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September 25, 2009
Exclusive: Caution Needed in Navigating the Minefields in Current Global Security Environment
On September 21, 2009, the Marshall Institute honored Dr. John Foster for his nearly two-thirds of a century work dedicated to protecting our national security. As a member of the Strategic posture Commission of the United States, which in April released its much anticipated report to the American people, Dr. Foster continued his work on behalf of maintaining a sound U.S. deterrent strategy.
I first met Dr. Foster when he was the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research, Development, Test and Evaluation during the early 1970s. He has also been a featured speaker for over a decade at by Congressional Breakfast Seminar series on nuclear deterrence, missile test and homeland security. His remarks this week are an extraordinary clear appeal for the United States and its allies to carefully navigate the minefields we face in the current international security environment.
Dr. Foster begins: “This audience must realize that I am very humbled and in awe of the distinction that this Founders Award represents. While I have focused on our national security for more than two-thirds of a century now, my objective has simply been to understand the threats that we face, understand the perceptions and objectives of potential adversaries and then to help implement the actions necessary to provide for the common defense. In doing so, the satisfaction of making some contribution has always been more than enough.”
Dr. Foster then review the nearly two decades since the end of the Cold War, “… the two decades that have produced a number of asymmetries between the U.S. and its friends and potential adversaries. Over this time, the U.S. has been the lone superpower. We have engaged in several regional conflicts around the world and other nations, large and small, and terrorists have developed and adapted capabilities to frustrate our objectives and attack us directly.”
He further explains that the .U.S had indeed led efforts to reduce nuclear proliferation but also notes: “There are still too many high yield nuclear weapons, more than enough to provide for adequate deterrence of another large conventional war or an exchange of weapons of mass destruction. And, as President Obama has declared, as we draw down our nuclear weapons, we must maintain a safe and effective deterrent to protect the U.S. and our allies.”
But then he turns to the issue of pursuing nuclear weapons reductions, and asks, “How low should we go? How much will be enough to deter?” He further explains: “We can’t know with certainty whether deterrence will work or how it will need to change, subject to each new opponent and contingency. The functioning of deterrence depends on each side’s capabilities, their states of mind and their communication skills. As the saying goes, ‘Nuclear deterrence is used every day.’ However, what is said and what is done to deter changes constantly.”
The nuclear expert further explains: “It is most important that we recognize that regional crises can and frequently do occur around the world, and some are of strategic interest to the major powers. Since such crises could, and occasionally have, escalated to major conventional combat or to the use of chemical or biological weapons, to prevent escalation, nuclear deterrence must work. To do so effectively, nuclear nations on both sides must possess and exhibit credible nuclear deterrence capabilities and postures. Such considerations set declaratory policies, military doctrine, programs and capabilities. Because of the uncertainties involved, we know we also must provide a hedge against the possibility that our preferred deterrence capabilities will be insufficient for the occasion, because if that were so, deterrence would not prevent attack.”
Dr. Foster then turns to the issue of the current discussions between the U.S. and Russia about arms control specifically a follow-on extension of START, the Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty. The DOD is also responding to the Congressional requirements for an NPR, the Nuclear Posture Review, and a QDR, Quadrennial Defense Review.”
He then turns to two very critical issues that have not received much attention. They involve what are known as asymmetries or imbalances between the U.S. and Russia that will affect the benefits of any future arms control agreement. Dr. Foster explains: “First, in July, further strategic nuclear reductions were agreed to by Presidents Obama and Medvedev in Moscow. The objective now is to pursue specific reductions and details that will maintain a strategic balance on both sides.”
“The worrisome asymmetry is that, according to Russian sources and as pointed out by Keith Payne in the Wall Street Journal on July 7th, the Russians can achieve their reductions by eliminating systems that are already nearing the end of their service lives, such as their remaining SS-18 and SS-19 ICBMs. And while doing so, Russia is also developing and deploying new fixed and mobile ICBMs and SLBMs and has just announced the start of a new strategic bomber. Over the next decade this triad of new systems will have replaced the older ones as they are drawn down.”
“In contrast, while existing U.S. strategic systems could remain in service for another 20 to 30 years, the U.S. does not have an approved program to provide a sustainable TRIAD. Future U.S. reductions will come at the expense of existing serviceable weapons and without the benefit of on-going replacement programs. These U.S. systems were designed, developed and deployed during the Cold War. Several reports have noted that in the last 20 years, critical skills in science and engineering and production as well as the industrial base have been atrophying and those reports recommended that development activities be initiated.”
The situation could lead to the U.S. retiring some of our strategic systems to go from a TRIAD to a DIAD. Foster explains: “If so, a DIAD would deny us the opportunity of either prompt retaliation (ICBM’s) or strategic signaling (bombers) or a survivable capability (SLBMs), and then we would be dependent on only one leg should a common failure mode develop in the other leg. Such a situation would remove the stabilizing strategic flexibility and options we have worked decades to provide to our presidents through the existence of a TRIAD. In addition, in future negotiations with the Russian Federation it seems unlikely we could persuade them to accept a similarly bounded position – according to what they have said.”
“This would leave to an increase in strategic dangers because Russian and U.S. strategic modernization programs are out of synch by at least a decade – with the United States being the only nuclear power that is lagging in nuclear weapon modernization programs and without a production capability or capacity,” (a point also made this year by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates).
What then are the implications then of this situation? As the U.S. and Russia move forward, and out of synch, to modernize their nuclear arsenals, both strategic and tactical, how do they avoid falling back into a more competitive relationship? “A relationship that would also generate concerns of unpredictable competition with and among their neighbors” Foster warns.
“My second worrisome asymmetry concerns tactical nuclear weapons. The Perry/Schlesinger Commission observed that the Russian Federation has about 3,800 tactical nuclear weapons while the U.S. has drawn down tactical nuclear weapons to a few hundred. U.S. officials have described the asymmetry as being a 10:1 advantage in favor of Russia.” From the Russian perspective, they claim a need for the development of such weapons because they face superior conventional forces in their near environment.
But the Russian posture has gone beyond simply deploying such weapons. Here Dr. Foster’s explanation becomes chilling: “Their civilian and military leadership have pointed out that they have developed – and are deploying nuclear weapons that are low yield, relatively-clean, enhanced electromagnetic pulse, and weapons embedded within precision delivery penetrators. Their present declaratory doctrine talks about ‘conflict de-escalation,’ by which the Russians mean bringing a conventional conflict to a quick conclusion via Russia’s first use of nuclear weapons. And recently, they have threatened nuclear attacks against their neighbors. So, that is what the Russians have been saying and doing.”
“However, as perceived by some of our friends and allies, in what Russia continues to call its “near abroad”, facing thousands of tailored tactical nuclear weapons, Russia poses a very credible nuclear threat. And we know the same situation is perceived by our allies and friends bordering China and North Korea. They see their nations at risk of coercion or attack and some of them question the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrence should some regional conflict get out of hand.”
What are the implications for the current U.S. extended nuclear deterrent asks Foster. He notes that deterrent “consists of deployed dual capable aircraft and deployable but not deployed cruise missiles (TLAM/N). These capabilities require replacement, as some of our key allies have privately emphasized. We must take the steps necessary to modernize our forces and to persuade our allies that our extended deterrence, now and in the future, will provide an adequate deterrent.”
“In the midst of these asymmetries and emerging concerns among key allies about the credibility of our extended nuclear deterrent, President Obama has introduced a draft resolution to the United Nations Security Committee (UNSC) calling for nuclear disarmament. This step undoubtedly will deepen concerns among allies who rely on our extended nuclear deterrent to prevent not just nuclear attacks on them, but also chemical or biological attacks.”
According to “Yoriko Kawaguchi, the Japanese representative to the International Commission on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Disarmament…this anxiety over a weakening of the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent” is serious. Says Foster: “She stated that limiting the role of the U.S. nuclear deterrent ‘Would give the wrong signal to North Korea or other rogue states ……and undermine the security of Japan….’”.
A Czech commentator on President Obama’s moves toward nuclear reduction and disarmament was more pointed: “A starry-eyed view of the world could not only put the United States at risk, but also cause its allies to lose their confidence in the superpower’s ability to meet its allied commitments, including the provision of a nuclear defense shield. This would leave the allies with no other option but to launch their own development programs. Needless to say, this would probably increase rather than eliminate the risk of a nuclear conflict. It would not be the first time that a policy based on ‘wishful thinking’ would bring results directly opposed to those expected. This is called the effect of unintentional consequences. This time, though, a mistake would carry a hefty price tag.”
Dr. Foster notes that “these are tough words for us to hear, but they are understandable. We need to be cautious as we move in the direction apparently chosen by this administration because the unintended consequences of a rush toward nuclear reductions could be serious.”
Dr. Foster then concludes: “So it seems at least to me, that the U.S., at the moment, is between a rock and a hard place. We recognize a possible ‘tipping point’ should the consortium of nations not be successful in terminating North Korea and Iran’s nuclear weapons programs. But there is also another ‘tipping point’: some of our allies facing Russia and China may conclude that our extended deterrent is not sufficiently credible and may choose to develop their own nuclear deterrent. We don’t want more allies contributing to nuclear proliferation and at the same time we have been reluctant to enhance or apparently even to preserve our extended nuclear deterrent capabilities.”
He says further: “The administration is now giving priority to understanding the concerns of selected allies regarding our extended deterrent. In doing so, we should be mindful of the historical situations where we were successful in persuading several allies to terminate their nuclear weapons programs. And fortunately, if changes are now required they do not require actions by a nuclear consortium, they can be made unilaterally by the United States.”
“Finally, in pursuing the START negotiations, the NPR and QDR, as the Perry/Schlesinger Commission observed, ‘the force posture design and arms control should keep stability and U.S. credibility as their central objectives.’ We are thereby eloquently reminded as to what our charge is – stability and U.S. credibility. The challenge now before us is to achieve those objectives.”
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense consulting company in Potomac, Maryland.
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