SEARCH FSM
Family Security Matters does not stand behind or endorse any candidate for president (or any other public office). However, as the President is also Commander-in-Chief and is responsible for setting national security policy, we will be publishing a variety of articles on both the Republican and Democrat candidates for President during this election year. As always, the opinions of our Contributing Editors are their own, and do not necessarily reflect those of Family Security Matters.
July 3, 2008
As part of his tour under the auspices of the European Foundation for Democracy, Professor Walid Phares gave a lecture at the European Policy Center (EPC) under the title of "Radicalization of Muslim Youth: se self fulfilling prophecy." The event was chaired by Mrs. Shada Islam and attended by diplomats from many nations including Afghanistan, Singapore, Indonesia, US, Canada, Romania, Austria, Malaysia, Japan, UK, Poland, the European Commission, the Council of Europe andmembers of the European Parliament.
In partnership with the King Baudouin Foundation, the EPC describes itself as an independent Think Tank at the cutting edge of European Union affairs. The lecture series is under the EU integration and Citizenship program.
According to a report by the EPC on Dr. Phares' lecture, the radicalization of Muslim youth impacts both the EU's internal and external activities, including its national economies and security. Therefore, policies are needed to confront the growth of Jihadism, which is a recruiting ground for young Muslims. "The inability of understanding the roots of this growth in militant and ideological activities is a main reason for the need to debate it and propose better responses to the challenges," Phares said.
It is important, he added, that "Europeans identifies the phenomenon of Jihadism, understand why their perception of it was compromised for so long, and move forward to design new more efficient policies to contain it." Phares expanded as follows:
1) Identification:
a. While Jihadists may have local demands in the various European countries, they still have one ideological display, mostly Salafi Jihadism. When one examines the ideological roots of almost all cases of violence, a unified doctrinal background is clearly detected. Next to Salafism, Khomeinism can also be found.
b. A battle of Identification has been taking place for years between a school of analysis claiming that at the roots of Jihadism are European Foreign Policies, economic disparities and socio-psychological tensions; and another opposing school raising the issue of theological issues behind violence. But in reality, and despite the impact of all the above components, it is an "ideology" which has been found systematically at the strategic roots of the strikes and Terror activities.
c. This ideology has a history beginning in the 1920s with the Wahsbis and the Muslim Brotherhoodsand as of 1979 with the Khomeinists; it has developed global strategies; and as we can see clearer now, it waged three wars of ideas to confuse its foes, democracies."
Phares said that in order to prevent future incidents of Jihadist terrorism (like those in Spain in 2004 and the UK in 2005), a national security policy is needed. In addition, the EU must to take long-term measures to address the civil and urban tensions which fan this violence. Finally, the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy needs to include measures to prevent it spreading outside Europe's borders.
What is Jihad?
Why have Western governments been unable to deal with the Jihadist threat? Phares said it is because they have not fully understood how it is growing both in Europe and in Muslim countries. Therefore, to prevent Jihadism, the first step is to define it.
Jihadism is the movement for those who follow Jihad, and is a particularly radical interpretation of Islam, but the Jihadism as a religious movement has been "transformed" into an ideology. It responds both to local demands - for example, it is used as a recruiting ground by appealing to people's discontent over the handling of issues such as immigration, or internal security, and Jihad also has a broader world "vision."
Jihadism has two branches: Salafism, based on Wahhibist thought, and developed by the Muslim Brotherhood during the early part of the 20th century, now espoused by second- and third-generation Salafists; and Khomeinism, based on the strand of Shiism developed by Iranian religious leader Ayatollah Khomeini.
Dr. Phares disagreed with those who argue that Jihadism is essentially a school of thought which has developed as a reaction to Western foreign policy in the Middle East, pointing out that it began in the 1920s, long before the Arab-Israeli conflict.
He also disagreed with those who claim that the Jihadist movement is born out of frustration over economic disparities, pointing out that its supporters come from all levels of society - while some are poor, many are engineers or doctors and it is funded by members of rich upper-class Muslim benefactors.
The failure to see the rise of the Jihadist movement
The Salafist movement was founded in the 1920s and became more visible from 1945 onwards, during the period of de-colonization. At this time, the Jihadists were able to inject their ideology into anti-colonialist thinking through educating young men in the network of madrassas founded throughout the Muslim world, thanks to support from oil-rich Arab nations. Yet the world failed to detect the rise of the Salafist movement.
After 1990 Jihadism achieved greater prominence. Jihadists saw the Soviet collapse during this period as a "defining moment," as they were able to expel Soviet troops from Afghanistan just before the completely unrelated collapse of the USSR. They therefore believed their actions brought down one of the strongest countries on earth. They took this as a sign, despite the huge imbalance of forces, that they had won through Allah's intervention. So, they argued, what can the West do in the face of such a movement?
In addition to Salafism and Khomeinism, there are two other distinctions within Jihadism: the realists and the radicals. The realists do not believe in engaging with the major powers such as the EU or the U.S., and so take their fight elsewhere - to Chechnya or the Philippines. They also believe in biding their time until they are strong enough to win.
The radicals, on the other hand, believe in taking immediate action - Osama bin Laden's attack on the Twin Towers is a prime example. They argue that this will provoke engagement with the West and Allah will intervene to grant them success. The realists within al Qaeda have recently criticized bin Laden for carrying out the 9/11 attacks when he could not win the larger battle.
Dealing with Jihadists
There are several measures which would help prevent the spread of Jihadism, according to Dr. Phares.
The first, as discussed above, is to define the ideology so one knows who one is dealing with.
The second is to work with the moderates in the Arab and Muslim world to define Jihadist ideology. Phares was scathing in his tone about what he described as "the battle of the lexicon," in which Western policy-makers draw up a list of words to be avoided in order not to fan Muslim-Western tensions.
Thirdly, one should explain to the public exactly what Jihadism is trying to achieve and the disasters that will result if its proponents are not stopped.
Finally, one should encourage an open debate about both the theology and the politics of Jihadism. The "tipping point" will be reached when one can engage with the democratic forces in the Arab and Muslim world. In Europe, the debate should include all Arab and Muslim communities, giving a space for all political and religious forces - not just the Salafists or the Khomeinists - to speak.
Brought to you by the research staff and editors of FamilySecurityMatters.org
| Print This E-mail This |
|