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June 15, 2009
Exclusive: A Nuclear Free World: Can It Happen?
The United States is now seriously reviewing its nuclear deterrent posture. We are seeking further reductions in our deployed nuclear weapons. We hope to extend the verification measures contained in the START treaty which otherwise expires in December 2009. And there is an emerging consensus that the nuclear enterprise which sustains our warheads and nuclear capability needs to be modernized.
Much attention is focused on the reduction of “deployed” nuclear weapons in the U.S. and Russian arsenals. Under the terms of the 2002 Moscow Treaty, both nations must reduce by 2012 their operationally deployed warheads to less than 2,200. The U.S. has already reached that level while the Russians are probably somewhere above 2,200 but below 3,000. These numbers are rather remarkable in that they represent the lowest level of U.S. deployed nuclear weapons since the Eisenhower administration.
Additional focus has been on the pledge of the new administration to seriously engage in the pursuit of zero nuclear weapons, known often as “global zero.” While the U.S. and Russian arms control regimes affect only those two countries, there are additional declared and undeclared nuclear powers which would have to be brought under such a regime for a world without nuclear weapons to be realized. These countries include England, France, China, Pakistan, India, North Korea, and Israel.
On Wednesday, June 10th, one of America’s most thoughtful defense experts, the former Air Force Chief of Staff, addressed these critical issues in a speech in Washington, D.C. Gen. Larry Welch, (ret), and recently President of the Institute for Defense Analysis, explained that to achieve such a nuclear weapons free world, there are six preconditions that would have to prevail. While many of these goals are in of themselves worthwhile, irrespective of whether the world does or does not go toward zero nuclear weapons, none now exist.
First is a fissile material cutoff, proposed by both the previous and current administration. If it is likely that nuclear electric power will increase six-fold by 2050, control over fissile material production and waste material from power plants will become a very important job. This is largely due to the fact that the major producers of nuclear energy technology are also either major nuclear weapons producers or capable of such production.
Second would be the need to adopt some relative conventional balance, as called for in the NPT or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The Russians today maintain thousands of tactical nuclear weapons to balance the conventional superiority of NATO and the United States, not unlike the U.S. posture during the Cold War of maintaining a nuclear deterrent in central Europe to counter balance the very large advantage enjoyed by the former Soviet Union across the Fulda gap. It is unlikely the elimination of nuclear weapons would occur if major conventional imbalances remained.
Third, we would need to address non-deployed stockpiles which are considerably greater in number than the deployed weapons. This is probably true of countries other than the U.S. and Russia as well. Thus, promising to reduce our deployed weapons from 2,200 to 1,500 is a reduction of roughly one-third; but when compared to the total stockpile of weapons the reduction is much smaller.
There are also other reasons the U.S. has maintained more weapons than those we have deployed. At this time, and for the entire period of the Cold War, the United States has maintained both a “technical and geopolitical hedge”. This meant we kept warheads in the stockpile in the event one of our deployed warheads evidenced technical problems. And we kept a number of warheads to ensure we could respond to a strategic surprise or breakout by an adversary.
The requirement for both of these necessities would have to disappear to get to zero nuclear weapons, but little if any discussions have been held on either of these issues. In addition, while these “hedges” refer to strategic weapons, there has been relatively little discussion of the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons being maintained, especially by Russia, which are not matched by the United States.
These are all part of the stockpile beyond deployed strategic weapons. Without discussion of these issues one cannot take seriously the push of those who want to go toward “global zero.” The currently aging deployed force requires a stockpile “hedge.” Our lack of technical confidence in our force over the long term has to be corrected for any serious consideration of major reductions, (especially to the non-deployed stockpile), to say nothing of going to zero.
Thus, a modernized stockpile, while it might seem counter-intuitive, is required for further major reductions in nuclear weapons. We need high confidence in the long term reliability, increased safety and intrinsic security of the weapons. Once acquired, we could see major reductions in our overall stockpile of warheads, but not necessarily in the deployed force of bombers, submarines and land based missiles.
Fourth, any goal of going to zero nuclear weapons has to deal with the consequence and ease of cheating. With the presence of just a few 10s of nuclear weapons, a power could emerge that could blackmail any country, no matter their conventional capability.
Today, with an arsenal of 2,200 nuclear deployed warheads, marginal cheating is simply not of any serious consequence. Even with such cheating, neither Russia nor the United States can carry out an effective pre-emptive strike against the other.
Thus, whatever number of warheads we have greater than zero, it seems obvious such a survivable force should be deployed to avoid just such a possibility of a “prompt” launch in a crisis. That survivable force looks remarkably like the deployed force of 450 Minuteman, 14 submarines and the bomber force committed to the strategic nuclear deterrence mission we have today.
In fact, any reduction in either the number of submarines or land based missiles simply makes no sense. Crisis stability remains the name of the game. Any agreed upon reduction of warheads is not incompatible with the maintenance of the current number of “launchers.” In fact, as one reduces warheads, the higher the ratio of launchers to warheads means a higher degree of stability is maintained. That is especially important as numbers get lower.
The fifth thing you want to do is to have foolproof technical capability to determine whether any cheating is going on and what level of nuclear weapons people do or do not have. No such capability exists. In fact, we have had and are having a very difficult time determining the extent to which countries such as Iran, Iraq, Libya or North Korea, for example, are cheating now, or have nuclear weapons “programs,” let alone have deployed nuclear weapons.
A sixth and final pre-condition for going to zero nuclear weapons is the control of nuclear weapons production capability. Today, China and Russia have robust capabilities, while the U.S. has virtually no such capability. [Producing a few nuclear weapons is not known as a “nuclear weapons production capability]. To carry out such an end game would require an international enforcement mechanism to ensure not only that no one cheats but no-one attempts to build a hidden production capability. Our current problems with Iran and North Korea, and previously with Iraq and Libya, show the dimensions of the problem we face.
In short, none of the six conditions exist today. And there is relatively little discussion of any of them except occasional reference to a fissile material cutoff. History tells us that the current deterrent strategy works at between 1,700-2,200 deployed warheads. A small reduction to 1,500 might work if we kept the current force structure of submarines, bombers and land-based missiles.
To maintain a damage limitation strategy – as endorsed by the report of the Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States – would require roughly our current deployment. To go to a strategy of just killing people, a “city busting” force, would be immoral and would not be believable. While the force currently is operationally capable, we need to improve its margin of performance, safety features and intrinsic security.
Going to zero nuclear weapons is viewed with great skepticism by some, myself included. It is not dissimilar to the goals of Kyoto – major reductions in carbon use and energy consumption are being pushed that accomplish nothing toward reducing climate temperatures. Artificial, false or bogus goals call into question the steps being advocated to get there, even should some of the steps being proposed have merit. We should do what we need to do to maintain a safe nuclear deterrent while taking those steps that also further our goals of counter proliferation.
While some who advocate a trajectory to zero acknowledge the difficulty of getting to zero, they argue that by going in that direction, beginning the climb up a mountain although we cannot see the top, we establish our genuineness, our improved moral stature, and by doing so we encourage our allies and friends to “get serious,” especially with respect to Iran and North Korea. All this sounds good, but there is no evidence that it is a real world reality.
Former USAF Chief of Staff recently addressed this issue. He said that three questions come to mind: what country not now pursuing nuclear weapons will begin to do so because the United States modernizes its deterrent or remains at the Moscow Treaty level? None come to mind he said. And conversely, what nations now pursuing nuclear weapons will cease to do so should the United States reduce its nuclear weapons to 1,500 or lower? The answer is exactly the same – none have been identified. But what countries might pursue and deploy nuclear weapons if they become concerned with the capability of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent? General Welch said that two immediately come to mind, Japan and the Republic of Korea, who have both recently expressed concern with what they have seen as a diminished U.S. commitment to extended deterrence.
The proliferation we face today, specifically the nuclear programs in North Korea and Iran, are deadly serious. The IAEA just found Iran further in violation of the NPT. North Korea has exploded a nuclear device while testing rockets capable of reaching the United States. Russia now concludes Iran can reach central Europe with ballistic missiles.
Whatever the U.S. does in response, the full range of US capabilities should be used. This includes but is not limited to divestment, trade and banking restrictions, missile defenses, interdiction through the Proliferation Security Initiative, arms control, and deterrence. This would include pushing companies not to sell refined petroleum products to Iran. The watch word should be if you wish to do business with North Korea or Iran, you do not do business with America. Legislation currently sits in Congress to implement these policies. It should be passed. Our current capabilities can be enhanced, especially missile defense. Our allies can be fully brought on board. Anything less will simply not be “serious” and certainly will not “provide for the common defense.”
Whatever the U.S. does in response, the full range of US capabilities should be used. This includes but is not limited to divestment, trade and banking restrictions, missile defenses, interdiction through the Proliferation Security Initiative, arms control, and deterrence. This would include pushing companies not to sell refined petroleum products to Iran. The watch word should be if you wish to do business with North Korea or Iran, you do not do business with America. Legislation currently sits in Congress to implement these policies. It should be passed. Our current capabilities can be enhanced, especially missile defense. Our allies can be fully brought on board. Anything less will simply not be “serious” and certainly will not “provide for the common defense.”
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense consulting company in Potomac, Maryland.
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