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July 16, 2010
Exclusive: New START – Strengthening or Weakening America?
A treaty reducing nuclear weapons is important. And thus we should be paying attention to the New START treaty now before the Senate. But equally important, in fact more so, is whether the foundation upon which the treaty rests is sufficiently strong to continue to protect America’s security.
At issue is whether the United States maintains a strong and balanced nuclear deterrent and has sufficient political consensus to do so in the face of serious fiscal restraints on the defense budget. By contrast, much of the commentary on the process of Senate ratification has centered on the question of the treaty's restrictions on planned or possible future US missile defenses, which has tended to obscure other related but equally critical issues. Thus while the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s consideration of the “New Start Treaty” continues, some key issues remain to be addressed.
A little background is in order. Critical to the treaty’s ratification is an assumption that if the treaty does not restrict the deployment of “planned” US missile defenses, no further objections need be considered. This requires, understandably, some fancy verbal footwork. The treaty does not in fact limit “planned” missile defenses. For example, if we planned to field missile defenses in any of our three Minuteman bases, in part of the 450 silos now containing offensive missiles, the treaty would not allow that.
But since we have no plans to do so, the treaty supporters have declared there is nothing in the treaty to stop “”planned” US missile defenses. Many supporters then have leaped to the conclusion that any further concern with the treaty other than potential missile defense restrictions is without merit because somehow only potential missile defense inhibitions have been raised by “treaty opponents” and are worthy of consideration.
This all came about when it was pointed out that there were in fact provisions in the treaty that did actually restrict missile defense, after numerous assertions from treaty drafters that such restrictions did not exist. Unable to deny the obvious, treaty drafters said the restrictions while present were meaningless because the US had no “plans” to build the missile defenses that were banned. Better yet, and here the argument had more merit, the banned deployments would not have been either cost-effective or operationally sensible.
Yes, it is true, that as long as no future administration plans to use some of our current Minuteman silos for such missile defenses, the START treaty does not impair our missile defense plans. General O’Reilly, the director of the Missile Defense Agency, has addressed this question in some detail. He notes that placing interceptors in Minuteman silos would require new electronics, a change-out of the current suspension system, plus new command and control systems, all of which would be more expensive than building new silos at Ft. Greeley in Alaska, where we currently have 26 ( out of a planned 34) deployed interceptors capable, (according to MDA) of shooting down long-range ballistic missiles. At this site, significant additional missile interceptors could be deployed should Congress and the administration so decide.
As for deploying interceptors on our strategic submarines, which is also prohibited by START, the current missile defenders are “hot launch” rockets, as opposed to the submarine launched D-5 missiles which “pop-up” cold before they ignite away from the submarine. We would have to build a new interceptor to be effectively and safely launched from submarines, which would be costly and would not be the most cost-effective use of either the four Trident submarines no longer part of the US nuclear deterrent force or those 12-14 Trident submarines now still critical to our nuclear deterrent Triad.
However, this debate, though accurate as far as it goes, unfortunately obscures issues that are far more important. There are at least seven such issues. These include: (1) the extent to which future force structure modernization is planned and funded; (2) whether agreement can be reached on the needed modernization of our nuclear infrastructure for maintenance of a safe and reliable nuclear weapons stockpile; and (3) whether the strategic significance of pathways for future growth in Russian strategic nuclear forces allowed by START are understood, including throw-weight, missiles launched from airplanes or surface ships and the number of warheads that can be deployed per missile, especially in light of a very aggressive Russian strategic nuclear doctrine.
In addition, there are important issues such as: (4) the extent to which quick ratification of the New Start Treaty significantly lessens what future leverage the US has to control and limit the deployed and stockpiled tactical nuclear weapons in Russia; (5) what promises will the Russians claim, or understandings will they claim we agreed to, about future missile defenses based, for example, on US mobile Aegis Navy ships; and (6) to what extent does Russia see the START agreement as contingent on the US also agreeing to a treaty or agreement limiting “weapons in space” or the extent to which Russia sees the START treaty as part of a web of legal entanglements that will limit future US technological advancements, notably in US missile defenses and prompt global strike capabilities. Former defense official Fred Celic makes the point that we might have proposed a trade-off: the Russians could get their lower levels of SNDVs if the US in return could get an upward boundary on the level of tactical nuclear weapons.
A final issue goes to the heart of (7) the extent to which US strategic nuclear deterrent policy is driven primarily by a genuine pursuit of zero nuclear weapons [some have described as a long range “goal,” not to be considered as more than a genuine gesture toward compliance with Article VI of the NPT] rather than a continued pursuit of a strong strategic nuclear deterrent at whatever level of weapons we deploy.
Administration supporters would argue that we are pursuing both, and they would be right, in part. Nevertheless, there are two caveats: (1) what do we mean by "maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent" and (2) what would we be doing differently if we had not chosen to “decisively” move down the path toward zero nuclear weapons?
In short, implicit in this argument is that under all previous administrations, the goal of global zero was acknowledged, but US efforts were more centered on ending the nuclear arms race--the nuclear SALT, INF, START, and SORT treaties--and maintaining a strategic balance bounded by stability and effectiveness. Thus strategic modernization was closely watched but a real commitment to “global zero” was absent.
Ironically, following the end of the Cold War, there was a significant neglect of the nuclear enterprise, both in terms of maintaining the nuclear weapons stockpile but also in insuring continuity of US force structure modernization. Long term plans for the effective modernization of our nuclear enterprise were left for “another day”; the priority given to the nuclear enterprise also suffered. Resources and commitment waned. While the media template was that the Bush administration relied too heavily on nuclear weapons, reality was much more mixed. A road map for the future was there in part, but too much was left vague and “to be determined”.
Thus it is that while the administration has submitted in a congressionally required report a rough roadmap of our future nuclear modernization effort, the report remains classified and reportedly does not contain an explicit commitment to either a future bomber—under consideration-- or land-based ICBM or intercontinental ballistic missile fleet beyond 2020-30. This is significant in that 2030 is the minimum time that Congress requires the US to continue to maintain our current ICBM force until we can decide on a follow-on force. Here the debate is not something we should put off. To be fair, since at least 1993, or almost 20 years, there has not been agreement on a well-defined future strategic nuclear deterrent, but that nonetheless does not mean such an agreement should not be forthcoming.
This is not a trivial matter. As former USAF Chief of Staff and Commander of our Strategic Air Command, General Larry Welch noted recently, the requirement for a Minuteman fleet of single warhead missiles, complemented by strategic submarines and bombers, for example, is critical to maintaining future strategic stability and deterrence, especially as we go down to lower levels of deployed weapons. The ICBM system is also very cost-effective. The submarines are a secure second-strike capability. The bombers give us unparalleled flexibility. Keeping such systems deployed requires some work to begin now. Such a future roadmap is under development but has not yet been fully approved by either the administration or considered and blessed by Congress.
It would be very useful to have an agreed upon “roadmap” prior to START ratification. While New START ratification does not prevent development of a roadmap for a reliable deterrent, there is not now such a pathway and thus ratification would be to some degree a step toward a highly uncertain future in the absence of such a plan. The commitment to an effective deterrent in return for START ratification might do much to establish the beginnings of a sustainable political coalition of support for continued nuclear deterrence. Once ratification becomes a reality, pressure to establish a genuine bipartisan roadmap might lessen considerably.
In addition, the twin partner to a strategic modernization program for our triad of platforms—submarines, bombers and land-based missiles—is the requirement to maintain a safe, reliable, effective and safe strategic nuclear weapons stockpile, a requirement addressed at length by the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission. The administration has addressed some of these key requirements by adding significant funds to the US Department of Energy for some of this work. However, the US Congress has not yet agreed on such a roadmap for sustainment. While the ability of one Congress to “bind” a future Congress is limited, there is nothing standing in the way of a statute similar to the previous Kemphorne amendment passed in the 1990s that would require the US to continue the deployment of a strategic Triad and a sustainable and effective nuclear enterprise for all aspects of our deterrent.
Of critical importance also are issues surrounding Russian nuclear doctrine and pathways for growth in Russian nuclear forces. It is widely assumed the Russians planned for significant deployed warhead/platform reductions even in the absence of a treaty requiring such action, primarily it is thought due to economic pressures. But as both Dr. Steve Blank of the US Army War College and Mark Schneider of the National Institute for Public Policy have outlined, Russia has adopted a very aggressive nuclear weapons policy that sees the use of nuclear weapons “early and often” in armed conflicts, even those that may involve only conventionally armed adversaries.
Equally important, despite the current financial problems that inhibit growth in Russian strategic forces, are the “pathways” for growth in the Russian strategic nuclear systems not limited by the treaty but which were previously limited under START I. In fact, there were such restrictions under START I not now contained in the new START treaty.
This involves the deployment of nuclear missiles launched from ships, airplanes, and the number of warheads deployed per missile, for example, all of which has a relationship to the future force structure Russia might wish to deploy. The START treaty does not limit such deployments per se as part of the actual arsenal. The administration believes that any Russian deployments would be limited even though they are not now deployed. Any such conflict over deployment could be discussed within the new BCC, the bilateral consultative commission. And true, to the extent to which the current treaty is in force only for ten years, such Russia growth might not occur or be visible until the end of this decade, and thus the US could be prepared for such an eventuality.
That in turn raises the issue of the need to verify Russian actions, or as an alternative, we may be forced to rely on an assumption the Russians will not build such forces even if they can, or if they do, we can match them. We can raise the issue in the BCC as well. We might also believe such growth is not strategically significant even if the Russians did expand. Either way, we should at least have a discussion and a debate on this because it relates particularly to whether we are paying sufficient attention to the possibility that the future strategic environment may not unfold as we assume.
In the broader context of all nuclear weapons, apparently Russia wanted significantly lower levels of SNDVs, or strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, than did the United States. The Russians proposed 500, the US 1100. A compromise of 700-900 with appropriate flexibility for deployed and non-deployed systems would have been my preferred outcome.
But the agreed upon 700-800 number, while not optimal, will allow the U.S. to maintain somewhere between 420-450 Minuteman, which even at the lower range is at a minimum 94% of our current force. And the bomber counting rules, where every strategic or heavy bomber counts as “one” warhead, allows very significant flexibility to where the actual number of deployed weapons may ironically exceed the 2200 deployed warhead limit of the 2002 Moscow Treaty.
Given that, the SNDV level adopted was to provide the Russians a sense of parity or strategic equality to the US, putting them on a par with the United States in so far as nuclear weapons go. That is worth a lot to the Russians both symbolically and practically. But we may have given up a considerable amount of leverage with an SNDV level of 700 deployed systems, although proponents of the treaty suggest a trade-off in that we got better relations with Russia, although the jury may be out on that.
Although we may be able to live with an SNDV level below the optimal number we would like, we remain faced with Russian tactical nuclear weapons that are many times the number of US and allied weapons, by a factor of 10 or more. Estimates vary, but as Ambassador David Smith noted at a Heritage Foundation forum on START, Russia may have tens of thousands of such weapons compared to relatively modest US stockpiles, an advantage that gives serious pause to our allies in Europe and Asia. In addition, there is no difference in the physics package of such weapons when compared to strategic weapons, according to William Schneider, the former head of the Defense Science Board and one of America's premier strategic thinkers, so these weapons are available for rapid deployment.
Of further concern is a factor that is not now knowable. And that is the extent to which the Russians believe we have agreed in principle—but not necessarily specific to the treaty---to restraints on allowable missile defenses, especially those that are sea-based and involve the Navy's standard missile. As Uzi Rubin, the top-notch missile defense expert who is the father of the Israel missile defense programs, has noted, giving the standard missile a speed of 4.5-5.0+ kilometers per second—compared to the current capability of slightly more than 3/k/sec---would allow the US and its allies to deploy as few as 2-3 ships in the Mediterranean theater and protect all of Europe from ballistic missile threats not only from Iran, for example, but all of North Africa and much of the Middle East.
Once we achieve that capability, we would have a better supplemental defense capable of defending the continental United States against longer-range Iranian rockets or those with intercontinental capability. As Congressman Trent Franks, FDD adjunct fellow Rebecca Heinrich and former DCI James Woolsey have all warned recently, Iranian intercontinental rocket capability may be a reality within a few years. US intelligence assessments say Iran could launch ballistic missiles armed with nuclear warheads in a little as two years.
Since a key element of the proposed US missile defense capability is mobile, and thus could be moved to deployed areas other than Europe or NATO, it could, theoretically, be based in such a way to be able to intercept Russian rockets. Although it might then be 2020 or later that such a system is capable against Iranian long range rockets, according to administration plans, but by implication it would have some capability against Russian strategic rockets as well. And thus the continued Russian concern and opposition to such plans.
Although "planned" US deployments will not have any real significant capability against Russian strategic systems, the Russians have said both that any increase or any significant increase of future numerical deployed missile defenses would be a violation of the START agreement. They have also claimed that any qualitative enhancement of our capability would also be grounds for the Russians to walk away from the START treaty. This may of course be no more than bluff, but it could operate in a way to diminish US flexibility in deploying missile defenses. Remember the quip of one top arms control specialist: arms agreements between the US and Russia always end up as debates within America about what America should or should not deploy, even among Americans!
The irony of tying missile defense deployments with our offensive deterrent forces and those of Russia is that, after all, the missile threats we and our allies face are not controlled by the Russians. In fact, as many analysts would argue, to the extent Russia has helped both North Korea and Iran, they do in fact have some influence on the size and scope of the ballistic missile threat facing the US and its allies from Iran and North Korea and that is to make it worse! And of course there are no restrictions in START on exactly this kind of historical help from Russia to either Iran or North Korea, to say nothing of help from other countries. [This is ironic in that the US is not helping rogue nations with their ballistic missile or nuclear weapons programs. It is true the US has a cooperative program with the British, which we always have, on the future production of their replacement Trident class strategic submarines.]
Unsaid in most of the START commentary is also the question of the extent to which the US will agree to restrictions in the deployment in space of missile defenses. A defense official spoke a few weeks ago of how the PAROS treaty, calling for only the peaceful uses of outer space, could be written in such a way as not to require advise and consent of the US Senate. This official said, “We really want to avoid the Senate”, and indicated the administration might simply agree to “space rules of the road”, rather than a binding treaty, and achieve the same ends. The Bush administration, too, had also sought an agreement on space "rules of the road" which could be very useful if agreed to.
But serious issues remain. One such question is whether our Aegis capability to shoot down missiles with ranges greater than 2000 kilometers would be considered an intrinsic ASAT or anti-satellite capability, (a capability to shoot down missiles above the atmosphere) and thus be banned under a peaceful uses of space agreement. This is not simply speculative. The U.S. did use a modified Aegis system capability to destroy a broken satellite that was in danger of falling to earth with hazardous material that posed some danger to people and property. This “ASAT” or anti-satellite capability has been very high on the list of both the Russians and Chinese as a US capability to be banned under a space treaty. Some argue that our development of an ASAT capability or even the ability to protect our own satellites will trigger a similar program in Russia or China. But this assumes no such programs exist in either country or that such programs—if banned—can be effectively monitored and verified.
Finally, and perhaps this is the most interesting question, what would the United States do to maintain deterrence if we had NOT established a goal to get to zero? In short, what maintains deterrence but also allows you to go to zero vs. what maintains deterrence but which is inconsistent with going to zero? Some elements within the Global Zero community have hinted at this—going to lower levels of nuclear weapons, say below 1000, would break the US strategic Triad. This in turn, the theory goes, would compel the US to adopt a retaliatory targeting policy of pure city-busting—i.e., we would no longer be able to effectively target an adversary’s nuclear forces.
This would mean a secure second-strike capability would no longer be needed as the only targets worthwhile to strike would be cities and industrial facilities. This leads to the conclusion that there would be no corresponding need to keep any nuclear forces on alert—cities aren’t going anywhere and whatever nuclear forces exist in the arsenal of each country cannot be readily launched. And the assumption is that not having forces on alert means our adversaries would not plan to strike our nuclear forces under either a damage limitation or pre-emptive strike policy. And this in turn means the US can safely take our forces off alert!
General Welch has called the adoption of a “city-busting” policy immoral and not something the American people would support. In addition, the policy places in sanctuary our adversary’s nuclear forces which would further heighten strategic instability. Finally, while it is unclear at what policy end the global zero advocates would start—de-alerting first or breaking the Triad--the logic calls for both. The result, of course is the same—nuclear forces of only a rudimentary capability, highly vulnerable and relatively ineffective for deterrent purposes. Whether we are inevitably going in such a direction, by design or by default, is certainly a serious question that needs to be answered before the completion of the ratification process.
Finally, while START deals with currently deployed and stockpiled nuclear weapons, what about the broader context of future developed nuclear programs and proliferation, especially those in states deemed hostile to the US. For example, Russia has pledged to build nuclear power plants for Venezuela and Syria. Is this consistent with Global Zero or a "reset" US-Russian relationship? Is Chinese continued assistance to the Pakistani nuclear programs consistent with Global Zero? Given Iran and North Korea’s continued flaunting of both the NPT and related UN resolutions, is assistance, trade or investment of any kind for Pyongyang or Tehran consistent with Global Zero?
Much of the impetus behind START is an assumption that further warhead reductions could rekindle or reset our relationship with Russia for the better. This in turn, it is assumed, would allow Russia, in return for the benefits they received under START, to help put economic, political and diplomatic pressure on Iran, North Korea and potentially other would-be proliferators. Ironically, under both the UN and Congressional passed Iranian sanctions, the Russians received a waiver from the measures precisely because it was deemed a “cooperative” country in so far as the US deemed its relationship to Iran and thwarting proliferation. In short, you get a waiver from putting on the very restrictions in the relationship you have with Iran because you are deemed already cooperating in exactly such measures you now have to get a waiver from undertaking. Yes folks, diplomacy and what has come to be described as “smart power” is a wonderful thing!
In any case, the numerous issues surrounding START should get a hearing prior to a vote on ratification. That debate has started but it needs to be extended. START needs to stand on a solid, long-term foundation of planned strategic modernization and an effective implementing strategy. Getting there will take some heavy lifting. But our founders didn’t necessarily think it would be easy "to provide for the common defense". That is what we have leaders for. Congress and the administration both need to stand up.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Peter Huessy is on the Board of the Maryland Taxpayers Association and President of Geostrategic Analysis of Potomac, Maryland, a national security firm.
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