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May 26, 2009
Exclusive: The Gathering Storm – Development of Nuclear Weapons in Rogue States
Missile defense experts have now concluded the North Korean missile launched in early April is capable of dropping a 650 pound warhead on Indiana and a 500 pound warhead on Florida. The rockets first and second stages fired and separated. It is unclear what happened with the third stage, but the rocket still traveled over 3,600 kilometers before crashing into the Pacific Ocean. If all its stages had worked, the missile would be able to target nearly the entire continental United States. This was a dramatic improvement over a similar rocket launch in 1998 which travelled some 1500 kilometers.
There are three reasons this matters. First, as recent testimony before our Congress reveals, rogue states such as North Korea and Iran are deploying missiles of increasing range to threaten their neighbors and pursue regional and global hegemonic and totalitarian aims. Second, North Korea, Iran and Syria cooperate on both ballistic missile and nuclear weapons development. And three, whatever may be the ultimate use of such rockets, the development of nuclear weapons is a gathering danger because of their association and sponsorship of terror groups.
Although it is now clear Iranian ballistic missile capabilities are also significant and growing, a May 2009 report written for the East West institute, (EWI), by both Russian and American opponents of missile defense saw no “imminent threat” to Europe or the United States. In addition, the same report said the deployment of a planned missile defense in Europe – in Poland and the Czech Republic – would not provide any significant protection from such threats. The report also said the development by Iran of a solid-fueled rocket capable of traveling up to 2,000 kilometers was well over the horizon. In short, we had time to wait.
On May 20, 2009, just days after this report was released, Iran successfully launched a solid-fueled Ashura rocket for the first time. It travelled between 1800-2270 kilometers. We may know more as the launch is studied. Ironically, these two events, the April North Korean launch and the May Iranian launch, were a repeat of similar events in 1998. Then, the Rumsfeld Commission Report on Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States said ballistic missile threats could emerge suddenly, within five years of a nation making the decision to build long range rockets. On the other hand, the EWI report said such an Iranian development was long over the horizon, with little data now available to assess Iranian rocket capabilities. The Iranian rocket test flight proves that thesis wrong.
In 1998, North Korea proved Rumsfeld right by launching a rocket just after his report was released. The launch surprised the intelligence community which had said no such capability could be demonstrated by the North Koreans for many years, probably decades. If all the stages of the rocket had worked, it could have hit the western continental United States.
Similarly, on May 20, 2009, Iran proved a key point of the EWI report wrong. As we have noted, the new Iranian rocket traveled roughly 2,000 kilometers and can now threaten more than a dozen European countries. In addition, the new rocket is solid fueled and therefore can be more readily launched than the liquid-fueled variants the Iranians have tested.
Both the North Korean and Iranian rocket tests were important because the two countries work jointly on developing such technologies. Virtually all experts believe foreign sources of technology and components, whether missiles or nuclear weapons, are critical to the successful development of such capabilities. This was particularly true of the conclusions of the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission and is prominently noted by the EWI report. However, the Iranian rocket test appears to have been done from indigenously developed technology which is an indication that even without outside assistance, the Iranians can make significant technical progress with respect to rocket technology.
In another irony, the Central Intelligence Agency had released a 1995 assessment, (an NIE), claiming any missile threat to the United States from North Korea was at least 15 years away. What the CIA failed to tell Congress at the time was that the full report assessed only what North Korea could develop from indigenous sources. And the threats were to the continental United States and did not include Hawaii and Alaska. By 1998-9, the CIA would release another National Intelligence Assessment which would agree with the 1998 Rumsfeld Commission report.
So as we review the Iranian and North Korean threats, we have estimates that Iran is just months or maybe two years away from having nuclear warheads, (a danger confirmed by the EWI report). The two countries collaborated on building a nuclear capability for Syria, (only to see it destroyed in an Israeli air raid). Thus, even if only two rogue states are building weapons and missiles, future proliferation could involve any number of such countries. This is an indication of the difficulty confronting policy makers concerned with proliferation dangers.
The 1995 NIE delayed US development of ballistic missile defenses by a number of years. Following the publication of the Rumsfeld Commission Report, Congress passed legislation calling for the deployment of missile defenses as soon as the technology was ready. We have a similar “hinge of history” here.
What the news stories about the EWI report left out goes straight to the heart of the mater. They did not tell us “the rest of the story.” And that story is very, very important. In the introduction of the EWI study, we read: “The conclusions of this report could be undercut if Iran were to receive extensive help from abroad in the development of nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles.”
The report details a plethora of examples of how North Korea and Iran have cooperated on exactly these technologies. But that is again only part of the story. Unmentioned, however, is the recent 118 count indictment of a Chinese firm by the New York U.S. Attorney on charges of aiding Iran with ballistic missile and nuclear weapons technology. So much for their conclusion no Iranian threat is “imminent!” How do they know? Especially when faced with the “wild card” of foreign country assistance. Thus by their own admission, the conclusions of the report about Iranian missile capabilities should be thrown in the dust bin. Not surprisingly, one expert Israeli source told me the reports assessment of Iranian missile capabilities was largely “drivel.”
Thus, in urging the new administration not to deploy the planned missile defense in Central Europe, it is obvious the report relies on a wrongfully calculated threat timeline. It also fails in many places to correctly describe the technology available to deal with such threats, particularly the proposed deployments in Poland and the Czech Republic. Missile defense experts told me that on radars, trajectories, and payloads, the report gets our missile defense capabilities wrong. For example, Iranian rockets may be able to include counter measures and decoys, and thus make the job of the planned Polish interceptors more difficult. But the report misrepresents the capabilities of both the proposed radars and interceptors that can adequately deal with these Iranian missiles. According to experts, the report misstates the capability of the radar by a factor of at least 50 percent. The proposed radar for the Czech Republic has been flown against in a number of tests and its capabilities are well understood.
Furthermore, while claiming such interceptors will not being able to shoot down Iranian rockets – unsophisticated as they still are – the report in the same breath claims the interceptors in Poland would be able to shoot down more capable Russian rockets!! In fact, in simulations done by the Missile Defense Agency, the European based interceptors were capable of acquiring Russian rockets but an intercept solution could not be completed and thus the interceptors were never even launched.
There are a number of options for the US, NATO and Russia – should the later wish to collaborate with us – to deploy effective missile defenses in Europe. Our Secretary of Defense says the Alaskan and California based interceptors “work” against the North Korean threat. A two-stage version of this system has been previously proposed to be deployed in Central Europe. The question we need to ask is what ‘works” against the current and emerging Iranian threat. The initial sites proposed in Europe could have ground based interceptors capable of defending Europe from Iranian longer range rockets. But it is the only system also capable of defending the Eastern United States. It would be hard to ask American taxpayers to support a system based in Europe to defend NATO but not the United States as well.
During the previous administration, work was also initiated on using the ship-based Standard Missile on either land or at sea. These missiles are now deployed on some of our Aegis cruisers as a defense against short and medium range missiles, including those from Iran. Deploying such missiles on land, such as in Germany and Turkey on U.S. airbases has some appeal, but they could only defend against Iranian rockets with ranges of 2,500-3,500 kilometers and in the mid-course. Paris would barely be protected and London would not. This is not a good idea if we want to maintain the cohesion of NATO.
Current missile defense technology is emerging that has increasing capabilities even against more sophisticated threats. Congressman Trent Franks, a well respected four term member of the House Armed Services Committee, in remarks on May 15th, said the United States tested a THAAD missile – the Terminal High Altitude Air Defense system on March 17, 2009. Two rockets were launched. The first blasted the target out of the sky. The second interceptor followed so closely it was able to pick out from the remaining debris the largest object remaining which was only one yard long and destroy it! All this was done at speeds around 3 kilometers per second. As the Congressman then noted, if that “doesn’t light your fire, your wood is wet.”
Missile defense works. The European site has been endorsed by NATO and would be an important addition to our security. Such a defense could be integrated into plans for a cooperative defense with Russia. But work should not be delayed. The idea that no missile defense is needed against medium or long range missiles because missiles “have a home address,” (a claim made by the EWI Report), is patently absurd. Missile armed rogue states such as Iran see missiles as instruments of blackmail and coercion. They serve as top-cover allowing a nation to commit terrorism and aggression with impunity. They can threaten states working to impose greater sanctions or other economic restraints against Iran. Using the illogic of the report, all missile threats could therefore be deterred because every missile launch has a return address. But then why would the U.S. and its allies build missile defenses against shorter range rockets?
The Iranian and North Korean ballistic threats are clearly a gathering storm we cannot ignore, even as these emerging technologies are being wedded to the worst of all possible weapons. A two-track strategy is possible of building defenses while also putting together diplomatic coalitions to curtail these threats. The launches of April and May are harbingers of the gathering storm we face. Missile defenses are an insurance policy against such threats. Our duty is to “provide for the common defense.” We need to get on with this job in the best manner possible.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense consulting company in Potomac, Maryland.
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