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January 25, 2010
Exclusive: Ask Willa: Former CIA Operations Officer – Who’s to Blame for Recent Intel Failures?
The Detroit flight debacle; the tragic attack on CIA and other officials in Khost, Afghanistan; and the Fort Hood incident are appalling security failures. This is true particularly in this day and age, after so much presumed "reform" of the Intelligence Community.
These crises are not the result of lack of presidential interest, a fall-on-the-sword apology by the National Security Advisor, or the behavior of any other senior official on either side of the aisle, Democrat or Republican. This is not the time to be “political.”
Intelligence professionals carry out their work, at home and abroad, regardless of their political orientation. They are not motivated by their politics, but by their devotion to their service and to the well-being of the United States. As a retired operations officer, it is painful, even sickening, to watch politicians, especially those on Capitol Hill , who chose to use these tragic incidents to advance their own political agendas. And, I refer only to those who are doing that.
No matter what U.S. intelligence successes there have been in recent years, it is unacceptable that these three occurred in such close sequence and at a time when there has been so much supposedly useful reorganization and upgrading of U.S. intelligence, post-9/11.
So, who or what is the culprit behind these failures, these recent failures in particular? Why did they occur? Who is really to blame? And, most important, what can we do to improve our Intelligence Community?
The culprit is the behemoth bureaucracy.
The failures stem essentially from an overweight, flaccid bureaucracy, one which is too large, disperse and cumbersome to handle the most critical and sensitive intelligence on a consistent and priority basis. Instead of creating a lean, streamlined and effective system, the 9/11 Commission, after all its analysis, gave birth to yet another bureaucratic structure – The Director of National Intelligence (the DNI).
Certainly the Commission did not intend it to be yet another office, another layer, another system. But, that is in fact what they created and what it soon became. The DNI was intended to improve communications between and among the numerous intelligence organizations within the U.S. Government and to ensure the smooth and effective collecting, sharing and analyzing of intelligence. Instead, the DNI replaced the DCI (Director of Central Intelligence and of the CIA), and a new organization was born, soon to have its own body of personnel, offices and responsibilities, along with all the U.S. intelligence entities which had developed along the way.
We have watched U.S. intelligence grow from one tiny, emerging CIA in 1947, to over 16 U.S. intelligence organizations and thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands of employees, in a mere 63 years. In addition to the 16, there is the Department of Homeland Security, as well as tactical military security organizations, among others. There are too many layers within the system and too many managers approving work at all levels to get important, even critical, information through the system rapidly and efficiently.
And, if you doubt that, how was it possible that information from a highly credible source in Nigeria, the former Minister of the Economy, on his dangerously disaffected son, did not reach and speed through the highest levels of the intelligence system. And this was just one of the clues about Umar Abdulmutallab. The system is phlegmatic.
Do you think it is even possible to coordinate the incoming information from all of these organizations in an effective way? Of course it’s not. Yes, we still need separate compartments for crypto collection and analysis, various science and technology (S &T) entities, and human intelligence (HUMINT), et al, but we don’t need the number of organizations and employees we have today. U.S. intelligence needs to be reduced in size. To be highly effective, there should be fewer organizations, less concomitant turf and fewer personnel.
The DNI should be eliminated, and HUMINT should be consolidated, including the military entities. In my view, it should fall once again under the CIA. Other than turf, there is no real reason why the CIA cannot oversee and house most HUMINT, while the Pentagon retains whatever is truly necessary of their HUMINT responsibilities.
Redundancy in organization and mission is not necessary. This is not the private sector! Intelligence is not a business which operates on a competitive basis! Brilliant new operations and operational planning can come from within, from creative groups structured on an ad hoc basis to innovate and improve intelligence (including security, counterintelligence, counterterrorism et al).
And, while the policy makers are at it – I mean reducing the number of structures and overlapping positions – they should go ahead and spend the money required to ensure that employees – at all levels – have the best computer and technological equipment to do their jobs. The taxpayer dollar would be well spent to update basic desktop equipment to the level of the current marketplace. It is shocking to learn that our system failed to turn up the name of Umar Abdulmutallab – essentially because of a spelling error. State-of-the-art equipment will help everyone do a better job, and it will not cost the taxpayer much money.
Downsize and streamline the bureaucracy! And, if that’s done, the Intelligence Community will have the added benefit of keeping its best and brightest.
“Willa” is the pseudonym of a former CIA Operations Officer, who worked to protect our nation for over 30 years.
Reader Comments: Submit Your Comment (2) | Sign Up for FSM Updates!
I agree with most of what you say. Layer smother an organization faster than anything - particularly since the drones who can't hack it in the field gravitate to the headquarters.
I do not, however, agree with you concerning consolidation of all HUMINT at the CIA. In my experience, the CIA was seldom willing to go out into a hot neighborhood and meet a source at midnight. COmmander need people who they know will be responsive to their needs for information their troops depend on to survive. The other issue is interrogation. there have to be interrogators who are accompanying the infantry and can question a prisoner while his ears are still ringing from the grenade that killed his squad mates.
posted by: D. Christman
Monday, January 25, 2010 at 11:41 AM
Is being an OO for the CIA like being a spy? Do you need military experience? Do you go over seas and do covert missions? If not what is the closest job in the CIA to a spy.
posted by: Jacob
Saturday, December 10, 2011 at 00:55 AM
