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September 8, 2010
Russian "Illegals" Aren't Alone in Trying to Steal our Secrets
Just when you thought the bumbling Boris Badenov and his side-number Natasha Fatale had retired to a secluded dacha, the FBI uncovers the largest spy ring in the United States in post-Cold War history this summer.
For more than a decade, Mother Russia had been running a dozen, deepcover “illegals” posing as ordinary Americans (but using assumed names and identities, some of them of the deceased) right under our noses.
The rolled-up Russians were charged with being unregistered agents of a foreign government and with money laundering, but interestingly, none was charged with espionage—likely due to the lack of success of their clandestine efforts.
But shortly after a New York City court appearance where they pled guilty to the charge of being unregistered agents in a plea deal and were sentenced to deportation, the soiled spooks were whisked off to neutral ground in Austria, long the crossroads of international espionage, for a spy swap.
On a remote corner of the tarmac at Vienna’s airport, two chartered jets parked and our group of Russian illegals was exchanged for three Russian intelligence officers and a contractor accused of collaborating with American and British intelligence.
But while the would-be cloak-and dagger cabal did not seem to provide much in terms of “intel” booty to their Russian SVR (the KGB’s successor) handlers since 1999, this spy bust did unearth some troubling issues.
FROM RUSSIA WITH LOVE—OR NOT
First, the Russian snow leopard has not changed its spots, despite efforts by the Obama White House to court the Kremlin. The Russian government, rife with former Soviet security officials, including Prime Minister Vladimir Putin, still sees us as an important intelligence target.
And while Team Obama mashes the “reset” button on U.S.-Russia relations at every opportunity—such as the “Hamburger Summit” in June between President Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev—it must be understood how “Amerika” is seen from Red Square.
Unfortunately, the Kremlin doesn’t see the White House in the friendly, let’s-be partners sort of way Washington currently looks at Moscow. Instead, Russia views the United States through a prism of raw national interest, seeing a troubling competitor—and a country that won the Cold War.
And while we may say, “Comrade, we all won,” Kremlin potentates do not see it that way. In fact, in 2005, then-President Putin said that the greatest geopolitical tragedy of the 20th century was the fall of the Soviet Union.
But for the moment, the Kremlin is actually quite pleased with the generous crowd in the White House today, and some would suggest that the lack of protest by the Russians over the spy case was an effort to keep the beneficial relations toward Moscow on track.
For instance, the Kremlin is grateful to the White House for putting the kibosh on the Bush-era missile defense program in Eastern Europe, not harping on Moscow’s troops remaining in Georgia since the end of their 2008 war or fussing over diminishing political and civil liberties in Russia, among other matters.
And more than that, the Kremlin also really wants the U.S. Senate to give the thumbs-up to the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START), on which the Russians got a really good deal. (See “No-Nukes Nonsense” in the June 2010 issue of Townhall.)
The last thing the Kremlin wants is for the Russian spy story, replete with a fiery, red-headed Mata Hari, to linger in the U.S. news cycle, becoming a burr under the saddle of Senate deliberations on START ratification.
But while this seemingly lacklustre Russian intelligence operation did not reach its full potential, it is a stark example of the risks Moscow will take to get at Washington’s secrets. In addition, it is not the best the SVR can do.
NOT THE A-TEAM
MISSION: “You were sent to USA for long term service trip. Your education, bank accounts, car, house, etc.—all these serve one goal: fulfill your main mission, i.e., to search and develop ties in policy-making circles in the US and send intels [intelligence reports] to Center.”
—Message from Moscow Center to Russian agents
While some in the media reported the story of the Kremlin’s clandestine conspiracy as something out of a pulp-fiction spy novel, do not buy into the notion that these spies were little more than a menagerie of hapless James Bond-wannabes.
Indeed, though some scoffed at the Russian operation due to its seeming lack of payoff despite years of effort, including its choice of soft targets such as think tanks, the scientific community and academia, “spotter” operations such as this can pay big rubles.
This undated image taken from the Russian social networking website “Odnoklassniki” shows AnnaChapman, who became the media face of the 10 Russians arrested on charges of conspiracy to act as anagent of a foreign government. (AP)
Meeting new people is not only good for business and social networking, it is also useful in the spy business. For instance, one of the Russian operatives could come into contact and develop a relationship with someone who might one day find their way into the federal government in a position of influence or have access to sensitive information.
In fact, many senior political appointments in the executive branch of the federal government, which are doled out by the White House, are filled with folks who came out of think tanks, academia and other private-sector positions.
A spy might develop social or business ties with people like this while they are in the private sector that could carry over into their time in public life in a high-level post at the Pentagon, the State Department—or elsewhere.
For instance, while not completely analogous, a recent Cuban spy case is illustrative. Recently sentenced to life in prison, the septuagenarian great-grandson of Alexander Graham Bell was recruited by Cuba’s intelligence service, the DGI, in the 1970s. But it was only after he became a spy that the Fidel Castro-admiring Walter Myers joined the State Department, settling into the Intelligence and Research Bureau, where he passed classified information to Havana, according to the legal proceedings against him.
Another approach would be to try to gain access to someone who is not in the executive branch of the federal government, but might have access to information of interest, is influential themselves or has access to someone in power such as a congressional staffer. These people might not be directly involved in what is happening inside the White House, for instance, but through their jobs, they may have a pretty good idea of the deliberations on issues such as arms control or U.S. policy towards Afghanistan and Iran—all reportedly of interest to SVR taskmasters.
In addition, the use of illegals allows a hostile intelligence service to operate below counterintelligence radar to accomplish tasks that might be too risky for their inside embassy colleagues to do since they may be under surveillance by the host country’s security services.
For example, one illegal couple in the recently busted Russian ring, known here as Richard and Cynthia Murphy (but in Moscow as Vladimir and Lydia Guryev), even reportedly had Fourth of July barbecues on their front lawn that neighbors attended, reducing suspicion about their double lives.
The Murphy-Guryevs were eventually unmasked and monitored by the FBI, helping expose the spy web, but for some period, they may have been able to act freely as intelligence collectors for the SVR.
These Russians were not total amateurs, demonstrating some real spy tradecraft, including the use of dead-drops (i.e., a hiding place where something is left for someone to pick up later), sophisticated wireless computer messaging and steganography (i.e., hiding messages on
websites).
This is not the best the Russian intelligence services can do—not by a long shot. Indeed, back during the Cold War days of Spy vs. Spy, the Russians had some incredible intelligence coups against us, including running:
• the CIA’s Aldrich Ames, who betrayed CIA operations, officers and assets to Moscow, resulting in the death of at least 10 clandestine Soviet agents working for us;
• the FBI’s Robert Hanssen, who did grave damage to our national security by exposing sensitive counterintelligence operations over nearly 20 years that also led to the death of at least two Russian double agents;
• the U.S. Navy’s John Walker, who compromised codes, allowing Russia to decipher millions of encrypted, classified messages that would have been devastating if the Soviet Union and the United States had gone to war; and,
• the National Security Agency’s Ronald Pelton, who provided information to the
Soviets on a super-secret Navy submarine collection operation known as “Ivy Bells,” which, when compromised, ended the flow of critical information on the Soviet military to our national security establishment.
Moreover, according to the U.S. government, Russian intelligence is more active with more spies here today than it was during the Cold War—no doubt in part due to the ease of traveling to the United States from Mother Russia than it was before the fall of Berlin Wall.
This means that this latest, ill-fated operation is likely only a sampling of SVR operations currently underway here in the United States. Professional intelligence services, including the Russians, go to great lengths to keep their work in the shadows, so it is possible that this group of illegals is only the tip of the iceberg. From traditional embassy spies to front companies to cybersleuthing, there may be hundreds of Russian agents among us today.
And while our counterintelligence G-men should take a bow for shutting down these Maxwell Smarts and Agent 99s, this operation did get off the ground and, while not publicly available, it appears it ran undetected for at least two years before it was initially discovered.
Even more troubling: The Russians are not alone in trying to pick our pockets of privileged information.
ONLY ONE OF MANY
This combo of 10 booking photos provided by U.S. Marshals shows from top left, Cynthia Murphy, whose real name is Lydia Guryev, Patricia Mills whose real name is Natalia Pereverzeva, Anna Chapman, Tracey Lee Ann Foley whose real name is Elena Vavilova, Vicky Pelaez, and bottom, from left, Richard Murphy, born Vladimir Guryev, Michael Zottoli whose real name is Mikhail Kutsik, Mikhail Semenko, Donald Howard Heathfield whose real name is Andrey Bezrukov and Juan Lazaro whose real name is Mikhail Vasenkov. The FBI arrested the 10 on June 27, charging them with acting as unregistered foreign agents for Russia. All pleaded guilty to conspiring to act as an unregistered agent of a foreign country and were sent back to Russia as part of spy swap.
In fact, according to the U.S. government, in any given year, about one-half of the world’s nearly 200 countries conduct intelligence collection operations against the United States. Of course, that is what is known, the number may actually be higher
Espionage
And as it turns out, Russia is not our biggest counterintelligence problem—it is China that is the greatest threat to America’s secrets. In February, then-Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Dennis Blair, testifi ed to Congress:
“During the past year, China’s intelligence services continued to expand and operate in and outside the United States. Its human collection services enhanced their collection and processing capabilities directed against the United States.”
But Beijing reportedly tends to opt for the less-traditional spook modus operandi such as trying to recruit Chinese businessmen, students and scientists traveling here on study and work visas—even pressuring Chinese-Americans-to collect information that will aid the Middle Kingdom’s rise.
Of course, China may be best known these days for its cyber-spying operations, where a target’s computer is penetrated, often resulting in sensitive data being stealthily exfiltrated—in many cases without the victims even knowing of the perfect crime that has just been committed against them.
The DNI also told Congress that the Iranians and Cubans are both active against the United States. Both reportedly share their ill-gotten intelligence loot with America’s enemies, resulting in additional harm to U.S. interests.
And it is not just American government secrets such as national security policies, the thinking of key decision-makers or the latest negotiating strategy on an international trade deal that foreign intelligence services are interested in, but other matters as well.
In addition, U.S. commercial and defense technologies rank high on the intelligence collection priorities list of those working against us. Why spend a lot of time and money developing cutting-edge technologies when you can just steal them?
Swiping defense industry secrets allows potential adversaries to improve the capability of their armed forces or find ways to counter our most advanced weapons during conflict. During the Cold War, it was not uncommon to see new Russian aircraft that looked similar to existing, advanced American military planes.
On the commercial side, in some cases, purloining proprietary information such as designs, innovations and industrial processes, allows foreign firms to directly compete with American companies on the international market, undermining our economic competitiveness.
Another important effort by foreign spy agencies is to try to recruit American intelligence or counterintelligence officers to betray their country and work for them.
In this case, the other side can find out who is spying against them in their country (e.g., the Ames case) as well as how to successfully run intelligence operations here, gaining the knowledge to outwit our counterintelligence forces (e.g., the Hanssen case).
And then, of course, there is intelligence covert action—or influence—operations, which are meant to secretly intervene in the course of events to change their outcome in a specifi c direction without outside involvement being detected, including using propaganda, bribery or a Manchurian candidate.
The point is that there’s a lot more to this botched spy ring than some Russian Austin Power-skis run amok. There are some serious national security matters here that must be addressed to protect our interests, including seeing Russia with a sober eye.
People are wrong to think that espionage ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall some 20 years ago. Ain’t so. But that is what foreign spymasters would like us to think about the world’s second-oldest profession, lulling us into complacency.
In fact, on the contrary, spying is at all time highs and is not limited to TV and Hollywood blockbusters. That means, Dahling, as our dear Natasha would say, the time to tackle this growing threat to our national security is now.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Peter Brookes is Senior Fellow, National Security Affairs and Chung Ju-Yung Fellow for Policy Studies in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage Foundation.
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