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October 15, 2009
Exclusive: Radical Steps toward ‘Minimal Nuclear Deterrence’ Continue to Undermine American Security
A new article in the October 2009 issue of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists by Lawrence Livermore Laboratory scientist Jeff Richardson continues the dreary commentary by many in the disarmament community that maintains an historic trend that continually calls for radical steps toward minimal nuclear deterrence that would ultimately undermine America’s security and that of its allies. It is proposed that the land based Minuteman missiles be eliminated form our strategic nuclear Triad. The reasons given for such a proposal are transparently nonsensical, buttressed by an astounding amount of wishful thinking, and based on little, if any, analytical thinking.
First is the idea that reducing our deterrent force to no more than 500 warheads, (from the current level of roughly 2,200) is somehow a good idea. There is no discussion, only assertions that such a force is adequate to provide deterrence not only for the U.S. but for our numerous allies that rely upon our extended deterrent capability. Second, it is admitted the Chinese arsenal of nuclear warheads might very well reach such a number, as would a Russian arsenal already far in excess of that. Such an eventuality is airily dismissed as not posing any strategic risk to the United States despite the fact that our deployment of 500 warheads most likely would be on a notional force of some eight submarines and 10 bombers meaning that the potential ratio of combined Chinese and Russian warheads to US platforms would be something on the order of 50 to 1 compared to the current ratio of 5 to 1. How can that be a “good idea?”
Third, it is blithely assumed that such a move by the United States would be “cost effective.” According to CBO, the Congressional Budget Office, a new generation of strategic nuclear capable submarines to replace the current Tridents, would be smaller in size, carry fewer missiles and fewer warheads. It would cost roughly $84 billion for the submarines alone and not including a compliment of missiles. Adding the latter brings the cost to in excess of $100 billion. Deploying 80 percent of the notional force of 500 warheads on submarines yields a per warhead cost of $250 million.
Fourth, by comparison, a long-range planning process to review options for the land based Minuteman missile has been put in place by the USAF. Using past costs of upgrading through a service life extension program of the entire propulsion and guidance systems for the Minuteman – roughly $7 billion for all 450 missiles – yields a per warhead cost of $15 million. Should the next generation of upgrades to Minuteman cost twice as much as the nearly completed current upgrades, the per warhead cost rises to $30 million, which is only roughly one-tenth of the cost of a submarine leg replacement on a per warhead basis. How, then, is spending $100 billion compared to $14 billion considered to be “cost effective?” Talk about “fuzzy math!”
To be clear, I am in favor of keeping the current platforms that make up the Triad – this includes the 12-14 Trident submarines, the 450 Minuteman and the B52 and B2 bombers that we deem necessary to maintain in a nuclear capable role. Replacing each of these legs can be done over time. Warhead levels can be reduced, but as Andrew Krepinevich concludes in a new study that level should not go below 1500.
In addition, cooperation and common procurement elements for the land-based and sea-based missiles are now required by the U.S. Congress and will reduce potential future costs. The current cost of the Minuteman leg of the Triad is roughly $1 billion annually, including roughly $450 million for all research and procurement. The costs of the current Trident program exceed $3 billion, not including operations and maintenance. The bomber leg of the Triad is dual use and would be maintained even should this part of our nuclear force be permanently made conventional only. The idea that such expenditures are somehow too onerous for a country spending nearly $4 trillion annually on the overall national budget is simply ludicrous.
Given the long lead times involved in replacing each of these Triad elements, it would be the height of foolishness to eliminate any one of the legs, especially in light of the unsettled international security environment. But especially foolish would be to eliminate the land-based ICBM leg. One rationale expressed in the referenced article is that most valuable contribution of the Minuteman missiles is solely its prompt retaliatory capability, a capability that supposedly has little enduring value. It is further asserted the Minuteman’s capability as a retaliatory counterforce weapon has somehow magically disappeared over the past decade. These are the only two reasons given for getting rid of ICBMs.
In fact, the land-based missile leg is extremely valuable but for reasons ignored by the article. ICBMs have been transformed from highly destabilizing as they were during the height of the Cold War – when a few enemy warheads could be expended in taking out many more U.S. warheads on highly mirved missiles. Today, the deployment of the 450 Minuteman missiles, most of which carry only one warhead, each in their own silo, ensures that in a crisis no nuclear power could attack the US nuclear forces successfully in seeking to pre-emptively eliminate our ability to respond with sufficient nuclear forces. An adversary would have to nearly exhaust its arsenal of nuclear warheads to take out even a percentage of our Minuteman, while facing the certain prospect of a retaliatory strike from the U.S. of our surviving Minuteman and the remaining force of submarines and bombers. In preparing for such an attack, an adversary would also have to generate its force, giving the U.S. ample warning time to flush its remaining in port submarines to sea, and place its bombers on strip alert. As for the value of a prompt strike counterforce capability, this gives the U.S. the ability to prevent an adversary from believing it could launch nuclear weapons at the U.S. from a sanctuary. This thus strengthens deterrence and strategic stability.
In fact, the complimentary nature of the submarines, bombers and ICBMs makes the use of ANY nuclear weapons in a crisis by any U.S. adversary illogical and irrational. The Strategic Posture Commission came to this conclusion in April as did the New Deterrent Working Group this summer. And two new reports – one by the National Institute for Public Policy and the other by the Center of Strategic and Budgetary Assessments – also underscore both the value of the existing Triad and the dangers in reducing nuclear weapons arbitrarily to very low numbers.
The Minuteman force – because of its size and stabilizing influence – removes the temptation we saw at the height of the Cold War, for command authorities to “prompt launch” in a crisis. Given the enduring survivability of the ICBM force, there is no need for a quick or sudden decision to use such forces by a U.S. President. And given its survivability against an adversary’s force of limited warheads – such as the 1,500-1,675 being discussed by the U.S. and Russia for a follow-on treaty to the Moscow arms control agreement of 2002, Minuteman serves a highly stabilizing function in a crisis.
The deployment of a small number of submarines and bombers as is advocated by the Bulletin’s article would put a premium on an enemy of the United States seeking the means to find and detect the pathway used by U.S. strategic submarines when moving from their bases in Georgia and Washington to their patrol areas. If these submarines were found, they could be eliminated over time without the United States knowing what country was behind the attacks, a point made eloquently by retired SAC Commander General Larry Welch. In short, we could be attacked without warning or attribution, a sure prescription for strategic miscalculation.
As once argued by former NSC adviser Brent Scowcroft and arms negotiator R. James Woolsey, eliminating the land-based leg of the Triad would be an explicit invitation to an enemy to “come get us” just as if we painted a big bulls-eye on every Trident strategic submarine or its successor. Also, relying upon the surviving bombers to take many hours to seek their target and then have to navigate through heavy air-defenses is a prescription for strategic vulnerability, instability and dangers. Our deterrent would simply not be taken seriously. Our allies as a result could very well build their own nuclear forces, a proliferation cascade with serious consequences. For all these reasons, the Triad should be preserved and with it strategic stability, extended deterrence and America’s security. There is little doubt that when objectively examined, the land based Minuteman missiles are an extraordinary contribution to our “common defense.”
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis, a defense consulting company in Potomac, Maryland.
Reader Comments: Submit Your Comment (3)
Well, this year was no exception – there were talks about how this recession was coming to an end, and how to promote a more stable world economic system. Returning to a global gold standard instead of credit based (fiat) currency wasn't discussed. (This would have something to do with the problem.) Instead, the G8 decided to talk up doling out financial aid through the U.S. Treasury and personal loans out of the International Monetary Fund – and treating symptoms instead of the disease.
This all seems so logical? What is up with our country and making us secure?
Utopian visionaries do not count the costs of their actions. They see only their vision. If they examined in any way the costs to society and the world, that would put into serious jeopardy their sense of moral superiority on which their egos depend. That is why they so vigorously and oftentimes visciously attack those who disagree with them.These are not rational people, these visionaries. They must be fought just as loudly and vigorously, although without the visciousness, by rational thinkers.
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