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May 19, 2009
Exclusive: What Are We Doing in Afghanistan?
We’ve been in Afghanistan for 2,776 days – and still the Administration has no exit strategy, no plan for victory and no clue what it is doing. Does that sound familiar? It should, as it was a typical cry, written originally in The Nation in 2006, but about the “failure” of President George W. Bush in Iraq. The same original piece pointed out that World War II only lasted 1,244 days. Meanwhile, despite promises to the contrary by the present Commander-in-Chief, we also continue to fight in Iraq (where we have now been for 2,257 days).
Gen. David Petraeus brought Iraq back under control with the backing of President Bush. He has managed to persuade his current Commander-in-Chief not to withdraw too precipitously from Iraq, thus managing to avoid snatching defeat from the jaws of victory. The frail democracy in Iraq now has at least some chance of lasting success. However even Gen. Petraeus must have qualms about ever achieving lasting success in Afghanistan. Yet this seems to be a war which President Obama is committed to fighting, regardless of the cost.
While even the most die-hard anti-war enthusiasts are hard pressed to deny the success of “The Surge” in Iraq, Afghanistan is a very different prospect. Terrain alone makes it a much harder prospect for any form of lasting success. Rather than the mainly flat and low-lying lands of Iraq, the majority of the countryside of Afghanistan is more vertical than horizontal (less than 3% of the country is agriculturally viable, mainly due to terrain). This alone makes it ideally suited for guerilla warfare – something the Afghanis have had generations of experience in fighting.
Added to the mix is a country whose average altitude is over 4,000 feet, with peaks over 20,000 feet in the northern Hindu Kush region. This provides an immediate physical challenge to our troops, even if they were raised in Colorado (whose highest mountains top out at just over 14,000 feet). Slightly smaller than Texas, it has a population of over 33,000,000 (as compared to Texas’ 24,000,000), almost half of whom remember (and many of whom participated in) fighting against the Soviets during their ill-fated invasion which lasted from 1979 to 1989
On top of all these complications, there is an unemployment rate of over 40%, a life expectancy of only just over 44 years and a GDP of only $800 per capita, despite the considerable international aid which has been poured in since the U.S.-led removal of the Taliban in 2001. Such grinding poverty as comes from living in effectively a subsistence economy makes for little incentive for those who carry guns as a life-long habit to lay down their arms. Instead it breeds a hardy race of survivors who respect strength above all other qualities.
All of the above factors mitigate heavily against the imposition of any stability in the region without the complete and unreserved involvement of major portions of the local population. The long and painful lessons of military occupation and pacification in the region do not appear to have been learned, particularly by President Obama. This is as unlikely a country to be “pacified” by an American presence as any in the world, no matter how much effort the U.S. puts in or how many troops end up deployed there.
This is not meant to denigrate the heroic efforts of the troops (and supporting civilians) who do serve in Afghanistan. They do a wonderful job in the most appalling circumstances, usually with enormous courage, great fortitude and tremendous dedication. It is also a theatre in which the major and lasting successes are demonstrably achieved by Special Forces working in close cooperation with the local population.
Their work in local communities, providing medical expertise, social organization and reform, including support of Tribal customs, especially as democratic alternatives to Islamic fundamentalism, and many other benefits, is usually aimed at gaining friends through respect for their abilities and beliefs. This has often led to local support, a key gain in the battle against radicalism of any sort. The long-lasting and effective gains made by Special Forces doing such work are often massively disproportionate to the resources committed. But there are few allocated to this task and those few are under-supported and under-resourced.
If the goal is to achieve a region in which terrorism cannot flourish, then it is the work of the Special Forces in changing the attitudes of the indigenous population which provides the most likely means of victory. This will still require the active presence of the conventional military force to provide support, reinforcement and training over the huge areas involved. Their role would hardly change, but a change of emphasis is needed toward Civil Affairs, intelligence gathering and support for Special Operations aimed at enforcing local, non-radical authorities.
Afghanistan is a theatre to which the current Administration is committing our heroes without adequate thought to the consequences, and most especially to which the terms “without an exit strategy, no plan for victory and no clue what it is doing” apply. Our troops deserve better, especially from a Commander-in-Chief who was so critical of the “failed policies” of his predecessor in Iraq. What is our exit strategy, our plan for victory? We, and our troops, deserve to be told.
Family Security Matters Contributing Editor Tim Wilson is a retired British Army officer who now works as an independent consultant. Feedback: editorialdirector@familysecuritymatters.org.
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