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August 26, 2009
Exclusive: Improved U.S.-Taiwan Defense Cooperation Needed
The RAND Corporation, a leading non-profit defense think tank, recently released a new report on the military balance across the Taiwan Strait. It showed a marked shift against the ability of the democratic island to defend its skies against an attack by the Communist mainland. RAND found that a massive missile strike could pave the way for the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) to gain the air superiority that China would need to launch an amphibious invasion of Taiwan.
The RAND study warned,
Depending on missile accuracy, between 90 and 240 SRBMs [Short Range Ballistic Missiles] – well within the range of estimates of the number of launchers China will field in the near future – could, with proper warheads, cut every runway at Taiwan’s half-dozen main fighter bases and destroy essentially all of the aircraft parked on ramps in the open at those installations. By so doing, China could knock the Republic of China Air Force (ROCAF) out of the war for long enough to launch large-scale air raids on Taiwan intended to destroy any aircraft parked in shelters, as well as other hardened targets. Success in this gambit would suppress ROCAF operations indefinitely and lay Taiwan open to further Chinese air attacks.
The destruction of Taiwan’s major airbases would also cripple the ability of the U.S. to fly reinforcements into the island. American bases on Okinawa are within range of Taiwan, but could also be targeted by Chinese missiles if Beijing wanted to risk escalation by attacking American bases on Japanese soil, acts that could lead to U.S. counter-strikes on the Chinese mainland and a direct confrontation with Japan. Beijing would only risk such a great power showdown if it believed it would prevail in short order and present Washington and Tokyo with a fait accompli; a conquered island that the two allies would not have the ability to liberate.
To deter a war that Taiwan, Japan and the United States do not want requires that Taiwan present what President Ma Ying-jeou called a “hard ROC” during his 2008 election campaign. The United States must provide Taiwan with the weapons it needs to make any cost calculation about the use of force appear too high to the Beijing regime.
China has deployed or is deploying new fighter aircraft that could eliminate Taiwan’s traditional qualitative advantage. These PLAAF warplanes are the J-11 (a Chinese version of the Russian Su-27) and the indigenous J-10 (which looks suspiciously like an F-16). Taiwan has requested the right to buy F-16 C/D Block 50/52 fighter-bombers, which are more advanced than the 150 F-16 A/B jets they already have. The Obama administration has not approved this request, but should immediately. In an interview with Defense News published August 10th, ShuaiHua-Ming, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee in Taiwan’s national legislature, said,“We really need something to begin replacing these fighters….F-16s purchased in the 1990s do not have the air-superiority edge against China’s newer fighters, such as the J-10s and Su-27s. The F-16C/D release by the U.S. is critical. Taiwan’s national defense strategy is to try to interdict the invasion force in the middle of the Strait before reaching Taiwan.”
At its most narrow point, the Taiwan Strait is still 130 kilometers wide. It would not be easy to move an invasion force large enough to conquer an island of 23 million people with 2 million active duty and reserve military personnel across that much open water. Troop transports and supply ships are very vulnerable to air and missile attack. China would have to press into service commercial ships for such a massive venture, and they are not designed for combat.
The RAND analysts understand this and propose what it calls a “four rings” strategy to block a Chinese invasion:
· “Thinning the herd” of approaching ships using what amounts to unordered fire of longer-range ASCMs [anti-ship cruise missiles].
· Slowing the approach to the beach with modern sea and surf mines.
· Engaging assault vessels, whether large ships or small craft, on their final run to the beach with concealed or very mobile short-range missiles, such as Hellfire.
· Combining air-delivered weapons with direct and indirect fires to damage or destroy Chinese ships or craft while they are unloading ashore.
American cooperation will be needed to develop this in-depth defense of the island. In March, it was reported that Taiwan will begin low-rate production of the Hsiung Feng HF-2E “Brave Wind” land-attack cruise missile later this year. The HF-2E has a range of 600 km (370 miles) which means it could strike most of the ports and staging areas that China would use to mount an invasion. In 2008, it was reported that the Bush administration had blocked the export of missile components to Taiwan in an attempt to stop the HF-2E program because it was deemed an offensive weapon. Beijing, of course, always claims its massive military buildup across the Strait is to protect China from Taiwanese aggression. And unfortunately, there are a large number of people in the U.S. State Department who want to appease Beijing at every turn.
The HF-2E is tactically a strike weapon, but strategically it is purely defensive. Its targets would be ports and troopships massing for an invasion. The HF-2E does not have the range to hit major Chinese cities like Shanghai or Hong Kong, nor is its warhead large enough to do wide area damage to economic or population centers. It is similar to the U.S. Navy “Harpoon” anti-ship missile but in a land-attack mode. The U.S. has sold Harpoons to Taiwan, so there should be no objection to helping Taiwan build its own version in larger numbers.
At the 10th Taipei Aerospace and Defense Technology Exhibition and Conference, held August 13-16, visitors got a rare look at the HF-3 anti-ship cruise missile which could be used to “thin out” an attacking fleet as per the “four rings” strategy. It is built by the same military-run Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology (CSIST) that builds the HF-2E. Taiwanese cruise missiles, dispersed around the island with hidden, hardened or mobile launchers could make the planning of a Chinese first strike much more difficult than simply hitting known airfields.
Taiwan could also use American attack helicopters which can operate from dispersed and simple sites.
Taiwan has some Huey AH-1W Cobra gunships, but could use more, as well as new AH-64D Apache attack helicopters. These choppers could fire the Hellfire missiles called for in the RAND study. These missiles could also be fired from UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) as the U.S. is doing in Afghanistan. Taiwan is developing UAVs but could use American aid to speed production and to arm them.
Included in the weapons package President George W. Bush approved for Taiwan in 2001 were PAC-3 Patriot missile defense systems. Unfortunately, only a handful of these systems have been sold to Taiwan, not nearly enough to blunt the barrage of SRBMs China has aimed at the island. As Chairman ShuaiHua-Ming stated, “China has over 1,000 short-range ballistic missiles that can hit Taiwan. We have to use two PAC-3s to intercept one Chinese missile. That means we need 2,000 PAC-3s to intercept all the missiles in a saturation attack to protect the single defended area. We only got six sets of PAC-3s from the U.S.” More need to be provided as quickly as possible.
The PAC-3 is a point defense system, so it can only cover certain, high value sites. Taiwan needs an area defense missile defense system with the range to intercept Chinese ballistic missiles as they cross the strait. Japan has a similar problem, which also affects the defense of U.S. bases on Okinawa. Tokyo has expressed interest in the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system to augment its land-based ballistic missile defenses which, like Taiwan, are based on the PAC-3. Both Japan and Taiwan should be allowed to buy THAAD.
The KMT (Kuomintang/Nationalist) administration of President Ma has tried to lessen tensions with China and promote trade and investment across the strait. The Taiwanese want peaceful and profitable relations with the mainland, but they do not want to give up their freedom and right to self-government. Taiwan has a more prosperous and progressive society than does China under its Communist dictatorship. As the RAND study points out,
December 2008 survey data indicated that the overwhelming majority of the island’s citizens identified themselves as exclusively Taiwanese (51 percent) or both Taiwanese and Chinese (41 percent). By far the most troubling statistic, from Beijing’s perspective, must be that fewer than 5 percent described themselves as exclusively Chinese.
The Taiwanese identify themselves as a de facto independent people. I have been both to Taiwan and to China, and one can feel the difference between a free people and a subjugated people just walking down the streets. And people do not willingly move from a better to a worse condition. Americans and Taiwanese have a long history of friendship which should continue to be the basis for cooperation in national defense efforts. Deterring China from using force to conquer Taiwan is in the strategic interest of the United States.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor William R. Hawkins is a consultant specializing in international economic and national security issues. He is a former economics professor and Republican Congressional staff member.
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