stand alone. A unilateral attack without even tacit cover by the U.S. could spell disaster for Israel, too.
So far the radicals’ approach to removing Israel from the planet is death by a thousand cuts. Rockets, suicide bombs, then withdraw. Then do it all over again. Given the worldwide population of jihadists and their sympathizers outnumber Israelis; an uprising of folks angry at an IAF strike on Iran could result in severe blowback globally. Anti-Semitism is on the rise in Europe. A unilateral strike on Iran could unify even the more moderates against Israel. Although there is truth “there can be no courage without fear” Iran has already won a lot of rounds in the boxing match with the West. Iran has effectively tied Israel’s hands more than any other adversary has been able to do. Iran has fomented more instability in the region these last few years than Israel’s surrounding hostiles, including Team Arafat, have been able to do in a decade.
Part Three will continue with analysis of U.S. policy and a wrap up of the series.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Dr. Robin McFee is a physician and medical toxicologist. An expert in WMD preparedness, she is a consultant to government agencies, corporations and the media. Dr. McFee is a member of the Global Terrorism, Political Instability and International Crime Council of ASIS International. She has authored numerous articles on terrorism, health care and preparedness, and coauthored two books: Toxico-Terrorism by McGraw Hill and The Handbook of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Agents, published by Informa/CRC Press.
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