- MUST READS
- PRODUCTS
- RESOURCES
- MULTIMEDIA
- ENFACTLOPEDIA
- FSM AUTHORS
- ABOUT US
- CONTACT US
- FSM BLOG
- DONATE
- PRESS COVERAGE
SEARCH FSM
- IN THIS SECTION
August 14, 2008
Exclusive: Military Necessity
An old, bawdy joke has a bear hunter carefully tracking his target, shooting, and missing, only to suffer a perverted attack from the bear in response. Shamed and barely surviving, the hunter comes back the next day with ever more powerful weapons, only to again miss and face a more brutal and “frisky” counter-attack from the bear. This process continues a few more times until after completing his most intense retaliation, the bear asks, “You’re not really in this for the hunt, are you?”
The West values diplomatic negotiation for conflict resolution. While many leaders will repeat the mantra “all options are on the table,” military options are relegated to the far end of the table. Yet, the West seems to continually fail in its attempts to “negotiate” with some of its long term enemies. Israel has attempted peace with the Palestinians for many decades only to find itself in as dangerous a condition as ever. America has been in conflict with Iran for almost 30 years only to find itself in its most vulnerable position to date. Each time the West or Israel gives Iran or the Palestinian “leadership” an ever more favorable (powerful) offer, the response is an even firmer rejection. Perhaps Iranian President Ahmadinejad will turn around one day and ask “You guys are not really here for a deal, are you?”
When Yasser Arafat walked away from a sweetheart “land for peace” deal with Israel, most Westerners could not (or, more correctly, did not wish to) comprehend the logic. The rejection was most often explained as either a miscalculation, a result of pressure from other Arab countries, poor communication or a misunderstanding. Rarely is it cited that Arafat had made clear before the talks that he had NO intention of making any kind of deal. Rarely pondered is what Arafat or any Palestinian leadership would have done if Israel no longer served as its enemy. Most significantly, no one cites how Arafat was immediately heralded by his people as a hero for having stood up to the Americans and Israelis. Rejection itself is a goal.
The most recent attempt by the Security Council members to reach a deal with Iran has been met once again with Iranian rejection. It is clear that the Iranians have no interest in stopping their uranium enrichment and, by rejecting any deal, are simply stalling until either they reach nuclear weapons capability or have provoked some other desired response from either Israel or the U.S. Are we really seeking a deal or could we possibly have an investment in continuing to see our attempts at “peace” rejected?
Obviously, the West wants to reach a deal which embodies its concept of “peace.” Part of the problem is that the other side simply does not have the same concept or objective. In failing to fully accept the futility resulting from such conflicting goals, the West enables a continuing and accelerating process which brings about the very result it claims it seeks to avoid. The old adage- that insanity is constantly doing the same thing expecting a different outcome- applies to this very policy.
Our experience with Iraq is instructive. For 12 years, Saddam’s continual refusal to comply with Security Council resolutions bred a cycle of more resolutions followed by more resistance. As President Bush, supported in part by Prime Minister Blair, began to mobilize toward using force, they were met with opposition from so-called “allies” and others such as France, Germany, and Russia, each of which had lucrative economic deals with Saddam in need of protection. The UN processes, which merely had an appearance of moving toward “change”, insured the status quo. Diplomatic approaches to “change” resulted in “no change.” It was only when Bush and Blair met the challenge with a credible threat of military force that “change” was permitted to occur. Force was not merely an “option;” it was a necessity if change were ever to occur.
Similarly, with Iran today, efforts at a negotiated solution acceptable to all parties are futile. Conceptually, the Security Council members collectively could severely influence the Iranian regime’s behavior. Russia could single-handedly “change” the situation by joining our push for strong sanctions; and its alliance with the U.S. and European nations would, in turn, stop all Chinese resistance. Yet Russia’s investment in selling weapons and nuclear equipment to as well as securing its relationship with Iran renders the Security Council fully impotent to produce any “change.”
All behavior is instructive. When U.S. forces liberated Iraq in historic fashion, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and their money quickly flowed out of Iran. Many clearly feared Bush was going to turn U.S. troops 90 degrees into Iran. Consequently, Iran cooperated to some degree in the U.S. tracking of al Qaeda in an attempt to reduce the possibility of U.S. force being utilized against it. We “taught” Iran to be more cooperative.
It was only when, shortly thereafter, the anti-war Bush-hating forces were fully mobilized that Iran began to see how reluctant to use force much of America was. The more convinced that force would not be used, the more empowered Iran became in being able to duck, dodge, delay, and disregard all attempts to persuade it to stop its enrichment program. Again, we “taught” Iran to behave in this fashion as well.
(Following what it argues was provocation, Russia responded with force in Georgia. Very few in the Kremlin seem concerned with Russia’s place in the world, much less making sure that all diplomatic avenues were first fully exhausted. China has few problems with Islamic terrorism because it reportedly snuffs out entire villages in response to the first signs of terrorist activity. Few there seem perturbed over China’s standing in the “world community.” These countries and others teach a very different lesson. Consequently, more often than not, these conflicts are resolved sooner rather than later).
Clearly, many U.S. factions have an interest in enabling this cycle of “no change.” The fantasy that a successful, peaceful resolution is still obtainable is so compelling that it blinds many to common sense. State Department-speak makes our public feel a little more safe with its references to “finding common ground,” and “explaining” to our counterparts certain (otherwise obvious) benefits they stand to acquire should they come around to our terms. Blaming President Bush for seemingly failing to “engage” allows us to continue the hope that our wish for peaceful relations with our enemies will come about. Barack Obama’s rhetoric concerning talking with our enemies continues the fantasy that with the proper negotiating skills, strategy, and the power of personality, the troublesome difficulties with Iran will settle. These fantasies create a “control factor”- the sense that we can truly control the dangerous threats we confront. The reality - the choice between an Iranian regime empowered with nuclear weapons and a military confrontation with Iran that will likely evolve severe retaliation - is too unnerving for most to accept.
Yet, without the credible threat of force, nothing will “change” and time will push us toward that critical moment when Iran becomes a nuclear weapons power, a “game-changer” as Obama would say. While military force of one kind or another may not be fully successful against, and may provoke devastating counter-attacks from Iran, it is the only action that will “change” the cycle of behavior that the various parties have settled upon. It may be that America is so “insane” that it desires the results we have always gotten from this behavior. More likely, certain powers have been so controlled by the State Department’s vision that American common sense has been shelved. By liberating Iraq, Bush had established a credible threat upon which effective negotiations could have taken place. The tragedy of Iraq is that America’s Left has caused that capital to be squandered.
The “military option” is not an option at all if “change” is what is truly desired. Rather, it is a “necessity” that is required in some form to transform the ineffectual process that has been at the center of our policy for years. The U.S. can play the dangerous game of continuing the cycle on the hope that it will somehow accurately determine when Iran is about to reach its goal, attempt to “negotiate” until then, and, if necessary, use force just as time runs out. Yet it is merely another fantasy that that time is ascertainable in advance and, as time goes by, America’s military advantage is quickly dissipating. (This thinking is a cover for no action because those who employ it will, at the supposed moment of final decision, reason that it is either too late or the tradeoffs too foreboding to risk force). Similarly, Israel can continue its fantasies of a “peace process” (more accurately described as the “extortion process”). They will both be better served, however, it they do not waste another moment and begin the process of teaching Iran and the Palestinians a new game. Until the “military option” is no longer viewed as an option but understood as a “necessity,” no “change” will occur, even under a President Obama.
FamilySecurityMatters.org Contributing Editor Bill Siegel lives in New York.
Reader Comments: Submit Your Comment (0)
| Print This E-mail This |
|
