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May 18, 2009
Exclusive: Nuclear Deterrence in the 21st Century – Important Questions Need Answering
In Washington, there a few strong voices on U.S. security interests to which we should listen. I recently had the opportunity to hear from such a person. He is a former Department of Defense and senior White House staffer, a top specialist in nuclear deterrent issues. He had some wise counsel for those of us on both the left and right, especially as we contemplate the rising nuclear dangers facing the United States, its allies and friends. His words of wisdom were especially important given what some see as a rush to secure a new nuclear agreement with the Russians.
The Basics
First, he said, let’s review the basics. Most importantly, there is no regime which can be created to verify with high confidence the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. And even should the United States eliminate all its weapons, nuclear weapons elsewhere would continue to exist. And just as important, the knowledge of how to build nuclear weapons would continue to exist as well.
Second, outlaw or rogue states will continue to want nuclear weapons to pursue their hegemonic and totalitarian goals. They will do so not because they want to match the U.S. nuclear capabilities but because they know our overwhelming conventional capability can prevent or deter their plans for aggression.
Third, other major powers will continue to make themselves our adversaries and they will keep their nuclear weapons. Our allies will also look to us to provide a nuclear umbrella and if we do not do so, many of them will seek to build their own nuclear weapons.
Fourth, however, while nuclear weapons are not an all-purpose deterrent, they do have a moderating effect on the way the major powers act towards one another.
Fifth, U.S. unilateralism is unlikely to produce major reciprocal steps by the Russian government, and while loose nukes are a threat, we should be properly worrying about loose Russian and Pakistani nuclear weapons, not those deployed or stockpiled by the United States.
And sixth, the NPT, or Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, is manifestly in the security interests of the non-nuclear states, and not just in the interest of the permanent five nuclear powers, known as the P5.
What’s New?
There is a new administration and a new Congress in Washington, obviously. Both the candidates in the 2008 election campaign endorsed the goal of seeking the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons. In his recent speeches, especially in Prague, President Obama reiterated his long-term goal of nuclear abolition and his determination to preserve America’s deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.
But then this former top official had this to say: “But far too many – on both the left and on the right – continue to approach the web of issues surrounding nuclear policy with a poisonous mix of arrogance and ignorance which is fueled – the way tritium boosts a fission explosion – by ideology. It’s unhelpful and counter-productive…and it’s high time the debate moved past it.”
He then moved to the most interesting part of his remarks – examples of how both sides in the debate are frequently wrong. He started with the left. There is an assumption that “everyone” believes in “global zero”. Well, in fact, the Russians and Chinese do not and neither do the North Koreans or the Iranians.
He further noted most folks on the left believe missile defense is bad. But what about our troops who are protected by Patriot and Aegis missile defenses? And the Japanese and South Koreans who face the threat of North Korean rockets, or to anyone living under the shadow of an enemy’s ballistic missile force? The issue is not missile defense per se but the extent that a U.S. deployment of a BMD system designed to blunt the Russian or Chinese deterrent or one designed to blunt the U.S. deterrent might be deployed. [That that is why the U.S. has emphasized that our missile defense deployments are to defend against “limited” threats. My own belief is that at a minimum, a global and layered effective defense is needed against accidental, deliberate or rogue launches even should this involve Chinese or Russian missiles.]
Most interestingly is that he met head on the oft repeated claim that U.S. nuclear weapons “cause proliferation.” He explained “this is patent nonsense.” But, and this was a very important point, there is a political reality caught up in this argument that has to be discussed, including the use of America’s nuclear status as a whipping boy used to justify irresponsible behavior.
While many Americans are justifiably concerned with the threats of nuclear terrorism, he counseled that the justification of abolition as a means to deal with these threats had things backward – terrorism threats are here and now. Abolition is at best many decades away.
Some argue, he pointed out, that America’s conventional superiority makes our nuclear deterrent unnecessary. That raises and interesting question: do we want to make the world safe for conventional war? However horrible World War I was, it obviously was not sufficient to stop World War II.
Finally, he dealt with the charge that America’s nuclear forces are on a “hair trigger” alert status which is thus dangerous and requires removing our forces from that posture. Such a charge, he explained, was false and a red herring. The Russians do not believe U.S. forces are in such a posture. And U.S. forces are under secure and sound control.
On the other side of the ledger, he explained the right often believes the NPT and the UN review conferences are meaningless and can be dismissed, especially the requirement contained within the treaty that the world’s permanent nuclear powers, [P5], must work toward nuclear disarmament. But to halt proliferation, and regulate and control as much of what exists, the international community must be mobilized. Like it or not, the NPT and its associated Review Conference are “powerful tools” in this regard. If not used by the United States, they will be employed against us.
Related to this is the assumption that the notion of abolition must be “resisted at all costs.” But “just say no” is not a policy, he explained. A patient and careful assessment of the dangers of the path going to zero and how this would undermine the U.S. deterrent in search of such a goal is required. And this logically leads one to consider whether further reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals are justified. At some point, our friend said, reductions could be dangerous but at the 1500 warhead level is not yet at that point. [Note: I might agree but only with very flexible counting rules and the preservation of the full Triad including all 450 Minuteman missiles now deployed].
Finally, he explained that too many see the CTBT, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as a dangerous trap and any future ratification effort must be defeated. However, currently we have no plans to test nuclear weapons again and there is no political consensus to support testing. We have what he described as “the worst of all worlds: we won’t test and we have not ratified the Treaty and are seen as blocking an accord deemed important to non-proliferation.” This problem is compounded by the U.S. and its aging stockpile of warheads and the absence of support to modernize it. In his judgment, it is essential we modernize the stockpile but that cannot be done without the CTBT.
Common Ground on Which to Talk
He concluded with six points about which we should be concerned. First, whatever new reductions in nuclear warheads we are to consider, “are we prepared to contemplate how under all circumstances we maintain a survivable U.S. force structure”? Second, “how can we secure support for a reliable, replacement warhead to ensure the modernization of our weapons stockpile”? Third, we have to “watch carefully that nuclear weapons are not cut to such low numbers that missile defense creates a condition of strategic instability.” Fourth, we have to be very attentive to Allied concerns, a point made by the Strategic Posture Commission. Fifth, we should be clear that long range prompt conventional strike capabilities are not substitutes for nuclear weapons. And finally, sixth, “how should we think about deterrence in the 21st century especially in terms of what our adversaries value”?
While I do not agree with everything my friend laid out, most of it I did. This is wise counsel to those pursuing a reformed nuclear deterrent. Much of what he said is consistent with many of the points made by the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission report of May 6th. If heeded, his remarks could help considerably in forging a lasting consensus among policy makers about the role of nuclear weapons in “providing for the common defense.”
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense consulting company in Potomac, Maryland.
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